The TOEV Pineios is the largest irrigation organization in terms of coverage in Larissa and one of the largest in Thessaly and Greece. Due to the vast geographical area it serves, it accommodates irrigators who rely on different techniques, as its network largely depends on surface water but also, to a smaller extent, on groundwater (approximately 50 boreholes). Overall, it manages an area of around 145,000 acres, which can reach up to 240,000 acres when supported by the Karla reservoir. The management of surface waters spans two Regional Units (the former prefectures) of Larissa and Magnesia, covering agricultural land that extends across more than 140 villages and towns in Larissa, Volos, Agia, and Velestino.Monitoring and safeguarding the open-channel network is of vital importance for protecting water quality, which is threatened both by industrial effluents and by free-rider practices from unauthorized irrigators who illegally exploit water resources through makeshift, non-permanent dams on the Pineios River. Yet, the most critical challenge facing the wider service area of the TOEV is the recurring summer water scarcity. Irrigation across the Pineios network is carried out through pipelines and pumping stations that channel water via cement canals into drainage/irrigation ditches or into twelve local water storage works. The pumping stations operate year-round, except in October and November, with the dual purpose of facilitating discharge during the winter months and ensuring water availability during the irrigation season (April 15 – September 15). The multiple pumping stations are essential for directing water flows, but toward the end of the irrigation season, and depending on rainfall in the preceding months, the available (released and running) water becomes insufficient. As a result, borrowing water from Lake Plastiras/Tavropos becomes necessary to ensure the smooth continuation of irrigation for all farmers. The dependence on the open-channel (surface water) system of the Pineios represents a distributive injustice for irrigators in the area, as the combination of evaporative losses during the hottest summer months and the occurrence of droughts exposes them to heightened vulnerability. In extended dry periods, neither the Gyrtoni weir nor the reserves of Lake Karla are sufficient to meet demand, leaving irrigators directly dependent on water transfers from the reserves of Lake Plastiras/Tavropos in Karditsa.
The inadequate conditions for balancing competitiveness due to differentiated irrigation practices represent a distributive injustice, as they affect not only the competitiveness of all irrigators of one TOEV compared to another, but also the members within the same TOEV, such as that of Pineios in Larissa. The horizontal pricing policy applied mitigates cost differentiation in irrigation across the open network among irrigators, since fees are equalized regardless of how many pumping operations from reservoirs are needed to deliver water to geographically dispersed users. However, this system does not provide any incentives for water savings within the network itself, as the fee is predetermined and detached from actual consumption. Furthermore, irrigators who depend on boreholes for their water supply are more vulnerable, as they must separately pay the cost of electricity required for pumping, in addition to the irrigation fee, an additional burden not faced by users of the open surface-water network.
The need for immediacy with producers was framed by the majority of stakeholders as a potential injustice in the event that TOEV administrations were removed under a possible centralised organisation of the new irrigation management body (ODYTH). The mediation role of the TOEV is a critical factor in smoothing relations among irrigators in cases of conflict over irrigation priority, water availability, and the distribution of limited water resources, as well as in coordinating the irrigation cycle. Immediacy in decision-making within the administration is of decisive importance for the smooth conduct of irrigation management during the summer period. This condition is particularly crucial for irrigated crops, as any malfunction of the irrigation system directly affects production, or in worse cases, the very survival of the crop. A delay in resolving a technical or other problem that obstructs irrigation is tantamount to crop destruction and the loss of expected income for the producer, something that generates significant pressure and requires rapid decision-making to address the issue.
The insufficient or limited funding of irrigation infrastructures by public authorities is perceived by TOEV representatives as a recognition injustice, since the expansion of the available means for completing irrigation directly affects both the planning and the operation of irrigation during the summer months. The transition to a closed irrigation network is acknowledged as the most important investment that could resolve most of the problems faced by TOEVs, and especially by the TOEV of Pineios, whose network largely relies on open channels. The transition to a closed system would save significant amounts of available irrigation water, as it would nearly eliminate transport losses due to seepage and evaporation, which occur mainly during the very hot summer months. In addition, it would allow for more effective control and monitoring of consumption, thereby reducing wasteful and careless use. Representatives of the TOEV of Pineios argue, however, that while a closed network may be a realistic solution for smaller operational areas, in large-scale applications, such as that of the Pineios TOEV, it is rather unlikely that the organization could support such a transition with its own resources or through bank loans (due to the requirement of high guarantees).Furthermore, the lack of implementation of major projects, such as the operation of the Mesochora and Sykia dams (and their associated works) to reinforce the Pineios from the Acheloos River, undermines long-term planning for securing the necessary reserves for irrigation. Similarly, the Gyftoni Dam, which falls under the jurisdiction of the competent Ministry, is not part of the TOEV’s irrigation planning, as it can only be used for three summer months, and in practice, it has operated only during the last two irrigation seasons (2022–2024).
The limited recognition of certain certifications by the market and by producers themselves highlights a core problem of technocratic design without a strategy for commercial integration. Although a range of certifications is based on high-level scientific analyses (relating to the bioactivity and quality of olive oil), they have not been accompanied by parallel efforts in promotion, visibility, and market linkage. Producers feel they have been given a “scientific certificate” that does not translate into economic benefit for the local community.
As a result, certification remains marginal in the market, without full exploitation of its potential, though it still offers some hope for the future.
Farmers perceive a deep asymmetry in the product evaluation process, feeling excluded from scientific dialogue and from co-shaping the tools and conclusions. Although they participate actively by providing data (olive samples, information on practices, environmental data), they receive no meaningful feedback or guidance on what the results mean in practical terms or on how to improve their product by making the necessary changes.
They are not told precisely what factors positively or negatively affected their product’s quality, nor do they have access to an evaluation framework that connects their cultivation decisions with the final outcome. Answers to their questions often fall short, as there is no concrete, evidence-based feedback on what worked and what did not. This creates uncertainty, frustration, and a sense of exclusion from knowledge, despite the fact that it is their own product.
The comment “We have the certification. And what do we do with it?” reflects the gap between scientific documentation and application: producers did not participate as knowledge holders in the shaping of the product, but functioned passively as data sources, without receiving actionable technical or commercial information in return. This represents their exclusion as equal interlocutors in the processes of knowledge creation, documentation, and commercial exploitation of the product, contributing to the widening gap between science and agricultural practice.
The insufficient inclusion of farmers in product evaluation stems from structural causes that make the process unequal and deficient. The approach of scientific teams remains academic-centered, relying on traditional knowledge roles and focusing on chemical analysis and documentation without actively integrating producers’ practical knowledge. The absence of feedback mechanisms means farmers provide data without receiving substantive responses or guidance on how to improve practices or use results. Moreover, evaluation and certification processes (such as AFQ) are developed without co-design, leaving producers outside the planning of a product that bears their name. Even before the planning stage, producers face a process of interpretation that turns their labour into a technical object, alienating them from it. The systematic undervaluing of agricultural experiential knowledge further deepens the divide between science and practice, turning producers from active contributors into passive informants.
Fragmentary information and the absence of systematic advisory support constitute a procedural injustice for farmers in Southwestern Magnesia. This is not merely a lack of technical assistance; it is a systemic failure of the institutional framework to ensure equal access to knowledge and agricultural guidance, regardless of farm size or location. For decades, information has been sporadic or commercially driven, and knowledge has been transmitted informally, by word of mouth—something that deepens producers’ sense of being left alone to manage complex issues (such as pest control, choice of active substances, and environmental compliance) without adequate scientific guidance.
The result is confusion, mistakes, income loss, and dependence on expensive private services, which substitute for what should be a public good. This is a procedural injustice because institutions do not ensure producers’ active and equal participation in the technical decision-making processes that directly affect them. This is not about farmers’ inability to adapt, but about the structural failure of public agricultural advisory policy, caused by a set of systemic factors: understaffing or complete absence of agronomists in the field—especially in remote areas—and the disconnect between scientific research and farming practice, since new knowledge does not reach producers in an organized way. The absence of an institutionalized local or regional advisory mechanism capable of tailoring guidance to the specificities of each area further compounds the problem.
The absence of an official, functional definition from the state regarding the status of traditional olive groves poses a serious obstacle for the local farming community. There is no clear and universally accepted interpretation of what constitutes a “traditional olive grove,” either as a landscape or as a cultivation system. While the uniqueness of groves with ancient trees, wild olive stock, irregular planting, and historical continuity is acknowledged, there is no official recognition or administrative guidance that would enable this uniqueness to be leveraged.
This creates confusion among producers and deprives them of access to subsidies, certifications (such as PDO/PGI), and development tools. The lack of a clear definition and institutional support undermines strategic efforts to promote olive-growing landscapes, hinders the creation of added value, and keeps the community in a state of insecurity and inability to assert its rights.
This is a structural procedural injustice, where the state fails not only to protect but also to recognize in a timely and substantive way the character of a living cultural and productive resource. The absence of a clear framework is due mainly to legislative fragmentation and administrative discontinuity, which create confusion as different bodies apply conflicting criteria without a unified definition. It is also due to the lack of scientific and cartographic documentation that would allow official designation of areas as traditional. Combined with the state’s lack of strategic vision for rural landscapes as developmental and cultural resources, this results in piecemeal policies and administrative inertia that foster insecurity and inaction, preventing communities from planning for their future.
Producer Groups were established under Law 4384/2016 to improve the competitiveness of agricultural products through collective production management and by strengthening producers’ bargaining power. Unlike cooperatives—which are more complex legal entities with their own statutes, boards of directors, cooperative shares, and obligations—Producer Groups focus primarily on joint marketing and distribution of products.
Although the state views collective organization as a key tool for supporting small producers and promotes it through the Strategic Plan of the CAP 2023–2027 in Greece (Intervention P3-77-1.1), farmers are skeptical about forming such structures. While they do not reject the idea of cooperation outright, they are forced to abandon it due to institutional, economic, and social barriers. According to producers, the legislation sets binding conditions (financial commitments, exclusive product supply, increased accounting costs) that are unrealistic for smallholders. Moreover, the eligibility criteria for support (number of members and a minimum marketed value of €100,000) are seen as prohibitive.
This pressure is compounded by the absence of institutional support mechanisms that could facilitate organization and viability. In addition, there is a lack of understanding among farmers about the role and potential of Producer Groups, which exacerbates mistrust and communication gaps. This difficulty is rooted in the historical trauma of failed cooperatives and the complete absence of guidance or substantive support from the state. Thus, the challenge of forming collective structures stems from a combination of structural obstacles, institutional shortcomings, and low levels of information.
Within local communities, there is widespread confusion and suspicion over who is truly an organic farmer. Producers speak of “organic in quotation marks,” indicating that the concept has lost its clear meaning. On one hand, there are producers who faithfully apply organic practices and believe in the process; on the other, there are certified producers who do not adhere to the principles of organic farming in practice, or do so only superficially. The latter category often enters programs solely to obtain subsidies and is enabled by limited oversight.
The injustice here is procedural, as genuine organic farmers are institutionally equated with those who fail to meet the necessary standards. This stems from the bureaucratic and subcontracted management of organic farming and the institutional framework’s inability to distinguish genuine practitioners—something that would require more frequent inspections of certified plots and products. Through certification and subsidy mechanisms (with state tolerance), “nominal” organic farmers are produced, creating both moral and financial burdens for those who truly follow the principles of organic agriculture. Thus, procedural injustice becomes an institutional problem of oversight.
Producers learn through scientific briefings that their product has distinctive qualitative attributes, such as high phenolic content. However, the absence of the necessary organizational and collective mechanisms renders this knowledge practically unusable. Theoretically, there is potential to enhance the product’s value, but the means to transition from knowledge to application are missing: there are no producer groups, no shared marketing structures, no standardization schemes, and no mechanisms to cover the costs of scientific support and promotion.
As a result, producers are trapped in a vicious cycle: for their product to gain added value, investment is required—yet such investment is impossible without access to appropriate markets. This deficit is not the result of individual inaction or lack of interest, but rather of organizational incapacity, whereby producers are excluded from participating in the processes that lead to quality upgrading and commercial exploitation of their product. The consequences are significantly distributive: knowledge remains unused, quality does not translate into economic value, and labour is not rewarded equitably.
Although the region’s olive oil is recognized as high quality, it lacks visibility, reputation, and commercial identity. The absence of institutional mechanisms for local identity, origin certification, and systematic branding results in the loss of both symbolic and commercial added value. The product is either sold in bulk and absorbed into other “strong” identities (e.g., Italian or other highly promoted Greek regions), or fails to compete due to the prohibitive costs of establishing an independent identity, costs that are comparatively higher than for already recognized areas (such as Kalamata or Crete).
This absence of organized institutional recognition deprives local producers of the right to benefit from the prestige of origin and quality, and constitutes a procedural injustice: the specificities and value of the local product are not protected institutionally, commercially, or culturally. Geographical origin, microclimate, cultivation practices, and historical continuity remain invisible, without effective mechanisms for standardization and certification that would secure the product’s distinct identity. The lack of bureaucratic infrastructure for recognizing local identity leaves the product “anonymous,” even when it is of exceptional quality. The community thus loses both the symbolic and economic capital that should accrue to it.
The causes of this injustice lie in the absence of collective mechanisms for standardization and marketing, in low levels of state support for developing local brands, and in the limited organizational cohesion among producers. At the time of the interviews in January 2024, the product had no geographical indication, though the PDO “Early Harvest Olive Oil of Pteleos (Agoureleo Pteleou)” is now under development, following coordinated efforts by the Region of Thessaly and the Municipality of Almyros.
Despite the recognized quality of the local olive oil, institutions and the state provide no substantive support for its standardization, promotion, or commercial positioning. Producers report that the state has not offered the necessary support, while they themselves are often unable even to participate in trade fairs or acquire basic technological tools for modernization—two key avenues that would enhance both visibility and cultivation. They also stress that the absence of state intervention in linking the product to the market deprives them of any opportunity to showcase it beyond the local level.
This situation concerns the unequal ability of producers to participate in the processes that determine the fate of their product. They lack access to support mechanisms (technical assistance, funding for standardization, promotional campaigns, export training), as well as to decision-making spaces or programs that would equip them to market their product as distinct. Although in theory they are allowed to participate, in practice they are excluded due to costs, lack of know-how, and the absence of state support. The processes of product promotion, certification, and export remain closed to small producers, leaving them dependent on intermediaries who capture the added value. The result is that the producer has no voice, no tools, and no equal standing in the agri-food chain.
This injustice stems from the long-standing inability of institutions to design support policies for small-scale, local production, from the lack of a decentralized branding strategy for Greek olive oil, and from institutional indifference to empowering producers themselves. Policies remain at the level of rhetoric or national narratives, without practical tools for small-scale producers in disadvantaged areas.
Producers possess deep experiential knowledge of cultivation, based on decades of practice, intergenerational transmission, and personal observation. As they themselves describe, they apply consistent practices over decades, have intimate understanding of the environment and conditions of each plot, and maintain an almost lived relationship with their profession.
Yet this knowledge is not recognized as valid or equal. It is neither recorded nor incorporated into planning, nor used as a basis for evidence in scientific or institutional interventions. Producers are treated as recipients of knowledge, not as co-creators of it, despite their ability to understand—and often to pinpoint—why samples performed poorly in tests.
This is a clear case of epistemic injustice: when knowledge, experiences, and perspectives are systematically undervalued, dismissed, or ignored due to prejudice or power imbalances. This injustice is rooted in a system that values only institutionalized, scientific knowledge while ignoring the contributions of lived experience, a bias embedded in institutional operations.
There are no institutional mechanisms for documenting and integrating local agricultural knowledge, nor communication channels that facilitate dialogue between science and practice. The cultural and social distance between scientific teams and rural communities reinforces this injustice, perpetuating the notion that experiential knowledge is “outdated” or “subjective.” As a result, producers are not only marginalized in terms of knowledge but also weakened in their role as equal partners in the production and utilization of their own products.
Differences among producers regarding the final product—whether to target table olives, high-quality extra virgin olive oil, or bulk lower-quality oil—constitute a procedural injustice when these priorities are shaped not by free choice but by unequal conditions of participation in the production system. Producers do not all have equal access to the resources, information, and institutional opportunities needed to form their strategies on equal terms.
While some can invest in quality and added value, others are compelled to focus on volume rather than quality, limited by infrastructure and financial capacity. Unequal access to critical infrastructure, such as modern olive mills essential for high-quality oil production, is a key factor. Many producers must work with outdated facilities that do not meet necessary standards, preventing them from supporting a premium product even if they wish to.
In addition, economic pressure and chronic lack of liquidity drive some producers to prioritize quantity for survival. The absence of collective planning and organized support leaves them to act alone, without access to shared strategies, technical guidance, or institutional tools that could help shape the direction of their production.
Across several regions of Greece, a common practice governs the delivery and processing of olives in mills: within a single facility or processing chain, organic produce is not given priority and is often incorporated into the conventional flow without distinct handling. As revealed in focus group discussions, this results in both practical and symbolic downgrading—the product is “in the middle,” without being recognised as something distinct.
This practice indicates that no special provision exists for processing organic olives, whether due to small quantities or to disregard for the need for separation. However, this non-separation can cause serious problems for organic producers: the allowable residue thresholds for organic olive oil are far lower than for conventional oil, so even minimal mixing can render the product unsellable in organic markets.
This constitutes a form of recognition injustice, since the belief and practical reality that organic produce is different—in terms of quality, philosophy, and handling requirements—is neither acknowledged nor respected. The product’s identity is muted or blurred. Moreover, the injustice has distributive consequences: without separate handling, the product risks losing its added value, and the producer may not be compensated proportionately, thus losing the premium they invested in creating.
The problem stems from the absence of institutional frameworks or technical infrastructure for distinct processing of organic olive oil, the lack of market demand for actively differentiated products, and the unwillingness of cooperatives or processing facilities to implement separation. Additionally, social devaluation or indifference towards organic production leaves producers powerless to demand fair treatment within the system.
Producers who choose organic farming—entailing greater effort, stricter requirements, and often lower yields—do not enjoy the social and economic recognition they deserve. They produce higher-quality and more environmentally friendly products, yet the market and compensation system do not meaningfully differentiate them, while their social profile remains marginalised or invisible.
The use of subsidies as a mere survival incentive suggests that the system pushes producers towards dependence on aid rather than towards a strategy that recognises the value of their work. The demand for recognition—not only in terms of price but also as symbolic appreciation of their efforts—remains unmet. This is not simply a matter of income; it is about institutional acceptance and social validation of the role that organic producers play.
The inability to utilise new technologies—such as drones, modern olive mills, and quality analyses—is particularly evident in the traditional olive groves of Southwestern Magnesia. While the technology exists and promises cost reductions and improved yields, access remains unequal. High initial investment costs and a lack of technical training act as barriers, leaving smaller and less organized producers outside the sphere of technological progress.
A striking example is the use of drones: producers acknowledge their usefulness for targeted spraying and monitoring of the olive fruit fly, yet purchase costs, the technical difficulty of operation, and the particularities of the terrain make this technology inaccessible for most. Similarly, oil analyses and certifications, which could highlight the qualitative superiority of the product, fail to translate into commercial advantage due to a lack of institutional support and effective marketing channels.
This inequality is not coincidental. It stems from four key factors: the high cost of investment, the lack of technical training, the absence of supportive institutions (such as producer groups and advisory services), and the mismatch between public programs and the real needs of small producers. The result is a clear form of distributive injustice: technological and commercial opportunities are concentrated among those who are already strong and organised, while small local farmers remain excluded and unable to benefit from innovation. Instead of reducing inequalities, technology widens the gap, establishing an uneven dynamic of development in the rural sector.
Producers face serious challenges in protecting their olive groves from key pests such as the olive fruit fly – dacus (Bactrocera oleae) and the olive moth (Prays oleae). The national olive fruit fly control programme, initiated in 1953, has in recent years become disorganised, with its implementation carried out in a perfunctory, mechanical manner, lacking scientific guidance or spatial differentiation. Sprays are sometimes applied in years with no production or without confirmed presence of the pest, by contractors subcontracted through the local Directorate of Rural Economy and Veterinary Services. Workers often cover only the roadside areas, without entering the fields.
Meanwhile, organic growers or those using mild pest control methods receive no meaningful support. They use their own traps, bear the costs themselves, and operate without technical assistance. At the same time, many of the most effective plant protection agents have been withdrawn from the market, while available alternatives (e.g., pyrethrins, calcium polysulfide) are questioned for their effectiveness.
The inability to provide effective pest protection disproportionately affects small-scale producers, organic farmers, and those in more remote areas, as they are forced either to spend money without tangible results or to remain exposed, taking on unavoidable risks. The state, while responsible for prevention, has created an implementation mechanism with limited effectiveness. This shifts the cost and responsibility for pest management onto the producer, creating an environment in which the weakest bear the greatest burden.
This injustice arises from the degradation of the public pest control system, the privatisation of implementation (via contractors with no technical accountability), the lack of technical expertise and pest population monitoring, and the withdrawal of effective control products without replacement. Agricultural policy does not adapt to field realities, makes no distinction between areas or production types, and leaves the most exposed producers to face the consequences of inadequate protection alone. In this context, where farmers are left vulnerable to the greatest threat to their annual income, some older producers recall with nostalgia the era of aerial spraying.
Agricultural subsidies are intended to support production viability and mitigate the effects of adverse conditions. In practice, however, the distribution system functions unfairly and unequally. Producers in high-cost areas (mountainous, rainfed, non-intensive cultivation) do not receive subsidies proportionate to their burdens. Instead, lowland areas with irrigated, intensive cultivation receive the same or even greater support, despite having more favourable conditions and significantly lower production costs.
At the same time, there are producers who declare cultivated land but do not actually work it, yet continue to receive subsidies. The lack of effective monitoring makes it difficult to assess actual activity, and bureaucratic rigidity leads to the allocation of resources to non-active or already advantaged producers, while active, small-scale, and vulnerable producers are excluded from meaningful support.
Subsidies are a primary mechanism for redistributing resources in the rural sector. When this redistribution fails to consider the real cost of production, the physical difficulty of cultivation, or spatial disadvantage, it becomes a mechanism for reproducing inequalities.
This situation constitutes an injustice stemming from the absence of spatially differentiated agricultural policy, bureaucratic indifference, and a lack of political will to direct support towards those genuinely producing under difficult conditions. Oversight mechanisms are inadequate, targeting is weak, and implementation occurs without socio-spatial criteria.
Following the extreme weather event “Daniel,” many producers faced the complete loss of access to their agricultural plots. Damage to essential rural infrastructure—roads, dirt tracks, and bridges—was so extensive that, in many cases, even pedestrian access became impossible. As a result, plots were cut off from the road network, making cultivation or harvesting indefinitely postponed and leading to the loss of the annual yield. This situation was not temporary: in many cases, restoration work did not proceed for weeks or even months, particularly in more remote locations.
The burden was not evenly distributed among the rural population: those with plots in more isolated or hard-to-reach areas were affected far more severely due to unequal spatial exposure, lacking both private means and state support to restore accessibility. Areas closer to settlements or with easier access recovered more quickly, while others remained cut off from their own production.
This injustice is linked to underinvestment in essential rural infrastructure, the absence of timely planning for natural disaster response, and unequal institutional reaction. By January 2024, when the focus groups were conducted, restoration mechanisms had still not completed repairs, despite repeated requests from those affected. As a result, producers perceive the (non-)response to the consequences of Storm Daniel as an act of injustice. In this case, vulnerability does not stem solely from nature: geographical conditions, combined with the absence of infrastructure and institutional responsiveness, transform a natural disaster into a structural injustice for the most remote producers.
Rural communities are increasingly experiencing climate change impacts that fully disrupt the olive cycle and affect both the quantity and quality of production. Some of the main issues include rising average temperatures, reduced rainfall, and more frequent extreme weather events, which stress olive trees and negatively affect their physiology and productivity. Additionally, higher winter temperatures can disrupt the necessary chilling hours required for normal flowering, leading to poor fruit set and thus lower yields.
These conditions are not unfamiliar to farmers in Southwestern Magnesia: they report off-season flowering (e.g., in October instead of March) and unusually high temperatures even in traditionally cold months. Extreme events such as hail not only cause immediate damage but also harm shoots that determine the following year’s crop. Fruitlessness is now recurring regularly, with entire years lost to production. In traditional groves dominated by old trees, these impacts are particularly severe.
The disruptions to seasonal cycles and the damage from individual events affect cultivation both immediately and over the long term, threatening farmers’ economic survival. Crucially, this vulnerability is not evenly distributed: traditional groves, due to their location, the age of the trees, and the absence of irrigation or technical interventions, are disproportionately affected.
Within the local community, some producers have less capacity to recover: they rely on long-established cultivation practices, have no crop diversification due to monoculture, and are entirely dependent on the year’s yield for survival. In contrast, more modernised producers or those in more favourable locations (with irrigation, access to technical support, or additional crops) can absorb some of the risk. Similarly, younger producers with better access to information and higher education levels are better positioned than older farmers or those lacking the knowledge to adopt alternative practices. Losses, therefore, are not just a natural phenomenon but become an unequal socio-economic burden.
This injustice stems from the combination of climate disruption with the absence of support or compensation mechanisms. There is no timely forecasting, indemnity scheme, or technical guidance for adapting to new conditions—nor any study based on predictive scenarios. The lack of policy to protect traditional farmers from the climate crisis, coupled with limited access to technological tools and information, leaves these communities exposed and without adaptive capacity. This creates a new divide between “resilient” and “vulnerable” producers, with the latter paying the cost of climate transition without assistance or compensation.
Despite the high quality of olive oil produced in Southwestern Magnesia, the vast majority is sold in bulk, without packaging or commercial identity. It is widely known among local producers that large volumes are sold either through intermediaries or directly by producers, mainly to Italian and Spanish traders, who blend them with other oils. During transport, the oil is shipped in tankers, unbottled, and sold as anonymous raw material, which buyers then market under their own brands abroad. In many cases, Greek oil is mixed with oils from other countries, such as North African ones, and sold as a “European” product.
This means that producers bear the full cost of producing, caring for, and harvesting a high-quality product but receive no compensation for its added value. The benefit from quality, organoleptic characteristics, and local identity does not return to the local community. Instead, it is transferred to intermediaries and final exporters, who capitalise on it through bottling, branding, and marketing networks abroad.
The inequality lies in the fact that one link in the chain (the producer) shoulders the entire production burden, while another (the trader/reseller) captures most of the economic benefit. This is not an individual failure but a systemic mechanism that diverts wealth from the local community to more powerful commercial actors. The absence of local bottling facilities, the lack of a coherent national export strategy, the absence of policy support for collective marketing initiatives, and the dominance of intermediaries make bulk export the only option for most producers. Commercial weakness is accompanied by a lack of recognition: even when the oil is excellent, it carries no name, certification, or access to markets where its quality could be valued. The added value thus consistently migrates out of the area, reproducing a chronic and structural distributive injustice.
In large parts of the region, farmers lack access to water—even for basic needs. In Amaliapoli, drinking water itself is scarce; in Achilleio, residents have no drinking water; and in Sourpi, water quality issues persist. There are no irrigation works, and boreholes yield little or nothing, often with salinity levels that render them unsuitable for irrigation. Producers cannot irrigate even occasionally and must rely on rainfall, which is increasingly unreliable. Meanwhile, other areas—such as the Almyros plain or Larissa—have access to organised irrigation networks, allowing for extensive watering, which in turn increases productivity. Water, as a critical productive resource, is thus unequally distributed.
Irrigated crops enjoy multiple advantages: more stable and increased productivity, potential for intensification, better fruit quality, and significantly reduced risk of production loss during drought or extreme heat. In contrast, rainfed crops are fully dependent on weather conditions and exposed to every instability without any compensatory mechanism. The result is an unequal geographical distribution of income and opportunities, especially since the traditional Amfissis (Konservolia) variety performs better in the irrigated areas of Almyros, creating direct economic competition between the two production zones.
This injustice stems from the absence of basic infrastructure: irrigation canals, high-quality boreholes, and collective water management systems. Many producers were not even aware of the existence or role of Local Land Reclamation Organisations (TOEV). Traditional rural populations have not benefited from development policies that elsewhere implemented irrigation systems and technologically upgraded agriculture. Despite the need and willingness for improvement, the state has not supported the necessary infrastructure, leaving certain areas excluded from productive development due to unequal access to a fundamental natural resource.
Research findings reveal a systematic inability among producers to gather the necessary capital to store, process, or market their produce on their own terms and sell it later—whether privately or collectively. In both olive oil and table olives, storage has been a core part of production for decades: after milling, olive oil can be stored in tanks under appropriate conditions, while table olives are placed in tanks (large plastic storage barrels). Preservation in tanks relies on natural or controlled fermentations in brine, which deactivate pathogenic microorganisms, reduce bitterness, and extend the product’s commercial shelf life. This allows for sales months after the harvest period, when prices traditionally rise.
However, the rising costs of cultivation and farm management make producers economically vulnerable, even when production is of high quality. On one hand, equipment such as storage tanks is extremely expensive; on the other, producers are often forced to sell their oil immediately to pay labour costs, leaving them with no bargaining power. This means they cannot manage their product as a valuable asset with commercial prestige and longevity—both due to the high current costs of cultivation and harvest, the lack of capital for investment in equipment, and their dependence on local sales channels stemming from insufficient collective management structures.
Therefore, the inability to store and manage produce is a clear expression of distributive injustice in the primary sector. It is not merely a technical or economic problem, but a structural phenomenon of unequal access to resources, opportunities, and strategic choice.
The reduction in the available agricultural workforce has led to heightened competition among producers. Seasonal demand for workers, especially during harvest, cannot be adequately met by the existing labour pool. Demand exceeds supply, and workers, now in a stronger bargaining position, choose where to work based on higher pay or less demanding conditions. This results in constant movement from one farm to another, with workers “leaving” one producer for another who offers more money or less time pressure.
Producers with supplementary income streams—such as part-time farmers, retirees, public sector employees, or owners of rental accommodation—are in a privileged position, as they have the financial liquidity to secure the desired workforce by offering higher wages.
This particular injustice stems from the overall deregulation of the rural labour market and the absence of any institutional framework for managing labour supply and demand. The migration of many workers to other countries or sectors, the avoidance of precarious and uninsured agricultural work, and the absence of policies to strengthen agricultural labour have created these conditions. In this environment, producers are forced to compete without rules, following the logic of “whoever pays more wins.”
The privileged position of those with supplementary incomes allows them to offer higher wages or more flexible terms, securing the available workforce first. Professional farmers, with fixed costs, limited incomes, and greater dependence on their production, cannot compete under these terms. The result is the de facto transfer of the scarce resource of labour to those who are more financially flexible, at the expense of the most vulnerable full-time agricultural professionals.
Thus, a tripartite structure of local producers emerges: professional farmers, part-time farmers with another main job (or income), and owners of family or inherited land. These three groups compete for the available workforce, intensifying inequalities.
Agricultural production in Southwestern Magnesia relies heavily on manual labour. Producers depend on external workers to meet core cultivation needs: harvesting, spraying, pruning, and transportation. A large proportion of agricultural labourers are foreign nationals (estimated at up to 90%), mostly from Balkan countries such as Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania. However, the availability of these workers has dramatically declined over the last decade. Workers who were once steadily available and affordable are now either entirely absent or have moved to other sectors or abroad.
Local producers now face intense competition for a limited workforce, which demands increasingly higher wages. The problem is not only financial but also temporal and operational. Not all producers can plan their production processes consistently because of the uncertainty of securing workers, and the longer the fruit remains on the trees, the more vulnerable it becomes to weather damage or disease. Often, producers must carry out the work themselves, leading to exhaustion—especially for older farmers or small family holdings with no alternative support—or they must pay high amounts, resulting in financial losses.
Dependence on labour creates uncertainty and an unequal distribution of both costs and effort. Producers without access to a stable, available, and affordable workforce are forced either to pay more or to overexert themselves physically to maintain production. This cost is neither reflected in the product’s price nor recognized by the market. In contrast, areas with easier access to workers or less need for external labour are at an advantage.
The causes include the general shortage of agricultural labour, the migration of workers to other countries or urban centres, the absence of state measures to support agricultural labour (e.g., subsidized wages or organized access to workers through bilateral agreements), and the ageing of the local population. The burden falls disproportionately on smallholders who have no alternative.
In the traditional olive groves of Southwestern Magnesia, cultivation takes place on land with rugged relief, rocky surfaces, narrow passages, and steep slopes reaching or exceeding 30%. This particular morphology makes the use of modern agricultural machinery almost impossible, leaving farmers without the option to modernise their cultivation practices. They are thus forced to rely almost entirely on manual labour: spraying, pruning, harvesting, and transportation are carried out by hand or with minimal support from basic tools. In some cases, even access to the groves requires walking or using 4×4 vehicles. The result is a high annual operating cost borne entirely by the farmer, with uncertain returns on investment.
These producers bear a disproportionate cost for the same or even lower output compared to producers in lowland areas (such as the neighbouring plain of Almyros), where full mechanisation, irrigation, and lower-cost intensive cultivation are possible. As a result, farmers in mountainous areas face an unequal distribution of costs without compensation through added value or state support. At the same time, they may own capital—land, plant stock, or production capacity—but cannot fully utilise it, thus experiencing a double injustice.
This injustice arises from a combination of geomorphological constraints, lack of infrastructure (roads, irrigation works), absence of technologically adapted solutions for sloped terrains, and, most importantly, a lack of policies that take spatial particularities into account in agricultural production. This is not an individual inability, but a structural condition of unequal burden.
The gradual loss of color in apples grown in lower zones is already a clear sign of the unequal adaptive capacity of different areas in the face of new climatic conditions. Producers experience first-hand that the same crop, within the same geographical unit, is subjected to uneven environmental pressures depending on altitude. This is not only an economic downgrade for those in lower zones but also a deeper form of injustice: the gradual inability to maintain production quality remains invisible within policy or social recognition of the problem. In this way, climate change does not only impact production volume, but also introduces new, informal inequalities, leading to a condition of recognition injustice.
The combination of spatial saturation and institutional restrictions defined by the PDO framework can generate a set of distributive injustices. According to producers and interviewees, the total available land for apple cultivation has been completely exhausted, with no room for further planting. The cooperative cannot expand either into other areas or through more intensive cultivation methods, as yield per stremma has already reached the maximum achievable level, despite producers’ efforts to boost productivity through means such as optimising irrigation. Even in cases where there are adjacent plots with an agricultural past, their current classification as forest land acts as a deterrent to any agricultural use, depriving producers of the possibility of horizontal expansion. Tree replacement is mainly limited to diseased plant stock and the gradual transition to trees with dwarf rootstocks, reflecting a trend towards technological adaptation within the existing limits.
At the same time, the geographical and qualitative stability imposed by the PDO, with its restricted production zone (Zagora, Pouri, Makryrachi) and strict climatic and soil criteria, acts as a mechanism that confines cultivation within predetermined boundaries. Although there is a desire to increase production, there is also recognition of the pressing need to adapt to new and changing climatic, agricultural and commercial conditions. Overall, there is broad acceptance of maintaining the limitations set by the PDO specifications. These boundaries are neither contested nor expected to be expanded, indicating that the priority is to safeguard the product’s quality stability.
Producers clearly highlight the gap between the actual requirements of organic cultivation and the public image of such products—particularly among consumers. Many mistakenly perceive organic products as “unsprayed,” overlooking the fact that they require strict adherence to protocols, intensive care, and the use of approved natural formulations. In many cases, interventions are more frequent than in conventional agriculture. This misconception devalues the labour and technical expertise of organic farmers. Consumers reject products for aesthetic reasons, such as a blemish or imperfection on an apple, without understanding the meaning of purity in organic farming. This creates a recognition injustice: the work, knowledge, and effort of producers are not acknowledged as valid or valuable within the consumer system. Recent studies confirm the limited interest of Greek consumers in organic products.
Although the availability of organic products has grown (estimated at around 5,000 product codes), consumption has shown only a modest increase—from 2% in 2002 to 6–10%—and Greece remains among the last in Europe in per capita consumption of organic products (ECA, 2024). High prices are one of the main deterrents, as a related survey found that only 29% of respondents said they would not mind paying a higher price for organic food (Focus Bari, 2024). This is further supported by the fact that Greek consumers place less importance on the certification process of food compared to consumers in other European countries (Eurobarometer, 2022).
Consumer resistance is not merely a matter of insufficient information—it signals a structural absence of meaningful communication channels between production and consumption. Neither the state, nor institutions, nor the market have invested in mediating this relationship, leaving producers exposed to consumers who demand “clean” products without understanding what that entails in practice. The lack of comprehension regarding the costs, practices, and specificities of organic cultivation leads to a recognition injustice, as the experience, effort, and expertise of organic farmers are overlooked. In this way, not only is the work of producers undermined, but so too is the broader potential of organic farming as a sustainable choice.
The large-sized Starking apple is deeply intertwined with the agricultural life of Zagora. However, other sizes exist that deviate from the brand-like image of this symbolic variety. The growing share of small apples in Zagora is directly linked to changing climatic and environmental conditions—drought, water scarcity, poorer soils. Although the small apple marketed by the cooperative is of the same quality as the large one, it is commercially undervalued, with differentiation based solely on size rather than quality or production process, which remains identical across all stages: hand-picking, sorting, packaging, certification. Nevertheless, the small apple is sold at a significantly lower price, reflecting not its true value but a consumer bias that equates larger size with superior quality.
Producers recognise the need for new commercial networks and marketing strategies, as production realities evolve. The small apple could, in fact, become an advantage: it generates less waste, is more convenient for consumption, and caters to different consumer patterns—as indicated by demand in certain foreign markets. However, this new reality demands adapted practices and strategic adjustments to meet changing conditions.
The destruction of critical infrastructure in Zagora by Storm Daniel exposed severe inequalities in access to essential goods and services. Producers reported the complete loss of irrigation networks—pump stations, water tanks, hoses—built through significant investments and expectations. Following the flood, not only was there no substantial restoration, but the interventions carried out were makeshift and temporary, without state support, at least up to the time of the interviews in April 2024. This has left producers facing enormous operational costs and the risk of production loss, without equal protection or assistance.
Significant damage was also recorded in the road network, including the collapse of bridges, interrupted access to villages, and severe roadway destruction. Product distribution was directly affected: trucks were unable to reach loading points normally, forcing transport to take place in a fragmented and precarious manner. Loading and delivery procedures slowed considerably, as they required detours through improvised or inadequately repaired routes, which increased both distribution costs and times, further burdening an already strained productive activity.
Limited access to water in Zagora constitutes a field of pronounced distributive injustices, as equal irrigation opportunities are not guaranteed for all producers. Despite the importance of water for apple cultivation—given that apples have high water requirements—irrigation infrastructure is not evenly developed across all villages in the area. According to producers, functional networks exist only in Zagora itself, while in other villages projects are rudimentary. This uneven distribution means that farmers in certain areas start from a disadvantaged position, without adequate or reliable water supply, directly affecting their productive capacity and income. Some producers tap springs for irrigation, while others have no access at all, with severe consequences for tree productivity. It is widely acknowledged that a better irrigation system would significantly improve production, yet the limited infrastructure and the seasonal use of natural streams by some producers yield only modest results.
The destruction of key irrigation infrastructure during Storm Daniel dramatically worsened the situation. Producers describe how costly and labor-intensive projects were completely destroyed, with no meaningful restoration or official updates from the state. Those without private alternatives—such as water tanks—are now left without water and, consequently, without production. Moreover, while drawing water from aquifers is not institutionally prohibited, it is extremely difficult in practice, as the development of new boreholes is subject to strict restrictions and requires special licensing. The dependence of production on rainfall underscores the vulnerability of the local agricultural model, with small-scale producers—who have limited resources and no margin for loss—bearing a disproportionate impact. A coordinated water resource management plan, adapted to the area’s geographical complexity, has not been translated into viable technical solutions with state support. In addition, after natural disasters, infrastructure restoration appears to proceed with significant delays.
The transition to organic farming, as promoted institutionally, creates significant distributive injustices, particularly in mountainous and hard-to-reach areas such as Zagora, Pelion. While in theory it represents a sustainable and desirable production model, in practice it fails to account for the unequal starting points of producers. The demands of organic cultivation—increased spraying, meticulous management, manual grass cutting, strict protocol adherence—are especially difficult to implement in terraced plots and scattered or sloped farmland where mechanisation, including tractor use, is impossible. As a result, small-scale producers bear a disproportionate burden, as all tasks must be carried out manually, with higher costs in both time and labour.
In addition, legal requirements for product segregation, specialised storage, laboratory analyses, and organic certification impose substantial financial costs on producers, without meaningful subsidies or support. Moreover, producers note that converting one plot to organic requires the conversion of all similar plots to the same system. On the market side, the premium on organic products is inconsistent, and prices remain only marginally higher than those for conventional produce. Although gradual efforts are being made to establish organic apples in the marketplace, they have yet to secure a significant share. This means that access to the benefits of organic farming—better prices, entry into niche markets, positive environmental impact—is not equal for all. Those with capital, more favourable land, or better access to information and infrastructure have higher chances of success.
In this way, existing inequalities in the agricultural field are reinforced. The causes of this unequal distribution of opportunities are found at multiple levels—from the historic absence of support for small-scale and mountainous producers to the lack of technical assistance and the complexity of the institutional framework. Although the Cooperative set up a certified packing facility for handling organic apples as early as 2009 and launched its own organic apple label in 2017, organic apple production remains very low (around 2.5%), with ambitions for future growth.
Labour shortages in Zagora expose a series of distributive injustices that primarily affect small-scale and less resilient producers in semi-mountainous areas. The region relies almost entirely on manual labour for cultivation, harvesting, and tree maintenance due to its steep terrain and the impossibility of mechanisation, with the greatest labour demand occurring during the harvest period from August to February. During this time, the cooperative’s workforce expands by around 120 seasonal workers. This means that the availability and cost of labour are critical factors for the viability of local agriculture.
Traditionally, daily wages in Zagora have been higher than in other producing regions, further increasing production costs. In the past, most labour needs were met by foreign workers (mainly Albanians), who gradually integrated, acquired specialised skills, and became cooperative members. Today, however, labour supply has declined, creating a continuity crisis and a loss of expertise, with no effective replacement mechanism in place. The children of migrant workers who joined the local economy do not continue agricultural work, while policies to bring in workers from third countries overlook the need for specialised skills such as pruning, spraying, and harvesting. This current crisis is rooted in the lack of a long-term state strategy for managing agricultural labour, the absence of retraining or integration mechanisms for new workers, and the inability of existing policies to meet the specialised skill requirements of Zagora’s mountainous agricultural model.
The commercial success of a single variety (the Starking apple) led local production to focus overwhelmingly on the cultivation of the red apple. As producers themselves note, although apple cultivation has a centuries-long history in Pelion, it acquired “near-monoculture” characteristics only in recent decades. The mass adoption of Starking was driven not by agronomic resilience but by marketability and consumer demand: its colour, taste, appearance, and storability made it attractive to buyers and built strong value chains. The dominance of this variety curtailed the equivalent development of other local apple varieties—such as Firiki, Golden, or Fuji—as well as other crops, such as kiwifruit.
While Starking became a symbol of Zagora’s success—with about 95% of its apples carrying PDO status—it also heightens vulnerability to climate change-related phenomena. A telling example is Storm Daniel in September 2023, which struck during the harvest season, causing a loss of 10% of plant capital. For a smallholding-based region like Zagora, this scale of loss is particularly severe, as small-scale producers lack the financial capacity to absorb such shocks. For them, losing 10% can mean forfeiting an entire year’s income or even being unable to meet basic obligations. Although the Municipality of Zagora acted swiftly to collect the harvest and salvage part of the yield, no plan for compensation has yet been announced. In this way, a natural event is transformed into a distributive injustice that amplifies the already unequal position of the most vulnerable actors in the production system. The roots of the injustice lie not only in the scale of the damage but also in the absence of preventive risk management mechanisms, such as local emergency plans or provisions for insurance coverage. Beyond the risk of extreme weather events, the emergence of new diseases due to climate change and shifting market demand under competitive pressure further increase the sensitivity of agricultural systems—and of the communities that depend directly on local production.
The case of Zagora reveals pronounced distributive injustices linked to small and highly fragmented landholdings. The activities of the cooperative’s members cover approximately 12,000 stremmata, with producers noting stark differences in the size of holdings, and output per producer ranging from as little as five tonnes to well over one hundred tonnes. Although the average is around 15 stremmata per producer, the dispersion is significant, with serious implications for equal access to resources, benefits, and resilience. Small holdings limit the ability to invest, diversify crops, or participate in schemes such as organic farming or certified integrated management. Small-scale producers, who lack the capacity for mechanisation or economies of scale, bear a disproportionate burden from both natural disasters and the stringent requirements attached to new agricultural standards. As one producer put it, “with a small holding you don’t have much room to lose,” underlining how much more vulnerable smaller farmers are compared to their larger and more powerful counterparts. The historical distribution of land, the absence of a land restructuring policy, and increasing competition from more extensive and mechanised farming models (e.g. Imathia, Kastoria) entrench this unequal situation and exacerbate the uneven access of individual producers to markets. These entrenched characteristics are partially mitigated through the functioning of the agricultural cooperative.
A key issue raised by representatives concerns the equal treatment of TOEVs by the State, namely inclusion. Inclusion refers to the recognition of local needs and the participation of smaller-scale and less powerful TOEVs in critical decisions that affect the future of a community’s irrigators. There is a prevailing perception that larger TOEVs in terms of geographic coverage, as well as those located geographically closer to the centers of political power, receive preferential treatment, both in resolving their problems and in being prioritized in decision-making processes. A telling example of this injustice is that, although the TOEV of Lake Karla exists institutionally and functionally, in practice it has no authority or participation in decision-making regarding the lake’s management, despite its close geographic proximity to it.
The need for direct engagement with producers was interpreted by the majority of stakeholders as a potential injustice in the event that the administration is distanced from the Local Land Reclamation Organizations (TOEV) through a possible centralization of the new irrigation management body (O.D.Y.TH.). The mediation role of TOEV is a critical factor in smoothing relations among irrigators in cases of conflicts over irrigation priority, availability, and distribution of water resources, as well as in organizing the irrigation cycle. Within this context, it was also argued that the application of technologies (e.g., water meters) does not inherently guarantee the smooth operation of irrigation allocation, since such technical solutions are vulnerable to sabotage unless a culture of trust and “good practice” among irrigators is first established.
The inability of the state to regulate electricity prices, combined with the lack of prioritization of TOEBs for funding energy projects that would contribute to their energy autonomy (through net metering or other forms of interconnected or battery-based autonomous systems), is recognized as a critical injustice that increases the fixed operating costs of crops dependent on groundwater irrigation. This injustice has a twofold impact. On one hand, it represents an additional burden for producers who rely on boreholes, raising their cultivation costs compared to other irrigators using closed networks, surface water, or even flood irrigation. On the other hand, the higher irrigation costs lead some producers to be unable to meet their contractual obligations and cover their irrigation fees to the organizations. This debt is then carried as a “loss” by the TOEVs, deteriorating their financial stability and affecting the social relations between the board members and these producers within their local communities.
Access to funding and opportunities for investment in irrigation networks constitutes a distributive injustice that particularly affects smaller Local Land Reclamation Organizations (TOEVs). Investments in network maintenance and modernization are crucial for ensuring infrastructure stability and achieving water savings. One of the most important ongoing transitions is the shift to closed irrigation networks, which maximize water conservation in the distribution system, coupled with changes in on-farm practices such as drip irrigation. However, the financial aspect—the high cost of implementing this transition remains a significant obstacle. Two structural characteristics of geographically small TOEVs exacerbate this problem: the limited size of their service area (and thus the small number of farmers served) and their restricted capacity for economic growth, which is directly tied to their financial resilience. A small geographical jurisdiction translates into a limited base of fee-paying irrigators, resulting in smaller reserve funds collected through irrigation fees. Consequently, these organizations often struggle to cover fixed operating costs, including staffing permanent positions to address technical and administrative needs. In many cases, such needs are only partially met by members of the board or, when financially feasible, by hiring external collaborators. Securing access to funding frameworks requires the preparation of technical studies and meeting numerous bureaucratic requirements, tasks that often exceed the administrative and technical capacity of these smaller TOEVs. This capacity gap results in their exclusion from financing opportunities, further deepening existing inequalities. In the aftermath of recent disasters, the primary concern of these organizations’ boards has been the restoration of their damaged networks, leaving even fewer resources and capacities available for pursuing modernization and sustainable infrastructure upgrades.
The inadequate conditions for leveling competition in production costs, arising from different irrigation practices, constitute a distributive injustice as they are directly linked to available infrastructure, the geographic location of irrigators, and the geological composition of soils. The method of irrigation is closely tied to either increasing or reducing production costs. The largest single cost in production is the electricity required to operate a borehole. Irrigators in the area acknowledge that those with access to the Lake Karla network hold a privileged position compared to those relying on boreholes to irrigate their crops. The use of pumps in such cases significantly increases production costs, thereby reducing farmers’ net income. In some instances, the operation and maintenance of a borehole is deemed an unprofitable irrigation practice, particularly when it suffers frequent operational problems and when rising electricity prices further burden costs. This situation leads many farmers to abandon irrigated crops, either entirely or in large part, when the combined expenses of repair and pumping (depending on irrigation depth) surpass production costs or leave only minimal profit margins. Following flood-related damages, the repair and maintenance of destroyed boreholes has emerged as yet another major challenge for producers in Thessaly.
The lack or insufficiency of water availability, especially during the summer months due to local specificities [depleted aquifers, drought], constitutes a distributive injustice in the sense that it concerns the equitable distribution of resources and access to them. In the case of Magnesia Prefecture and the Local Land Reclamation Organization (TOEV) “Lake Karla,” which serves irrigators from Velestino – Stefanovikeio – Rizomylos, access to the Karla irrigation network is of pivotal importance for the economic viability of local farmers. The re-establishment of Lake Karla in Thessaly, aiming at the broader development of the area, began with national funding and co-financing from the 3rd Community Support Framework (CSF) and the Operational Programme “Environment,” continuing with resources from the NSRF 2007–2013 and the Regional Operational Programme of Thessaly.
Lack of access to infrastructure such as the Karla network leads to reliance on the area’s groundwater resources, i.e., the use of boreholes for irrigated crop production. Borehole use not only increases pressure on the aquifer resulting in the gradual deepening of the water table, but also makes irrigators more vulnerable compared to others who use alternative irrigation sources such as direct supply from the (planned extension of the) Karla network. Moreover, access to the Karla network directly influenced crop variety choices associated with higher farm income (e.g., cotton, maize, alfalfa). As local irrigators report, in years when they had to rely solely on boreholes rather than the Karla network, they often reduced the area of irrigated crops they sowed out of “fear” that their pumps might fail or that there would not be enough water to secure a productive harvest, leading them to partially sow cereals (rainfed crops). At the same time, the pilot use of the Karla network significantly contributed to the replenishment of the local aquifer for as long as it was in operation.
Promyri farmers highlight the lack of equal and independent access to agronomic knowledge as a critical problem affecting both production and their adaptability. The absence of local public agronomists, who could provide scientifically sound advice, has forced producers to depend on private agronomists who also act as commercial agents. This conflict of interest distorts the advisory role, turning technical expertise into a product for sale rather than a tool for farmer empowerment.
Small-scale producers, who often cannot afford private consultancy, lag behind in adopting improvement techniques, new pest management methods, or opportunities to increase productivity. Criticism of the Region and OPEKEPE reflects the state’s failure to provide institutional and tailored support through the permanent presence of agricultural specialists in every municipality or cultivation zone.
This asymmetrical access to knowledge and the lack of state interest in locally organised agronomic services amount to procedural injustice: small producers are excluded from information and decision-making, leaving them dependent, less competitive, and more vulnerable to the challenges of farming.
The withdrawal of Promyri’s olive producers from the state olive fruit fly (dacus) control programme is a clear example of procedural injustice and institutional failure. Farmers report that the program was designed and implemented without their participation or consultation, relying on a generic plan that ignored the area’s specificities—such as the lack of access to many olive groves due to the inadequate rural road network.
The control applications—implemented by the Directorate of Agricultural Economy of the Regional Unit, under the supervision of the General Directorate of Financial Services of the Ministry of Rural Development and Food—were haphazard, limited, and ineffective. State intervention amounted to collecting farmers’ contributions without delivering substantive results, as crews were understaffed, equipment was inadequate, and spraying was restricted to easily accessible plots.
The lack of personnel, low technical capacity, and absence of performance evaluation rendered the program costly and useless for most growers, who were ultimately forced to protect their crops themselves. The decision to withdraw from the program was therefore not a choice but a reaction to a failed system. The complete erosion of the state mechanism left producers more vulnerable to the olive fruit fly, especially those without the means to carry out bait sprays themselves.
Despite their ecological sensitivity—farmers are not opposed to the limited use of mild pesticides—the absence of an organised, effective state strategy, and the perfunctory rather than substantive implementation of prescribed procedures by local crews, has left them unprotected. Thus, producers’ inability to influence these processes and their withdrawal from a defective system are emblematic examples of institutional inertia that imposes both economic and social burdens on rural communities.
ELGA (Hellenic Agricultural Insurance Organization), the state agricultural insurance organisation, fails to meet the expectations of insured farmers regarding compensation for weather-related damage. The compulsory payment of contributions is seen as meaningless, as farmers do not receive tangible returns. Compensation amounts are determined within the framework of state aid programs, but the processes of assessment, recording, and payment are slow, insufficient, and in many cases non-existent. Producers question the system’s reliability, as despite submitting damage reports and related claims, the final outcome for most is either zero or negligible.
Interviewees referred specifically to two recent cases: fruitlessness (acorn drop) and Storm Daniel. Fruitlessness, which wipes out farm income—particularly in monoculture areas—is directly linked to climate change impacts and rising temperatures. However, it is inadequately covered by ELGA’s insurance framework despite the severity of the losses. Similarly, Storm Daniel, which caused extensive damage to crops and plant capital, did not lead to corresponding compensation, and in cases where payments were approved, the amounts were derisory and significantly delayed.
The problem goes beyond administrative inefficiency. It reflects the institutional inadequacy of ELGA’s insurance model, which has not been updated to address the new climatic conditions and the risks arising from the increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather events. As a result, the farmer’s relationship with the insurance body becomes one of unilateral burden, where contributions are compulsory but the protection for which they are supposedly insured is not delivered.
The “New Farmers” program is widely welcomed as a measure supporting young individuals entering the primary sector. However, in certain cases, instead of reinforcing genuine and active producers, it ends up erecting bureaucratic barriers. Specifically, the current provisions do not include individuals already employed in agriculture who are (or were) insured at OGA (Agricultural Insurance Organization). In contrast, it subsidizes individuals with no substantive connection to farming, provided they meet certain administrative or insurance criteria. As a result, the subsidy fails to reach those who produce and genuinely need support and instead benefits people who simply meet formal requirements and exploit them to collect additional funds, completely distorting the measure’s intended purpose.
Another serious issue concerns the use of the funds. In many cases, the amounts granted are not invested in cultivation or in modernizing agricultural activity but are instead spent on personal expenses, with no developmental orientation. This situation stems from an inadequate monitoring mechanism for the use of grants, which stands in stark contrast to the strict eligibility checks for program entry. Furthermore, the distribution of support is based more on land area than on actual productive activity, resulting in large landowners—whether or not they farm—being the main beneficiaries, while small and medium-sized producers, who depend entirely on agricultural work, are left on the margins.
This situation constitutes a form of procedural injustice, as it excludes active farmers from support and from participation in policy-making, locking measures that should be supportive into a vicious circle of bureaucracy and compliance with purely formal criteria. The result is the discouragement of continuity in farming, the absence of feedback channels from farmers to the state, and the gradual abandonment of rural areas.
The limited support from the state for promotional and outward-oriented actions, such as participation in trade fairs and commercial missions, is highlighted by farmers as one of the key weaknesses of the system. They report that they have no access to support mechanisms and are not included in relevant programmes, resulting in them bearing the full cost of participation in promotional events, both within and outside Greece.
Those who manage to represent Pelion’s products in international exhibitions do so at their own expense, which drastically limits the possibility of repeating or expanding such initiatives. The lack of recognition of local olive products, despite their quality, is a direct consequence of this neglect. In contrast to other regions of Greece, such as the Peloponnese or Crete, where cooperatives, regional authorities, and state bodies work together to promote local products, Pelion has no mechanism for systematic promotion.
The cooperative remains inactive in terms of marketing, while the state does not invest in actions to support local production at either national or international level. The absence of institutional provision for product outward orientation, and the need for producers to self-finance promotional efforts without support, reveals a deep inequality in the distribution of opportunities for market access.
The problem is not only economic but also political, as the institutions and policies that shape the agri-food landscape do not integrate the voices and needs of producers. The limited communication and absence of support tools deprive them of the opportunity to strengthen their competitiveness and perpetuate their economic and institutional marginalisation.
Olive producers in Promyri experience a persistent exclusion from agricultural policy-making processes, both at local and national levels. As they themselves emphasise, they have no meaningful involvement in decisions that directly affect their income, cultivation methods, or the survival prospects of their holdings. Their experience is not sought, their opinions are not heard, and their concerns remain outside the institutional field of dialogue, leaving them feeling permanently “on the outside.”
The absence of institutional channels of communication with central or local administration, the lack of information and access to consultations, and the marginalisation of geographic areas such as Magnesia create a sense of chronic institutional exclusion. Comparison with other regions (such as Karditsa or Messinia) shows that elsewhere producers have political support, access to institutional tools, and opportunities for negotiation. In contrast, in Pelion, the indifference of local and national authorities, combined with a lack of organisation and representation, has left producers without a voice.
At the same time, the complexity of bureaucracy and the financial costs of participation (in objections, legal processes, travel to Ministries, etc.) act as deterrents. Producers report that they lack the knowledge, time, and money to defend their interests, resulting in their practical exclusion from any institutional participation. This systematic absence of substantive involvement — whether due to state negligence or institutional barriers — constitutes an obstacle to the democratic principle of representation, leads to an unequal distribution of opportunities and resources, and thus represents a procedural injustice.
The “Amfissis” variety, also known as “Konservolia,” is a traditional, large-fruited olive variety that dominates in the Pelion region and is closely tied to the local agricultural identity. Its fruit is mainly intended for table use, as it possesses excellent organoleptic characteristics, good appearance, and high commercial value. Although the variety has been granted PDO recognition, producers stress that there is no adequate support for its preservation, enhancement, and promotion.
Despite its qualitative superiority and deep cultural roots, this local plant capital remains invisible in the eyes of the state. Table olive cultivation requires more intensive care compared to other varieties, as commercial value depends on the size, texture, and appearance of the fruit. It also requires access to water, which is often limited, as well as frequent and timely harvesting. Nevertheless, there are no targeted support measures or programmes for this variety from the relevant Ministry, as is observed in other regions and for other varieties (e.g., “Kalamon” or “Chalkidiki”).
The gradual undervaluation and abandonment of the variety are not due to its quality or to farmers’ choices, but rather to the fact that the institutional framework fails to recognise the need to preserve and strengthen plant resources with local characteristics. The lack of recognition and support for Amfissis as a cultural, agronomic, and commercial asset leads to its marginalisation, despite its long-standing value and importance to local communities. This neglect creates conditions of declining production, low productivity, and ultimately, abandonment of an agricultural resource that has been adapted to the area for centuries.
The shortage of agricultural labour is one of the most critical and urgent problems faced by farmers in South Pelion. Given the particularly rugged terrain, mechanisation of tasks is limited. Consequently, a large part of the production process (harvesting, pruning, spraying) relies exclusively on manual labour. In this reality, agricultural workers constitute a key pillar of agricultural production.
However, the available workforce, mainly migrant labourers, is shrinking. The short duration of residence permits granted in Greece — only three months — compared to other EU countries that offer permits of six or even nine months, makes the country uncompetitive as a destination for agricultural employment. Strict fines and bureaucratic obstacles exacerbate the problem, discouraging legal employment and leading to labour shortages during the harvest period.
Faced with the state’s inability to ensure a sustainable and fair framework for access to agricultural workers, farmers themselves are forced to fill the gap. Often, the entire family, regardless of age, participates in agricultural work. Elderly people, including retirees, work in the fields out of necessity rather than choice, in order to secure a minimum income that supplements meagre pensions.
This situation constitutes a form of misrecognition, as the state fails to acknowledge, at both institutional and practical levels, the need for stable and adequate access to labour for agricultural holdings, especially in areas with difficult conditions and low levels of mechanisation. Neglect of the labour dimension of agricultural production places the burden solely on farmers, leads to intensification of family labour, and traps them in a vicious cycle of physical exhaustion and economic insecurity.
The Pelion area is characterised by steep terrain, sloping land, and large, traditional olive groves. This geographic and morphological particularity makes agricultural work significantly more demanding compared to lowland areas. In South Pelion, the use of machinery is scarcely feasible, meaning that most tasks (such as pruning, harvesting, fertilising, and plant protection) are carried out manually, by workers or by the producers themselves.
The physical strain is high, the work is time-consuming, and daily wages are increased due to the difficulty of access and execution. However, these objective conditions are not institutionally recognised. This issue is also linked to subsidies, which no longer make distinctions based on terrain: lowland, semi-mountainous, and mountainous. These gradations entail higher degrees of difficulty for agricultural work, and in the past, they were accompanied by some form of support, which has now ceased.
The equalising logic of allocating subsidies based solely on crop type and area, without considering the specific challenges faced by farmers, further burdens an already strained sector, pushing more and more olive groves towards decline. The result is the gradual abandonment of olive groves, degradation of the landscape, and marginalisation of areas producing high-quality but “invisible” products.
The inability of the state, and particularly the Ministry, to adapt support policies to the real cultivation conditions and to differentiate treatment according to geomorphology and the needs of each area perpetuates inequalities and weakens the prospects for rural development in semi-mountainous and hard-to-reach zones.
Although the Pelion region is widely known for its tourism and cultural identity, it has not been established in the collective consciousness or in the markets as a place of high-quality olive oil and olive production. While PDO certification has existed since 1996 for the Pelion “Konservolia” variety, which also covers the Promyri area, there has been no equivalent recognition or systematic promotion for olive oil.
The absence of a strong, recognisable product brand identity for local goods creates serious obstacles to outward orientation and commercial exploitation. The Sipias Cooperative engages in small-scale packaging, while a large portion of the product remains in the hands of private individuals who process and market it independently.
Although there have been efforts to participate in foreign trade fairs at their own expense, producers report that the recognition of Pelion as an olive-producing area is almost non-existent, something confirmed in commercial contacts abroad. Comparison with other regions, such as the Peloponnese or Crete, where farmers operate in a more organised manner and take an active role in promoting their products, intensifies the sense of collective neglect.
Producers feel they are operating alone, with limited institutional support from the state. The lack of official recognition of the quality and uniqueness of Pelion’s products constitutes a form of misrecognition, as the value and identity of a local product is overlooked. The lack of promotion leads to lower selling prices, limited ability to penetrate competitive markets, and ultimately, reduced income for producers. This, in turn, limits the ability to invest in modern cultivation practices, contributes to production abandonment, or prevents diversification.
The institutional framework for PDO/PGI products was introduced as a way to capitalise on the local and traditional distinctiveness of a product. However, economic and regulatory pressures are forcing farmers to change their production choices in ways that do not necessarily align with their long-term interests or the resilience of local communities.
The imposition of higher insurance contributions to ELGA for table olive varieties has transformed what should be a support mechanism (i.e., insurance coverage) into a financial burden for farmers. Specifically, varieties such as Amfissis, which are mainly intended for table consumption and covered by PDO status, are considered by the organisation to be more high-risk, resulting in farmers having to pay significantly higher premiums to insure them.
This additional cost leads many farmers to adopt declaration strategies not based on agronomic or commercial criteria but solely on reducing their insurance obligations. In other words, instead of selecting and declaring the actual use or variety they produce, they declare that they cultivate olives for oil production in order to pay lower premiums.
This trend is clearly reflected in official data: according to the Hellenic Statistical Authority’s Agricultural Census (2021), 100% of the olive trees declared in Magnesia are recorded as intended for olive oil production. This is a clear distortion, since in reality the majority of the plant material in the area is of the Amfissis variety, which is primarily a table olive. The same pattern is found in OPEKEPE’s records.
The under-reporting of table varieties and the misrepresentation of the actual cultivation profile are not accidental. They result from the combined pressure of increased insurance costs and the inadequate response of ELGA, which does not provide satisfactory compensation. As a result, farmers end up concealing the true nature of their cultivation and, in doing so, inadvertently undermining the PDO certification, with implications for the transparency, quality, and market identity of the product.
This represents a distortion of a framework that appears to be failing both production and the preservation of rural economies. Small producers struggle more to cope financially, unlike larger enterprises that can absorb these labour costs. This economic coercion pushes them towards oil production instead of table olives, in order to avoid additional burdens. However, this shift limits their freedom of choice and alters the agricultural landscape and traditional cultivation practices of the area, meaning that farmers do not have equal access to markets and subsidies, and are compelled to change their production based on economic constraints.
The withdrawal of active substances is a key element of European policies for sustainable agriculture and environmental protection. Under Regulation (EC) 1107/2009, which governs the placing of plant protection products on the market, approval processes for active substances have become significantly stricter, and many substances are no longer renewed, particularly when concerns arise about human health or the environment.
Among the withdrawn substances are Dimethoate and Phosmet, which were the most widely used active ingredients against the olive fruit fly in Greece. These two substances, with strong systemic action — meaning they could combat both adult and larval stages of the pest inside the fruit — were extensively used in public olive fly control programmes.
Such products are considered “resources” of the farming community, as they represent the primary tool for addressing entomological and microbial threats. The withdrawal of these pesticides, without prior sufficient scientific, technological, or governmental provision for effective alternatives, drastically increases the vulnerability of crops, particularly in areas where pest damage is systematic and recurring.
This change disproportionately affects producers who lack the technical means, knowledge, or financial capacity to apply alternative practices, such as biological control, bait spraying, or the use of traps and population monitoring. While some producers attempt to adapt using their own resources, the high costs, uncertainty about effectiveness, and lack of organised state support make such practices precarious and inaccessible to the majority of farmers.
As a result, a new form of distributive injustice emerges: the consequences of the withdrawal are shifted entirely onto producers without compensatory measures or transitional support. The agricultural system’s failure to adapt to these changes burdens the most vulnerable, leading either to reduced yields or economic loss, at a time when risks from the climate crisis and new pests are intensifying.
Market concentration and the unequal bargaining power between producers and traders fuel injustices — in this case, distributive ones. Specifically, the market for table olives, as well as olive oil, is controlled by a small number of traders, limiting farmers’ options and leaving them dependent on oligopolistic practices. Producers have no access to alternative marketing channels nor the ability to negotiate selling prices collectively.
At the same time, technological underdevelopment and the lack of storage and processing infrastructure (such as containers for table olives or tanks for olive oil) further reduce producers’ bargaining power, as they are forced to sell their products immediately, regardless of price or market conditions.
The problem is exacerbated by the absence of a stable pricing framework or a minimum price, which heightens uncertainty and favours the arbitrariness of middlemen. Moreover, the lack of collective export structures or cooperative management pushes producers to operate individually, without negotiating power and without the ability to claim a share of the added value of their products.
The injustice lies not only in the economic exploitation itself but also in the fact that the structure of the market and the absence of state or institutional support prevent them from participating on equal terms in the mechanisms of the agricultural economy. This increases inequalities, deepens the dependence of small-scale producers, and weakens the local agricultural base.
The provision of subsidies is a pivotal component in maintaining agriculture and olive cultivation, as it ensures that producers receive some financial support that is not exclusively dependent on their yield. The aim is to sustain productive activity and the long-term viability of the sector. Agriculture as a whole is vulnerable to weather conditions and climate change, and subsidies act as a minimum guaranteed income mechanism, which, however, has been drastically reduced over the years.
Producers acknowledge the supplementary and guarantee role of these payments but criticise the way they are distributed. They argue that the absence of a link between subsidies and actual production undermines the purpose of the measure and fails to enhance either competitiveness or the survival of small farms. Furthermore, they note that the lack of transparency in allocation criteria, the bureaucratic difficulty in accessing certain programmes, and the preferential treatment of larger or more organised holdings create a sense of exclusion and unequal treatment.
The inadequate distribution of subsidies therefore constitutes a form of distributive injustice, as certain groups of producers — particularly smallholders and those in remote areas — are disproportionately affected by the lack of support. The loss of such assistance, combined with rising production costs, intensifies precarity and discourages continued engagement in the primary sector.
Three-phase olive mills produce three types of by-products: olive oil, olive kernel (pomace), and olive mill wastewater (katsigaros). The latter two must be transported to an olive kernel oil mill for further processing. In the Promyri area, there are significant difficulties in managing this by-product because the nearest olive kernel oil mill is in Almyros (a considerable distance in kilometres and hours), which collects by-products from across the region, quickly reaching capacity.
The limited processing capacity of these facilities, the absence of alternative local infrastructure, and the uneven geographical distribution of existing biomass energy production facilities exacerbate the problem. The restricted capacity of available units, combined with the exclusion of three-phase mills from certain environmental programmes (as olive mill wastewater is classified as a pollutant), traps cooperatives and olive mills in terms of disposal options.
Moreover, unclear and changing regulations on the temporary storage or transport of waste heighten uncertainty. Even alternative solutions promoted — such as their use for biodiesel production — face obstacles, as the facilities that receive olive kernel and wastewater are still limited in capacity and located in Farsala.
Although there is a means of transport via special tanks, collection must take place in Lechonia, requiring cooperative members to travel one hour from the mill to the collection point. The absence of specialised equipment, the high transportation costs, and the lack of institutional support for investment in transport means and infrastructure make it difficult to invest in sustainable solutions. As a result, the burden of management is disproportionately shifted onto local producers, without consideration for their material and geographical capacity to respond.
Combined with the challenging terrain, fragmented landholdings, and the decoupling of production from subsidies, there is a pronounced sense of pessimism about the future of both olive cultivation and overall rural life in the area. Although the cooperative is relatively new (13 years in operation), the incentives appear to focus on finding short-term solutions rather than long-term strategies. Interviewees emphasised that their main goal is simply “to survive,” accepting current difficulties and obstacles.
Abandonment does not relate only to cultivation but also to rural life itself, as it is tied to the inability to secure a permanent and stable income. Olive farming in this particular area is not easy to manage due to the terrain and the lack of supporting infrastructure such as irrigation networks and rural road networks, and it functions mainly as a supplementary income.
Because of these challenges, younger generations do not return to the countryside, preferring to remain in urban centres where at least one stable source of income is guaranteed. By contrast, agricultural work can potentially yield higher revenues but is marked by a high degree of vulnerability. As a result, there is no generational renewal in rural areas, which contributes to the achievement of certain SDG targets (2.3, 2.4, 8.6, 8.9) being jeopardised.
This finding aligns with the broader picture in Greece, where the average age of farmers is 57 and only 11% are under 40 (Eurostat, 2020), highlighting both a lack of succession in the sector and an increased risk of farmland abandonment. However, even where measures exist to address the issue and to support youth participation in agriculture through the “Young Farmers” programme, other problems emerge — which will be examined later.
Farmers in Pelion possess multilayered knowledge of the microclimate, cultivation techniques, diseases, and risks specific to their area. This knowledge is the product of years of observation, hands-on practice, and intergenerational experience. However, it is systematically excluded from decision-making institutions because it is not accompanied by the title of “expert” or “institutionally certified scientist.”
Producers’ observations are ignored, their opinions are not sought, and their solutions are dismissed as “unreliable” from the outset. This is a case of epistemic injustice, meaning exclusion from the sphere of knowledge on the basis of social position. Farmers are not recognised as credible sources of knowledge, not because their views are wrong or unsubstantiated, but because they are perceived as “just farmers.”
This injustice is both recognitional, as it is tied to the social undervaluation of agricultural identity, and procedural, as it has real consequences in excluding producers from making use of their experiential knowledge and from participating in policy design that concerns them. The absence of institutions or processes that integrate farmers’ voices and knowledge, for example, in committees, consultations, or policy evaluations, widens the gap between design and implementation and creates policies that do not reflect field realities. It devalues their embedded knowledge and alienates them from institutions and processes.
The causes of this injustice can be traced to both institutional and cultural factors, including the dominance of technocratic scientific authority without consultation with local communities, the fragmentation of the farming population, which lacks organised structures for equal representation, the passivity generated by representative bodies, the lack of recognition of experiential knowledge as co-productive with science, and administrative centralism, which turns “policy for farmers” into “policy by experts without farmers.”
The absence of institutionalized agricultural advisory services in the Pelion region is a clear case of procedural injustice, as it excludes producers from access to scientifically informed, independent, and locally adapted knowledge. Farmers report that they operate solely on the basis of experience and trial-and-error, without any institutional guidance from agricultural services or university institutions, even though the latter are geographically close.
The limited information they do receive comes from commercial networks and private agronomists, whose advice is framed by product sales rather than holistic agroecosystem management. This institutional gap undermines farmers’ ability to make informed and environmentally responsible decisions, as pesticide and fertilizer use is often based on generalizations or alarmist narratives. In many cases, unnecessary or incorrect spraying occurs, which not only burdens the environment and production costs but also reduces the effectiveness of treatments by fostering resistance, for example, in the olive fruit fly.
The lack of a public, transparent, and accessible system of agricultural support hands over technical guidance to the market, increasing farmers’ dependence on private interests and reducing the potential for autonomous and collective knowledge management. This situation is not merely a technical matter of production; it is a political exclusion of farmers from dialogue with science, since their agricultural experience is not treated as a serious interlocutor but as a problem to be “corrected” by the market.
Olive fruit fly control is essential for the sustainability of olive cultivation in Pelion. However, the gradual withdrawal of state support, chronic underfunding, and management weaknesses have led to a situation of pronounced procedural injustice against active producers. Recently, Ministry funding for fly control has been significantly reduced, resulting in the cancellation of key actions such as spraying and trap placement, while tenders are often declared void due to delays or organizational failures within the Directorate of Rural Economy of the Regional Unit of Magnesia.
Although producers contribute financially through a 2% levy on the product produced or delivered (5177/2025), they do not receive the service they are entitled to, as application takes place outside critical periods or with low effectiveness. The absence of a coordinated state plan forces farmers to bear the costs individually for traps, monitoring, and plant protection treatments.
The inadequate collective management of the olive fruit fly risk particularly burdens smallholders and economically vulnerable farmers, who cannot afford the costs or manage the technical complexity of individual measures, resulting in reduced yields and lower fruit quality. At the same time, unregulated pesticide use by inexperienced or new entrants to olive cultivation creates resistant fly populations and harms the agroecosystem. The burden of protection is shifted entirely onto producers, not as a result of a fair or well-reasoned process but because of systematic administrative failures and the weakening of implementation institutions.
Bureaucratic issues, which result in the return of unused funds, demonstrate that institutional failure, not force majeure, is the cause of the injustice. Fly control, instead of being a universal and equally accessible service of agricultural policy, has become a mechanism of unequal treatment and lack of accountability. The systemic failure of the state to organize and implement the fly control program effectively in Pelion is exacerbated by local practices of collusion between administrative authorities and contractor crews, which further hinder fair and timely implementation, burdening producers.
Interviewees point out that the promotion of olive oil and the funding of packaging facilities, cooperatives, and other infrastructure have focused almost exclusively on areas such as Crete and the Peloponnese, leaving other areas of Pelion on the margins. This is not presented as a simple policy prioritization but as the result of partisan and clientelist choices, without meaningful participation or consultation with local communities in Magnesia.
The choice to strengthen other regions, while Pelion faces severe geomorphological difficulties and limited access to infrastructure, was not based on objective agronomic or development criteria but on political expediency. As producers themselves note, these decisions “were purely political.” This unequal treatment does not stop at the allocation of resources, which would be a distributive injustice, but concerns the very exclusion from planning. The voices of Pelion’s producers were absent not because they lacked arguments but because they were never invited to present them.
This constitutes a procedural injustice that deprives entire regions of the ability to gain a voice, support, and prospects, reinforcing feelings of frustration, invisibility, and marginalization. The state invested communicatively and financially in promoting other regions while leaving Pelion “off the map,” without mechanisms for publicity, commercial support, or institutional empowerment. The lack of access to decisions that directly affect the sector, the absence of Pelion from national agri-food strategies, and the unwillingness of competent bodies to hear local voices point to a democratic and participatory deficit in the primary sector.
The presence of a large number of part-time or non-active agricultural landowners in Pelion creates serious distortions in representation and decision-making, constituting a deep procedural injustice against active producers. Although these part-time landowners retain formal property rights, their limited or sporadic involvement in cultivation does not result in any differentiation in their institutional voice compared to that of full-time professional producers.
As a result, active farmers, who invest daily time, resources, and expertise in maintaining productive capacity, are deprived of proportional influence in shaping policies and strategies. Equal institutional participation regardless of the degree of active involvement erodes the collective functioning of the agricultural sector and undermines the fair representation of those who are the true agents of production.
This excerpt brings to light a clear procedural injustice, as it reveals the absence of collective organization and institutional representation among Pelion’s farmers. As described, producers are forced to deal with institutional bodies individually, without the support of farmers’ associations or coordinated groups, which severely limits their ability to negotiate, be heard, and demand solutions. The phrase “have we ever gone 200 people together?” captures the frustration and disappointment stemming from the lack of collective action and the absence of mass mobilization.
While responsibility is often shifted onto the producers themselves, the real problem is structural: the institutional inability to organise effectively, the lack of channels for representation, and the absence of institutional access. The reference to political superiors and the Ministry of Agriculture underscores that decisions are made elsewhere, without the participation of those directly involved. The excerpt confirms that producer communities are essentially excluded from decision-making processes, even though these decisions directly affect their productive and livelihood future. This is a deep form of procedural injustice, since their voices are not heard, not only because of institutional indifference but also due to the systemic inability to include them.
Although the “Konservolia Pelion” variety has held PDO status since 1996 in the European Union (Regulation 1107/96/EC), this recognition remains largely symbolic and disconnected from producers’ realities. They state that the PDO designation offers no tangible added value in either the market or support policies. Instead of functioning as a tool of commercial distinction and local identity, the PDO remains a formal label without application or institutional leverage.
Commercial chains do not promote it, nor does it appear to influence the consumer public’s purchasing decisions. Producers report that they receive no financial support or compensation linked to this designation, neither from the market nor from the state, which has not integrated the PDO into any reward scheme or differentiated treatment policy. The failure of institutions to leverage PDO status as a means of supporting and promoting the local product constitutes a form of misrecognition, as the geographic and qualitative specificity of the variety is not acknowledged in practice.
The product’s historicity, local embeddedness, and distinctiveness, which could be turned into a strategic advantage, remain invisible within an institutional and commercial system that is indifferent. Producers see no change in the value, demand, or pricing of their products due to the PDO designation, while the state itself has not developed any active support, information, or promotion policy for the label. Rather than serving as a platform for strengthening local agricultural identity, the PDO ends up being a tool without substance for producers, who remain institutionally and commercially unseen. The absence of integration into support policies, marketing narratives, and retail chains exacerbates the sense of injustice, as the official recognition exists only on paper, without translating into benefits or backing.
The limited recognition of agriculture’s role in landscape preservation and in preventing natural hazards such as wildfires is a clear case of misrecognition by the state. Farmers in Pelion are not merely olive oil producers: through continuous cultivation, pruning, and clearing, they perform essential environmental management in a region with steep terrain and a sensitive ecosystem. When plots are left uncultivated, they quickly become overgrown, increasing wildfire risk and threatening not only the farmers themselves but also surrounding communities.
However, environmental protection regulations are applied uniformly, without consideration for the particularities of the landscape and producers’ practices. Restrictions such as bans on burning branches or entering fields during high-risk periods are imposed without offering alternative solutions, making agricultural management more difficult. Instead of being recognized as custodians of the landscape, farmers are often treated as a threat.
The state’s inability to integrate producers’ contributions into environmental policy reveals the deep gap between institutional perspectives and local experience. This failure to acknowledge their role devalues farmers’ knowledge, experience, and contribution to the sustainability of the ecosystem.
The absence of recognition of the added value of local products is a characteristic form of misrecognition experienced by Pelion’s producers. Despite objectively high-quality standards—such as early-harvest wild olive oil or the fruity “Amfissis” variety grown in Pelion’s distinctive microclimate—neither the market nor institutions recognize this added value in ways that translate into income or institutional support.
As one interviewee pointed out, the production of an exceptionally high-quality oil from 700 kilos of olives yielded just €180 in income against €700 in costs. Despite being undeniably top-grade, the product does not generate enough revenue to cover its costs. The market and commercial mechanisms are poorly structured to support local, high-quality products that require greater effort and know-how.
Producers stress that, while they grow the same variety as in other regions (e.g., Amfissis), Pelion’s distinctive terrain and microclimate drastically alter the olives’ qualitative characteristics. Nevertheless, neither the market nor certification systems incorporate this differentiation into pricing or commercial identity. Instead, the added value remains “invisible,” falling solely on the producer’s shoulders.
This institutional and commercial inability to recognize the qualitative and local specificity of products constitutes a clear misrecognition, ultimately leading to the devaluation of differentiation efforts and the abandonment of quality as a viable strategy. Furthermore, the producer’s inability to assert their product’s added value within a commercial chain that does not support them strips their role of symbolic and institutional prestige. Local know-how, lived experience, and agricultural subjectivity embodied in these products remain invisible and unacknowledged, resulting not only in economic loss for the farmer but also in their undervaluation as a creator of value.
The inability of consumers to understand the qualitative characteristics and added value of local agricultural products, such as Pelion olive oil, constitutes a deeply rooted form of misrecognition. Producers describe how, even when they invest significantly in quality, standardization, and product differentiation, the market fails to respond because consumers lack the tools or cultural awareness to recognize this added value. Comparisons with other products are made exclusively on the basis of price, without any substantial evaluation of the specific production conditions, authenticity, or local identity.
As producers themselves note, there is no room to build an olive economy model based on traditionality, because the market and, above all, consumers do not perceive the difference. Beyond the economic devaluation of the quality product, the injustice here is deeper: the agricultural effort, local knowledge, and cultural value embedded in the product are not recognized either socially or institutionally. Producers emphasize that a large segment of the population, including younger generations, has no awareness of how olive oil is produced, the difficulty of the process, or the criteria of quality.
This lack of “consumer literacy” results in the authentic product being equated with the industrially produced one, while its creator remains invisible and anonymous within a market that chooses based on the lowest price rather than value. The distance between production and consumption generates a systemic problem of recognition: quality producers are not only unrewarded but are gradually discouraged from reinvesting in quality, since market absorption of the product is uncertain, shelf placement is precarious, and even when the product reaches the consumer, its added value is not recognized in practice. This is not merely a market failure but a broader failure of social and cultural recognition of agricultural effort and the differentiation embedded in local products.
The temporary status of foreign agricultural workers is a clear case of misrecognition, as institutions and the state fail to acknowledge the essential role of this labor force in agricultural production. Restrictions on residence and work permits, strict time limits, and the inability to establish stable working arrangements with farm workers create a condition of instability and ongoing uncertainty for producers.
Although these workers are absolutely essential for harvesting and maintaining crops, they are treated as “disposable resources” rather than as fundamental contributors to the agricultural system. The absence of institutional provisions for more permanent or flexible employment arrangements demonstrates that the state does not recognize the needs and functional reality of producers in areas such as Pelion. This indifference harms both agricultural production and the human dignity of the workers themselves, turning a functional necessity into a chronic problem.
Commercial networks and the competent authorities do not address the existence of adulteration—both in bulk and packaged olive oil—with the seriousness it demands. Instead of strict inspections and protection for quality producers, there is tacit tolerance or even cover-up, enabling practices such as blending oils of different qualities simply to meet the formal threshold for the “extra virgin” category. The result is the systemic equation of the honest with the dishonest, as the market does not distinguish between truly high-quality products and those that merely meet minimal technical criteria such as acidity.
This reality undermines the efforts of producers who invest in knowledge, responsibility, and integrity, as their work and values go unrecognized and unrewarded. Misrecognition here is twofold: on the one hand, the values and efforts of honest producers are undervalued by both the state and the market, which fail to distinguish them from rule-breakers; on the other, consumer trust in the local producer collapses, as there is no reliable way to verify quality or origin, and the product becomes devalued as a whole.
The prohibition on direct sales, such as selling bulk olive oil to known customers or friends, has removed from quality producers a crucial channel for validating and gaining recognition for their work, while further empowering commercial networks that control access to the market without being subject to equally strict controls themselves.
Such phenomena are not isolated irregularities but indicators of a system that rewards mass production, tolerates deception, and fails to institutionally support small-scale, local, high-quality production. Inspection mechanisms are either inadequate or silent, with the result that adulteration remains an everyday, accepted practice within the market. The moral and professional identity of producers is damaged, not because they break rules, but because they are trapped in a system incapable of distinguishing, monitoring, and rewarding quality products and the people who produce them responsibly.
Geography embodies a form of misrecognition experienced by Pelion’s producers, as state authorities fail to take into account the region’s particularly difficult and demanding geomorphology when designing support and subsidy policies. Despite the serious challenges farmers face, such as the impossibility of mechanization, difficult access, manual harvesting, and steep rocky terrain, they receive the same, or even lower, subsidies as farmers in lowland areas with far more favorable cultivation conditions and lower production costs. State policy is applied in a flattening, one-size-fits-all manner, disregarding the unequal burdens borne by mountain producers and treating distinct production realities as equivalent.
This approach devalues local knowledge, experience, and effort, as the added value generated through cultivation under adverse conditions is neither economically nor institutionally acknowledged. The additional costs incurred under such conditions are not covered and thus fall entirely on the producer, “disappearing” within a market that does not differentiate by origin or production conditions. The state fails to recognise that in areas such as Pelion, terrain is not merely a local peculiarity but a decisive factor shaping cost, capacity, needs, and ultimately the very survival of agricultural production.
The causes of this misrecognition lie in the absence of differentiated support policies based on geomorphological conditions, in the state’s inability to institutionally offset the disadvantages of mountain agriculture, and in the undervaluing of local agricultural knowledge as an equally valid source of know-how and adaptation. The persistent demand for equal treatment under unequal conditions reveals a deeper institutional indifference toward the lived and professional experience of producers, leading to a systematic failure to acknowledge the real conditions of life and production in Pelion.
The policy of transition to organic farming, as introduced by Farm to Fork strategy, creates distributive injustices, as it fails to take into account the differing capacities and challenges faced by producers. Small-scale farmers, particularly those with scattered plots, are obliged to apply organic practices to all their holdings significantly increasing production costs in a disproportionate manner. In addition, specific storage and product separation infrastructure is required, which is not financially feasible for everyone.
At the same time, the market does not adequately recognize the added value of organic products, meaning that producers do not receive satisfactory compensation for the additional effort and expense entailed by organic cultivation. Traders control demand and prices, with the result that producers often cannot sell their products as organic, since there is no meaningful price differentiation. Furthermore, the cost of laboratory analyses and certifications to prove that a product is organic falls entirely on the producer, with no corresponding subsidy or state support.
As a result, farmers are forced to shoulder a disproportionate financial burden without enjoying equivalent benefits in the marketplace. A policy of universal transition to organic farming, implemented without sufficient support mechanisms and without differentiation based on locality, ultimately reinforces inequalities among producers. Those with capital and infrastructure can adapt more easily, while smallholders are left exposed to high costs and uncertainty. This challenge is further compounded by terrain: organic farming on sloped land makes branch management and the application of required organic treatments even more difficult.
Producers in Pelion experience systematic devaluation of their product’s worth and identity due to the market’s indifference towards local characteristics and specific production conditions. One example is the introduction of imported olives from Egypt into the local market—sold at lower prices without differentiation—which not only exerts economic pressure on local producers but also undermines the institutional and commercial recognition of the product’s quality and added value.
The absence of mechanisms to protect identity and quality, whether through certification or stricter market controls, reveals a lack of institutional will to recognize and safeguard local production ecosystems. Another example is the market’s treatment of Pelion olives as equivalent to those from Almiros, disregarding significant differences in terrain, production costs, microclimate, and labor requirements.
The failure to recognize these differences constitutes a form of recognitional injustice, as the product is perceived as “seemingly the same,” depriving the producer of visibility and the right to reap the benefits of product differentiation. This injustice is closely linked to others, such as the lack of consumer understanding of the desired final product and the failure to recognize the added value of local products.
Despite substantial quality differences between olive oils of varying acidity levels, traders treat producers’ oil as a uniform commodity, failing to differentiate between, for example, 0.3% acidity oil and oils of higher acidity. In practice, they purchase various qualities at low prices, blend them, and produce a final product marketed as “extra virgin,” regardless of the actual value of the raw material.
This process removes added value from producers of superior oil and transfers it to the final trader–bottler, who captures the margin without bearing the cost or responsibility of production. Pricing is determined not by actual quality but by volume and convenience. Small producers, even if they achieve very low acidity, are not paid proportionally, discouraging the care and quality improvements necessary to achieve such results.
This constitutes distributive injustice because the economic benefits of quality are not returned to the point of production, but are concentrated in later stages of the value chain—at the expense of those who produce the high-quality product without the bargaining power to price it accordingly.
Environmental regulations, though based on essential needs to protect the natural environment, are implemented in ways that intensify injustices and constitute a clear form of distributive injustice for small producers, particularly olive growers in Pelion. The European Directive 2009/128 introduced restrictions on the use of active substances, leading to the loss of effective plant protection products and causing pest resistance to develop, particularly with dacus. This pest now requires continuous and frequent interventions to be controlled.
Producers are obliged to resort to repeated spraying, incurring significant financial costs, without any compensatory public policy measures. The new environmentally friendly products are more expensive and often less effective, with no state subsidies, tax breaks, or market incentives to bridge the gap. Moreover, the market does not reward this type of compliance: residue analysis does not increase the product’s selling price, and the producer’s environmental effort remains invisible in price formation.
At the same time, Pelion, as a tourist destination with high land value and a low environmental footprint from its agricultural activity, faces disproportionate restrictions, without corresponding exemptions or support. Producers are prohibited from using certain products or methods, even when local conditions require them, placing them at a competitive disadvantage compared to more “flexible” production zones.
A typical example is the ban on burning pruning leftovers, a practice that for decades formed part of local agricultural knowledge and was carried out safely and under control. Today, under new regulations, even low-intensity practices are subject to strict limitations, unfeasible prerequisites, and severe penalties, including subsidy cuts. Farmers are expected to shoulder the weight of environmental policy without proportional responsibility being shared by other sectors, and without receiving compensatory benefits—either through income support or assistance in meeting the new requirements.
The cost of compliance is imposed uniformly, ignoring the realities of small-scale, local, and low-intensity farming, with the result of deepening inequalities within the agricultural sector and discouraging environmentally responsible cultivation. Instead of acting as a mechanism for balance and support, environmental policy becomes a tool for excluding those unable to meet the new demands on their own.
The high cost of standardization and branding discourages small producers from investing in these processes, leaving them confined to selling bulk olive oil. Market demand for small packaging formats further increases costs, while producers lack the appropriate infrastructure to meet the requirements of commercial distribution. The process of standardization, labelling, and product promotion requires substantial starting capital, resources that small-scale producers typically do not have.
This situation creates unequal opportunities for market entry, as those with greater financial resources or membership in powerful cooperatives have a clear advantage in promoting their products. The cost of standardization and branding is not fairly distributed across the agricultural sector, leaving small producers at a disadvantage, since standardization, as a pathway to commercial success, is not equally accessible to all actors due to the lack of start-up capital and market knowledge.
The allocation of agricultural subsidies in Pelion does not reflect the real conditions and needs of producers in mountainous and semi-mountainous areas. Although Pelion receives compensatory payments under Measure 13 of the RDP 2014–2020 for mountainous areas, the amount remains extremely low (about €10 per stremma), failing to cover the significantly higher production costs caused by the terrain, accessibility issues, and the need for manual labour. Producers in the area point out that they face multiple times the production costs compared to lowland areas, even though they cultivate the same olive variety, Amfissis.
The steep terrain, limited accessibility, reliance on manual labour, and fragmented holdings dramatically increase management costs, yet these factors are not considered in subsidy calculations. Payments are distributed on an equal basis, which local farmers see as inadequate and insulting—especially given that, despite objective difficulties, they remain active and strive to maintain production.
Additionally, special support programs, such as Action 10.1.2 for the traditional olive grove of Amfissa (with aid of around €90 per stremma), remain geographically limited and practically inaccessible to Pelion farmers. These schemes require long-term commitments, which are unrealistic for owners of small plots who cannot engage in long-term planning, especially when their land is subject to building and land-use restrictions that discourage participation in subsidized schemes.
Thus, the uneven distribution of subsidies not only disadvantages Pelion producers but also excludes them entirely from development and support opportunities available elsewhere. Farmers lack access to sufficient resources, despite working under harsher conditions, a situation that leads to an economic dead end. This is not the result of their own decisions but of structural exclusions reinforced by subsidy allocation policies.
The consequence of this injustice is not only financial strain but also the gradual weakening of productive activity in the area, which is undermined not by a lack of quality but by a subsidy system that neither recognises nor supports the specificities and needs of farmers in semi-mountainous areas.
The abandonment of farmland in Pelion is not merely an indication of rural decline; it is a structural form of distributive injustice that disproportionately burdens active producers who continue to invest time, effort, and resources in the land. The consequences of abandonment extend beyond the individual level; they spill over into the broader agricultural and natural environment, affecting the assets of others who bear no responsibility.
Neglected or poorly maintained plots become sources of risk: for the spread of harmful organisms (notably the olive fruit fly, dacus) and for the increased likelihood of wildfires, especially in the summer months. Uncontrolled vegetation with shrubs, dry grasses, and bushes, combined with the proximity of such plots to roads and active farms, multiplies the risk of widespread damage, making abandonment not only an environmental issue but also a matter of civil protection.
In olive cultivation specifically, the idleness of inactive landowners undermines every individual or collective effort in plant protection. The olive fruit fly (Dacus), a pest that recognizes no property boundaries, finds refuge in abandoned trees, survives, multiplies, and develops resistance, rendering the control measures of active farmers (bait traps, spraying, and continuous care) ineffective. As a result, committed producers are forced to bear higher protection costs and a greater risk of production loss, without being responsible for deteriorating conditions.
Meanwhile, the rising tourist value of land contributes to the fragmentation of farmland, as non-agricultural investors acquire plots that often remain uncultivated, further eroding the productive fabric and hindering any possibility of coordinated collective action. The injustice is clear: those who abandon or remain inactive shift the costs onto those who continue to produce, creating a lack of accountability and collective responsibility that corrodes the local production system.
The causes of this situation include the absence of institutional interventions to manage abandoned plots and the lack of mechanisms for collective maintenance. As producers themselves stress, active intervention from the State—particularly from the Ministry of Climate Crisis and Civil Protection—is required to prevent the risks arising from abandonment and to restore balance in the sharing of responsibilities and costs.
Dryland cultivation is the norm in the Pelion region, partly because much of Southern Pelion has no irrigation infrastructure due to the absence of irrigation infrastructure, and partly because the area’s geomorphology, steep slopes and difficult terrain prevent the implementation of irrigation systems. The region’s olive trees, mostly of the Amfissis variety, have different requirements from oil-producing varieties and, although they have strong potential for high-quality fruit, they lack the necessary infrastructure to reach maximum productivity.
The lack of access to water is not the result of farmers’ choices, but stems from the absence of public irrigation works, lack of state support, political neglect, and the abandonment of water-scarce areas in development policies. Furthermore, the small and fragmented size of holdings makes individual investment in irrigation systems unviable, while the absence of cooperative structures compounds the problem. The result is a situation of distributive injustice, in which some areas—such as Milies—have access to water, while others—such as the rest of Southern Pelion—remain entirely dependent on weather conditions, with significantly lower productive capacity.
Unequal access to such a critical natural resource as water directly determines the quality, quantity, and market value of the product and reproduces deep inequalities among producers. These disparities are unrelated to farmers’ skills or the quality of their work, but rather to the mere accident of where their land is located.
The limited number of available workers highlights specific injustices in the distribution of labor. While the presence of non-professional (part-time) landowners is well known and socially accepted in the local community, their participation in the production process often generates tensions—mainly due to the imbalances it creates in access to labor. Workers are few and usually have to choose where they will work, as landowners rush to “book” them for tasks like harvesting or pruning. Non-professional landowners, who wish to complete their agricultural work quickly due to other professional obligations, are willing to pay much higher daily wages to secure immediate labor.
This creates competition among farmers and landowners in which the decisive factor is not a stable commitment to production, but rather the ability to pay more. The outcome is an environment of inequality, in which workers prioritize those offering higher wages, while excluding those who either cannot compete financially or did not act quickly enough to secure workers. Consequently, access to labor is not equitable but depends on each landowner’s economic capacity.
Such delays increase the risk to production, as olives remain on the trees for longer, over-ripen, deteriorate in quality, and become exposed to adverse weather (rain, wind, etc.). In this sense, farmworkers become a limited and critical resource over which landowners compete. Their allocation is not based on fair or collective criteria but on each landowner’s economic means and speed of mobilization—creating conditions of unjust treatment and injustice with direct impacts on production and the survival of professional farmers.
Farmers report a complete absence of a public service dedicated to their education, training, information, and technical advisory support. Such a service would provide accurate and unbiased guidance on everyday on-farm challenges, whether related to new crops or to cultivation practices such as proper fertilization and disease control.
The state’s withdrawal from providing agricultural advice has gradually been replaced by ad hoc updates and recommendations from private agronomists whose main occupation is the sale of farm inputs. As a result, the advice given is often shaped by the products they wish to promote, indirectly influenced by the commercial policies of agricultural supply companies. Many farmers report production losses due to such practices. In effect, they are pointing to an injustice stemming from the lack of impartial advisory services, often contrasting the current situation with the past, when public Agricultural Extension Services were the main source of farmer training and guidance.
Since its establishment in the early 1950s, the Agricultural Extension Service of the Ministry of Agriculture played a decisive role in disseminating agricultural knowledge and innovation, ultimately modernizing Greek agriculture. Agronomists from the Service were a constant presence in rural areas, offering field-based advice and earning farmers’ trust. From the 1990s onward, and especially after 2000, the Service was gradually weakened due to staffing reductions, underfunding, and the transfer of responsibilities to other bodies and/or private consultants.
With the consolidation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the parallel weakening of national policies, the Service increasingly took on a bureaucratic role focused on processing matters related to EU subsidies. After 2010, the Service was transferred to the elected Regional Authorities, with agronomists becoming regional rather than ministry employees. This led to the closure or merger of departments, including the Agricultural Extension Services. These changes further severed agronomists from farmers’ training and advisory work, marking the definitive withdrawal of the state from this role.
Today, the only official provider of informal agricultural education and training is OGEKA-Dimitra (Agricultural Vocational Education, Training and Employment Organization), part of ELGO- Dimitra (Hellenic Agricultural Organisation – Dimitra), which offers programs primarily for farmers eligible for EU-funded improvement plans, new farmer schemes, and similar projects.
The state’s withdrawal from farm advisory services—especially from direct field engagement—constitutes a procedural injustice. Through a series of decisions made without considering farmers’ knowledge or input, the state has deprived them of critical cognitive resources for their profession, ultimately worsening their production and livelihood conditions.
Another form of procedural injustice, as highlighted by farmers’ accounts, concerns the unreliability of the organic farming control system, particularly when applied to large-scale crops such as cereals and cotton. Farmers report that joining organic schemes often does not entail substantive changes to cultivation practices, nor does it involve thorough inspections.
Cotton is a characteristic example: producers themselves admit there is no available know-how to make organic cultivation truly feasible. In practice, they note, organic farming exists only “on paper,” with the primary motivation for participation being access to subsidies rather than genuine adoption of organic methods.
This situation represents a serious procedural injustice against consumers, who are misled about the quality and production methods of organic products, and against taxpayers, who fund, through subsidies, a system with unreliable compliance. In this context, organic farming, rather than serving as a tool for sustainable transition, is degraded into a nominal and often superficial subsidy mechanism.
The issue of Greek cotton quality represents a point of tension between the technological and organizational logics of producers and ginning companies. At a deeper level, however, it reflects a more fundamental lack: the absence of recognition of farmers’ need to orient their production toward higher-quality, higher added value products.
Many producers, perceiving that superior quality is not rewarded in practice, adopt technologies that maximize short-term economic efficiency at the expense of quality. A telling example is the growing use of stripper-type harvesters, which, unlike the conventional picker harvester that selectively removes cotton bolls, strip the entire plant. This results in the harvest of greater mass but with a high content of foreign matter. This choice is not driven by an intent to profit from excess weight, since foreign matter is deducted from the price paid by the gin, but rather by cost savings, as stripper machines have lower operating expenses, reducing overall harvest costs by up to 50%.
The downside is significant degradation of the final product: lower ginning turnout and poorer quality characteristics (color downgrading, shorter fiber length, higher foreign matter content). The burden of this quality decline is also passed on to the ginning industry, which faces higher sorting costs and reduced market value for the product.
Consequently, a vicious cycle emerges: the lack of incentives for producing high-quality cotton, combined with the absence of institutional and commercial recognition of its added value, reinforces practices that perpetuate low quality and the sector’s overall inability to achieve qualitative upgrading or competitive differentiation in international markets.
Many farmers are forced to abandon traditional irrigated crops in their area, such as cotton and maize, because of excessive irrigation costs and persistently low market prices. As accounts reveal, although water is available, irrigation costs can reach up to €40 per stremma for cotton and exceed €65 for maize, making cultivation economically unviable.
Farmers are thus turning to alternative crops that require less water or offer better returns, such as oregano and alfalfa (lucerne). This shift is not the result of a strategic plan or environmental awareness but rather a forced adaptation to conditions that push them toward an unplanned restructuring of their production.
This represents a form of distributive injustice, in which farmers in areas with disadvantaged (due to cost) water conditions and weaker bargaining power in product markets bear a disproportionate burden, with policy failing to account for the geographically differentiated cost–benefit ratio for each crop.
The mandatory use of a certain percentage, or, in some cases, the full use, of certified seed is primarily tied to receiving coupled support payments and, secondarily, to certification requirements for specific cultivation systems. This issue, which can create injustices, emerges most prominently in the case of cereals, particularly when crops are not grown under contract farming arrangements. For example, wheat or barley producers working with pasta or brewing industries, respectively, are already required to use exclusively certified seed under their contracts and therefore do not express dissatisfaction. The same applies to legumes grown under contract farming, which operate under similar terms.
In other arable crops, for various reasons, the use of certified seed is not generally perceived by farmers as a source of unfairness. In cotton, for instance, the technical impossibility of reusing seeds makes dependence on commercial propagating material self-evident. In industrial tomato production, contract farming dominates, with hybrids selected by processing companies. Similarly, in maize, farmers report being satisfied with the yields of hybrids and do not question their continued use.
However, our research records a geographically concentrated case of distributive injustice regarding the use of certified wheat seeds. In Magnesia — specifically in the Almyros plain — farmers emphasize that the cost of purchasing certified seeds is not offset by local yields. The geographic dimension of this inequality is critical: in the Larissa region, significantly higher field yields make it easier to cover the cost of certified seed through coupled support payments. By contrast, in Almyros, where yields are lower, the use of certified seed is often considered unprofitable. As a result, there is a widespread practice of saving and replanting seed from previous years to reduce production costs — a practice that excludes farmers from coupled support payments.
Some local farmers also object to the requirement for high percentages of certified seed, attributing the regulation to the influence of seed-producing companies. As one farmer characteristically noted, “Using three kilos of certified seed is enough to maintain varietal purity.”
Since cereals can be, in some cases, an “obligatory” choice for farmers, this represents a form of distributive injustice in which policy regulations unevenly distribute the burdens of compliance, disregarding the unequal ability to meet those burdens. The result is the reproduction and deepening of existing inequalities between regions with different productive potential and economic capacity.
The tightening of EU plant protection policy, under Regulation (EC) 1107/2009, has in recent years led to the withdrawal of many active substances that were widely used in agricultural production. These bans were based on documented concerns about human health, pollinator toxicity, or environmental contamination, as assessed by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). Among the banned substances are those considered critical for key crops — such as phosmet (an insecticide for cotton bollworm), glufosinate and S-metolachlor (herbicides), and the fungicides cyproconazole and mancozeb, which were widely used in cereals.
These bans have necessitated finding alternatives, including approved alternative plant protection products, organic formulations, Integrated Pest and Disease Management (IPM), and Cross-Compliance Programs. However, many producers argue that the withdrawal of these substances has led to higher costs and fewer — and often less effective — alternatives. They also emphasize that third countries continue to use products banned in the EU, resulting in significant differences in production costs.
Similar concerns have been expressed by the Hellenic Crop Protection Association (HCPA), one of the main scientific and professional bodies representing the plant protection sector in Greece, which includes companies distributing plant protection products in the market. The HCPA has voiced reservations about active substance bans in the EU, particularly when these are not accompanied by sufficient scientific evidence or viable alternatives for farmers. It has also raised concerns about the proposed Regulation on the Sustainable Use of Plant Protection Products (SUR), which aims to reduce the use and risk of pesticides by 50% by 2030.
Farmers describe this situation as a form of distributive injustice that manifests as a loss of competitiveness against imports from third countries. They argue that while they are required to use milder, more expensive products — which often do not provide adequate crop protection — they receive no equivalent support or protection from unfair competition, since imports from third countries are allowed without the obligation to comply with EU regulations.
References:
HCPA (2022). Newsletter on the Work of the HCPA (Issue 18). https://esyf.gr/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/ESYF_NL18.pdf
Farmers report a complete absence of a public service dedicated to their education, training, information, and field-level advisory support. Such a service could provide reliable and impartial guidance on everyday farming challenges, whether related to new crops or agronomic practices such as proper fertilization and pest control. The state’s withdrawal from farm advisory services has gradually been replaced by ad hoc advice from private agronomists, whose primary business activity is the sale of agricultural inputs. Consequently, the advice farmers receive is often tied to product promotion strategies and indirectly influenced by the commercial policies of input suppliers. Many farmers report production losses as a result of this situation. In essence, they describe an inequity rooted in the lack of impartial advisory services, comparing today’s reality to the past, when public Agricultural Extension Services provided trusted, state-led support.
From the early 1950s, when the Agricultural Extension Service of the Ministry of Agriculture was founded, it played a decisive role in diffusing agricultural knowledge and innovation, ultimately driving the modernization of Greek farming. Extension agronomists were present in rural areas, offering field-based advice and building strong trust with farmers. From the 1990s onward, and especially after 2000, the service was gradually weakened due to staff reductions, underfunding, and the transfer of responsibilities to other agencies and/or private consultants. With the strengthening of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the corresponding weakening of national agricultural policies, the service increasingly took on a bureaucratic role focused on managing EU subsidy procedures. After 2010, responsibilities were transferred to the elected Regional Authorities, with agronomists no longer employed by the Ministry but by the Regions. This restructuring led to the elimination or merger of services, including Agricultural Extension.
These developments further severed the link between state agronomists and farmers’ education and advisory support, effectively marking the state’s withdrawal from the field. Today, the only formal structure for agricultural training is O.G.E.E.K.A. “Dimitra,” which delivers education and training programs mainly for farmers eligible for EU-funded measures (e.g., Farm Improvement Plans, Young Farmers Schemes).
The state’s withdrawal from advisory services, and especially from its field-level presence, constitutes a procedural injustice. Through a series of policy decisions made without considering farmers’ perspectives or knowledge, farmers were deprived of critical cognitive resources for their profession, which in turn has worsened their production conditions and economic survival.
Most cotton farmers report a significant inequity arising from the fact that cotton in Greece is sold as seed cotton rather than as ginned fiber. This arrangement, seen as a distinctively Greek practice, is enforced by ginning companies that exercise control over the entire commercial chain. As a result, farmers are deprived of any real possibility to assess or negotiate the quality value of their production, since ginning yield (the percentage of pure fiber extracted per kilo of seed cotton) and key quality characteristics (such as fiber length, strength, and color) remain outside their control.
Ginners, for their part, do not acknowledge the trade in seed cotton as a problem. However, for both organizational and technical reasons, they claim they cannot meet farmers’ longstanding demand to sell cotton as ginned fiber with individual quality assessment. The absence of storage facilities at the farm level, coupled with the bulk and simultaneous delivery of harvested production during the ginning season, often results in the mixing of cotton from different plots and with varying quality traits. This makes quality segregation and individualized evaluation of each bale virtually impossible.
In this context, farmers’ exclusion from the ability to showcase the qualitative superiority of their production not only reproduces a structural imbalance in their market relationship with ginners, but also incentivizes problematic practices that compromise quality (e.g., the use of stripper harvesters).
The inability of the state to regulate electricity prices for agricultural use—combined with the failure to prioritize TOEVs for funding energy projects that could support their energy autonomy (through net metering, interconnected systems, or autonomous battery-supported solutions)—is recognized as a critical recognition injustice. This gap drives up the fixed operating costs of farming activities that rely on groundwater irrigation, where electricity costs account for nearly 80% of total production expenses. In the case of the TOEV of Megala Kalyvia, irrigation depends entirely on groundwater extraction. As a result, the cost of electricity is the single most significant expense for irrigated crops in the area. Representatives point out a serious deficiency in the state’s pricing policy for agricultural electricity, particularly for TOEVs already under repayment arrangements with electricity providers. Furthermore, the volatility of electricity’s market-traded value constitutes a major barrier for irrigation planning, as costs must be constantly monitored and adjusted. Farmers also emphasize that compound interest charges (interest not repaid but capitalized and re-charged) create conditions of financial strangulation for TOEVs, undermining agriculture as a key productive sector. In this context, establishing a photovoltaic park would carry dual benefits for financially constrained TOEVs: first, by reducing irrigation-related electricity costs; and second, by allowing surplus electricity produced outside the irrigation season to gradually be used for debt repayment.
Some farmers express concerns about the potential impacts of photovoltaic (PV) installations when placed on productive farmland or adjacent plots. A key worry relates to the long-term condition of the soil after years of PV operation and the possibility that land may no longer be suitable for agricultural use. Farmers point out that the construction of PV infrastructure—such as cement foundations, earthworks, and support bases—can affect soil quality and structure. In addition, there is frustration that fertile fields are often allocated to PV projects, while alternative options such as dryland or less productive soils are overlooked, usually because installation costs are higher in those areas.
Scientific literature confirms that PV installations can alter soil conditions. Research has shown that solar parks may degrade soil structure through leveling and vegetation removal, even if the soil’s chemical composition remains largely unaffected (Lambert et al., 2021). There are also concerns about potential contamination from heavy metals contained in PV panels or their supporting structures. While some studies remain limited in scope—for example, a recent case study by Yousuf et al. (2024) found no concerning concentrations of heavy metals in nearby soils—other research highlights possible risks of cadmium, copper, arsenic, mercury, and nickel leaching or runoff from PV components (White & Black, 2017; Robinson & Meindl, 2019; Tawalbeh et al., 2021). Commonly used materials such as steel and aluminum may, under certain conditions, contribute to soil and water pollution, underlining the need for systematic risk and impact assessments (Brown et al., 2022).
Within this context, farmers’ concerns about the long-term impacts of PV installations on their land are not unfounded. The absence of a regulatory framework that recognizes and addresses the potential consequences of PV projects on productive farmland and its future use constitutes a form of recognition injustice. Their concerns about the unsuitability of fertile land for such investments, and the need to safeguard the long-term viability of agricultural production, are not adequately acknowledged. Instead, priority is often given to lower installation costs or land availability, regardless of agricultural value.
Relevant references:
Climate change is increasingly affecting plant–pathogen interactions, with major consequences including the emergence of more severe diseases and the development of resistance to commonly used active substances. According to many farmers, in recent years crop infestations have risen, while the limited effectiveness of available control methods has resulted in a steady increase in crop protection costs—not only in Greece but across the EU.
Eurostat data (2023) show that the average cost of plant protection products rose by 9% compared to the previous year, despite the simultaneous decrease in the cost of other inputs such as fertilizers and fuel. At the same time, the European Commission estimates that the agrochemical industry spends approximately €300 million annually on preparing approval and renewal dossiers for active substances, with the cost of developing and demonstrating the safety of a new active ingredient ranging between €200–250 million.
Within this context, the distributive injustice lies in the disproportionate burden placed on farmers, who are forced to absorb higher crop protection costs while their agricultural income continues to shrink. Farmers generally recognize the importance of reducing environmental degradation, yet they face mounting phytopathological pressures that can only be managed through costly inputs—whether conventional plant protection products or more expensive biological alternatives promoted under the green transition.
This situation fuels frustration regarding both economic and environmental sustainability, as farmers feel they are bearing the cost of environmental policy implementation without receiving adequate compensation through the prices paid for their products on the market.
Relevant references:
The issue of cotton quality in Greece reflects a structural tension between the technological and organizational logics of farmers and ginners. At a deeper level, however, it highlights a fundamental gap: the lack of recognition of farmers’ need to shift production toward higher-quality, higher value-added products.
Many farmers, realizing that superior quality is not tangibly rewarded, adopt technologies that maximize short-term economic efficiency at the expense of quality. A telling example is the increasing use of stripper harvesters. Unlike traditional picker machines, which selectively collect the cotton boll, strippers remove the entire plant, leading to a larger harvested volume but also to a higher content of foreign matter. This choice is not driven by attempts to profit from excess weight—since foreign matter is deducted at the ginning stage—but by cost savings. Strippers have lower operating expenses and can reduce total harvesting costs by up to 50%. However, the outcome is a significant decline in the quality of the final product: lower ginning efficiency, degraded color, shorter fiber length, and higher contamination with foreign material.
The burden of this quality degradation is also carried by the ginning industry, which faces higher sorting costs and reduced commercial value of the final product.
As a result, a vicious cycle is perpetuated: the lack of incentives for producing high-quality cotton, combined with the absence of institutional and market recognition of its added value, drives practices that reinforce low quality. This dynamic ultimately weakens the sector’s ability to upgrade, differentiate, and remain competitive in international markets.
A growing concern among farmers in the region is the increasing competition that High-Yield Agricultural Land (HYAL) faces from the rapid expansion of photovoltaic (PV) parks. Large investors and energy companies approach landowners with highly attractive financial offers—either for leasing or outright purchase—often at multiples of what the land would yield if kept for farming. This creates strong economic pressure that reshapes access to land, particularly disadvantaging small and medium-scale farmers.
Tenant farmers, who until recently cultivated land under arrangements that also secured an additional income stream for landowners (such as retired farmers or non-farming professionals), now find themselves at a disadvantage. Landowners increasingly prefer the far more profitable options offered by PV companies, resulting in active farmers losing access to productive land and facing disproportionately high rental costs that exceed the economic returns of cultivation.
Although HYAL has been institutionally defined as a non-renewable national resource since 1983 (Law 1337/83), based on criteria such as soil quality, irrigation potential, microclimate, and traditional or specialized crops, enforcement of the protective framework has been highly deficient. The requirement to geographically designate HYAL was established under Law 2945/2001, mandating exclusive use for agricultural purposes. Yet administrative weaknesses—including understaffing and lack of technical expertise—prevented effective implementation, leaving most regions without official HYAL mapping.
Instead of strengthening protection, legislation since 2010 has gradually introduced flexibility for renewable energy installations on HYAL. Law 3851/2010 allowed, under certain conditions, the installation of RES infrastructure, followed by Law 4203/2013 which imposed temporary restrictions. In 2019, permissions were reintroduced under conditions, permitting installations up to 1 MW with a cap of 0.8% of cultivated land per Regional Unit. Despite these restrictions, the absence of HYAL mapping and limited administrative capacity hinder effective control and enforcement, enabling fertile lands to be exploited. According to recent data (2022), up to 320,000 stremmata of high-yield land nationwide may be allocated for PV development.
This development represents a clear distributive injustice: land is being rapidly reallocated in favor of alternative economic activities, restricting farmers’ ability to sustain agricultural production—especially those without ownership or the means to compete with the financial offers of PV companies. The pressure is particularly severe when PV parks are established on prime farmland, while marginal or less productive areas (such as mountainous or low-yield lands) are largely overlooked due to higher installation costs (e.g., lack of access infrastructure, electricity transmission). In this way, PV installations promoted without proper spatial planning occur at the expense of agricultural land, with additional risks of environmental degradation if land-use and environmental safeguards are not effectively applied.
Relevant references:
Small and fragmented landholdings are perceived by farmers in the Regional Unit of Trikala as a key factor generating inequities, particularly when compared to their counterparts in the Regional Unit of Larissa. Farmers argue that agricultural plots in Trikala are much smaller in size and more dispersed, while in Larissa landholdings tend to be significantly larger and more consolidated.
This perception is supported by empirical evidence from the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT) on the Structure of Agricultural Holdings. In 2016, the average size (in stremmata) of purely agricultural holdings in the Region of Thessaly was 58.43. However, there were significant variations across regional units: 59.50 in Karditsa, 73.76 in Larissa, 46.62 in Magnesia, and only 42.98 in Trikala. In other words, the average holding size in Trikala was almost half that of Larissa.
This structural reality creates inequities that translate into practical disadvantages in farming operations, which ultimately lead to higher production costs. Small and scattered plots require more extensive irrigation infrastructure, higher consumption of water and energy, and greater labor inputs per stremma compared to larger, consolidated farms. As a result, farmers in Trikala are unable to benefit from economies of scale, which undermines the competitiveness of their holdings.
This issue has been recognized in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 2023–2027, which introduced the Complementary Redistributive Income Support for Sustainability. This measure aims to achieve a more balanced distribution of income support in favor of small and medium-sized agricultural holdings.
Access to financing and investment opportunities represents a structural inequity affecting both smaller-scale TOEVs and those burdened with high fixed costs, such as electricity expenses, which leave little room for reinvestment from available reserves. Investments in network maintenance and modernization are critical to ensuring irrigation stability and improving water-use efficiency. However, such investments presuppose rational and transparent financial management within the TOEVs. As several representatives pointed out, this remains a persistent challenge in smaller communities, where interpersonal relationships often dominate irrigation management. When debts accumulate due to financial mismanagement, the organization’s ability to invest is further constrained. This, in turn, reinforces and magnifies local inequities built up over previous years, affecting both the quality of irrigation services and farmers’ access to them.
Inequities in production costs arise from the differentiated irrigation practices applied across regions, directly linked to the available infrastructure and the geographical location of farmers. Irrigation methods have a decisive impact on whether production costs rise or fall.
In the plain, all farmers rely exclusively on boreholes. Here, the dominant production cost—accounting for nearly 80%—is electricity consumption required to operate pumping systems. Local farmers acknowledge that this practice significantly inflates production costs, thereby reducing their net income. Representatives from Trikala noted that the high cost of irrigation fuels constant disputes and dissatisfaction within the community, as water is both scarce and expensive. They stressed the need for major reforms in water pricing policy, along with technical upgrades such as undergrounding of networks and the introduction of inverter technology in pumping equipment, to mitigate these inequities. Moreover, representatives of the Local Land Reclamation Organization (TOEV) emphasized that the shift from micro-sprinklers to reel-type sprinkler irrigation has contributed to the depletion and waste of groundwater resources, as excess water often escapes the fields. At the same time, this method has gradually damaged the irrigation network due to the high pressure generated by the reels. Transitioning to closed irrigation networks supported by pump inverters would help address these systemic inequities and improve resource efficiency.
In many agricultural areas, water scarcity in irrigation networks becomes particularly acute during the summer season. This is also the case in Megala Kalyvia, located in the western part of the Thessalian plain, where farmers face significant inequities in water distribution. Until 1977, irrigation relied exclusively on the Pamisos and Pineios rivers. However, following large-scale state programs for drilling expansion, farmers increasingly turned to groundwater extraction. Today, the Local Land Reclamation Organization (TOEV) of Megala Kalyvia manages 22,600 stremmata (2,260 hectares) of farmland, served by an irrigation network supplied by 34 boreholes. Yet, insufficient recharge of the aquifer, combined with parallel water abstraction projects, has gradually depleted the tributaries of the Pineios and forced wells to reach ever greater depths. Extended drought periods and recurring rain shortages have further intensified water scarcity, leading to a serious irrigation deficit in the area. A telling indicator of this trend is the dramatic deepening of boreholes: while groundwater could once be accessed at a depth of just 10 meters, farmers now need to drill down to 130–200 meters to meet their irrigation needs.
Most cotton farmers report a significant inequity arising from the fact that cotton in Greece is sold as seed cotton rather than as ginned fiber. This arrangement, seen as a distinctively Greek practice, is enforced by ginning companies that exercise control over the entire commercial chain. As a result, farmers are deprived of any real possibility to assess or negotiate the quality value of their production, since ginning yield (the percentage of pure fiber extracted per kilo of seed cotton) and key quality characteristics (such as fiber length, strength, and color) remain outside their control.
Ginners, for their part, do not acknowledge the trade in seed cotton as a problem. However, for both organizational and technical reasons, they claim they cannot meet farmers’ longstanding demand to sell cotton as ginned fiber with individual quality assessment. The absence of storage facilities at the farm level, coupled with the bulk and simultaneous delivery of harvested production during the ginning season, often results in the mixing of cotton from different plots and with varying quality traits. This makes quality segregation and individualized evaluation of each bale virtually impossible.
In this context, farmers’ exclusion from the ability to showcase the qualitative superiority of their production not only reproduces a structural imbalance in their market relationship with ginners, but also incentivizes problematic practices that compromise quality (e.g., the use of stripper harvesters).
The need for direct engagement with farmers was highlighted by most stakeholders as a potential source of inequity in the event that TOEVs are removed from management and irrigation responsibilities are centralized under a new authority (ODYTH). The mediation role and proximity of TOEVs are considered critical in resolving conflicts among irrigators, particularly concerning irrigation priority, the allocation and sharing of available water resources, and the organization of irrigation cycles.
TOEV representatives stressed that the immediacy with which irrigation is currently managed must not be lost, as it is a crucial factor for ensuring the smooth functioning of production—especially during periods of extended drought, when urgent off-cycle irrigation may be required. Under a potential unification of TOEVs into a single central administration, issues of inequity could arise, since a recurring concern expressed by representatives was that irrigation needs must be addressed immediately at the moment the problem arises. Delays, even short, can result in crop losses and consequently significant reductions in farmers’ income.
The inability of the state to regulate electricity prices for agricultural use—combined with the failure to prioritize TOEVs for funding energy projects that could support their energy autonomy (such as net metering, interconnected systems, or battery-supported autonomous solutions)—is recognized as a key recognition injustice. This gap drives up the fixed operating costs of crops dependent on groundwater irrigation.
It was further noted that rising electricity prices have discouraged borehole irrigation, with costs nearly doubling. In Zarko, farmers are particularly burdened with electricity expenses, not because of deep pumping (which does not exceed 70 meters), but due to the age of their irrigation infrastructure. Most boreholes were built in the mid-1970s, and the mechanical parts (motors) are now outdated, leading to inefficiencies and uneven pumping capacity. To address this, the TOEV has gradually installed inverters to balance irrigation needs and reduce electricity consumption.
The TOEV also attempted to apply for a photovoltaic park under a net metering scheme, but connection to the grid was not possible because the transmission lines had already reached their full capacity. According to TOEV representatives, the only viable solution to this inequity—where private companies are prioritized over agricultural uses in grid connections—is the expansion of grid capacity. Currently, network operators are in the process of investing in and upgrading existing installations to expand capacity, but farmers remain excluded until these works are completed.
One of the less visible yet structurally significant inequities arising from agricultural policy implementation concerns the failure to recognize geographical specificities, even within highly productive plains. Within the same wider area, different local ecosystems and agricultural landscapes coexist: from high-yield farmland to hilly and disadvantaged areas with difficult access, limited mechanization, or reduced irrigation capacity. Farmers stress that restructuring policies and crop promotion schemes are applied in a horizontal manner, without accounting for critical parameters such as irrigation potential, exposure to erosion risks, or productive differentiation between areas within the same plain.
Even regulations that appear rational in design, such as the ban on plowing plots with slopes greater than 15%, are enforced without geographical adaptation, leading either to meaningless applications or to unjustified burdens on agricultural activity.
The neglect of these geographical specificities constitutes a form of recognition injustice: on the one hand, it ignores or equalizes unequal capabilities and challenges between areas (e.g., irrigated vs. rainfed land); on the other, it erases elements that shape farmers’ identity and local knowledge. For some, this translates into reduced access to subsidies or support schemes; for others, into the loss of potential comparative advantages linked to geomorphology, locality, and the “authenticity” of their production—features that could otherwise be valorized through certification schemes, local markets, or differentiated farming systems (e.g., regenerative, organic, or integrated management).
Farmers recognize the need for crop zoning or tailored support schemes that reflect local capabilities—for example, promoting organic farming in hilly forage areas, or implementing strict integrated management in intensively irrigated farmland on the plain. Yet current measures do not respond to this need.
The absence of flexibility and participatory planning deepens the perception that agricultural policy disregards not only the material conditions of production but also the cognitive experience of farmers. Moreover, the potential to transform local specificities into productive advantages remains untapped. Thus, this form of injustice extends beyond the distribution of subsidies, touching upon broader issues of recognition and inclusion in the transformation of the agri-food system.
Farmers in the Regional Unit of Trikala express strong dissatisfaction with crop restructuring policies promoted by governments and their privileged interlocutors, arguing that such policies fail to reflect their actual situation. They stress that policy decisions to shift crops often ignore both the significant investments already made in specialized agricultural machinery and the accumulated know-how they have developed over years of engagement with specific crops, such as cotton.
While this reflects a broader dynamic of path dependency—where past investments and decisions limit present adaptation options—the discontent voiced by farmers cannot be overlooked. They perceive the situation as a clear recognition injustice: policymakers and stakeholders fail to acknowledge the vulnerable position of farmers when restructuring is pursued. Many of the machines farmers own are crop-specific, meaning that a restructuring initiative could render them obsolete, forcing distress sales and resulting in substantial capital losses. For some, loan repayments on such equipment are still ongoing, so selling under pressure could further damage their creditworthiness and economic resilience. Similarly, shifting from irrigated to rainfed crops risks rendering entire irrigation networks and infrastructures redundant, compounding capital losses. Although Trikala’s farmers may be somewhat less exposed than their counterparts in other parts of Thessaly, ELSTAT data confirm that they remain highly vulnerable to such restructuring pressures.
Beyond the economic consequences, farmers highlight the injustice of disregarding their knowledge capital—both technical and tacit—acquired through years of cultivating specific crops. This knowledge is essential for crop performance and agricultural development. In the context of restructuring, however, it risks being devalued or lost entirely, depriving farmers of a vital resource and undermining their long-term viability.
The issue of cotton quality in Greece reflects a structural tension between the technological and organizational logics of farmers and ginners. At a deeper level, however, it highlights a fundamental gap: the lack of recognition of farmers’ need to shift production toward higher-quality, higher value-added products.
Many farmers, realizing that superior quality is not tangibly rewarded, adopt technologies that maximize short-term economic efficiency at the expense of quality. A telling example is the increasing use of stripper harvesters. Unlike traditional picker machines, which selectively collect the cotton boll, strippers remove the entire plant, leading to a larger harvested volume but also to a higher content of foreign matter. This choice is not driven by attempts to profit from excess weight—since foreign matter is deducted at the ginning stage—but by cost savings. Strippers have lower operating expenses and can reduce total harvesting costs by up to 50%. However, the outcome is a significant decline in the quality of the final product: lower ginning efficiency, degraded color, shorter fiber length, and higher contamination with foreign material.
The burden of this quality degradation is also carried by the ginning industry, which faces higher sorting costs and reduced commercial value of the final product.
As a result, a vicious cycle is perpetuated: the lack of incentives for producing high-quality cotton, combined with the absence of institutional and market recognition of its added value, drives practices that reinforce low quality. This dynamic ultimately weakens the sector’s ability to upgrade, differentiate, and remain competitive in international markets.
Although most farmers report satisfaction with the agronomic traits and yields of the varieties available on the domestic market, they frequently express dissatisfaction with the quality of seeds produced through domestic seed multiplication. Their concerns focus on the conditions and practices under which seed production takes place, which are viewed as poorly controlled and substandard, leading to the circulation of seeds with reduced purity and quality. The problem is most evident in first-generation reproduction seed (R1) in wheat and cotton.
In these crops, farmers report frequent mixing of genetic material across different varieties. This is attributed to the lack of compliance with required distances between seed production plots, as well as to inadequate cleaning of farm machinery during harvesting. Such lapses compromise seed purity, undermining crop uniformity and predictable yields.
This problem is not observed in crops such as industrial tomato and maize, where imported hybrids dominate. Legumes and pulses present a special case, as native varieties developed by ELGO-Dimitra prevail. Since 2012, the Institute of Industrial and Forage Crops of ELGO-Dimitra has introduced a more effective control mechanism for seed production through an innovative system of competitive contracting, which allows the selection of seed companies based on strict quality and technical criteria.
Seed companies, for their part, reject farmers’ criticisms outright, while at the same time acknowledging that problems do exist, since companies cannot fully control the practices applied by their contracted growers in seed fields. Insufficient state supervision also plays an important role. The Departments of Rural Development and Controls (TAAE – formerly KEPYYEL), which are responsible for the official supervision of seed production on behalf of the Ministry of Rural Development and Food, face serious problems of understaffing and underfunding. This severely limits their ability to conduct thorough inspections or intervene in cases of violations and poor practices.
In the final analysis, responsibility for the decline in seed quality cannot be attributed to a single party. The issue is closely linked both to the seed companies themselves (with “good and bad companies,” as farmers put it) and to the diligence demonstrated by contracted growers at every stage of the production process.
In Thessaly, farmers face major obstacles in installing small-scale photovoltaic (PV) systems, even when these are intended exclusively to meet the irrigation needs of their farms. Irrigation is structurally essential for key crops in the region, such as cotton and maize, and the inability to implement such projects increases farmers’ energy dependence and intensifies their financial vulnerability. According to the Hellenic Electricity Distribution Network Operator (Deddie), as early as 2022 the regions of Larissa and Karditsa had already exceeded their available grid capacity for new connections, while today the margin for additional connections is reported as zero (Deddie.gr, 2024).
At the same time, the abolition of priority access for farmers in PV connection applications (which had been in place until 2019), combined with insufficient state support for self-generation with storage solutions (e.g., net metering with batteries), sustains this widespread sense of unfairness within farming communities. This exclusion affects both individual farmers and collective bodies such as TOEVs, which aim to reduce irrigation energy costs without any intention of commercially exploiting surplus electricity.
Farmers describe this situation as a double injustice: on the one hand, they are unable to use the grid to reduce irrigation costs; on the other, they believe they have already financed the network infrastructure up to their fields with their own resources over past decades. Now, they find themselves excluded from accessing the very same grid, while large private renewable energy companies are granted permits to use it for projects on adjacent land.
This situation constitutes a distributive inequity, as the current institutional and technical framework deprives many farmers of the possibility of achieving energy autonomy and reducing the cost of irrigation.
The tightening of EU crop protection policy, based on Regulation (EC) 1107/2009, has in recent years led to the withdrawal of many active substances previously used widely in agricultural production. These bans were grounded in documented concerns about human health, toxicity to pollinators, or environmental pollution, as assessed by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). Substances critical for key crops were among those banned, including phosmet (insecticide against cotton bollworm), glufosinate and S-metolachlor (herbicides), as well as fungicides such as cyproconazole and mancozeb, commonly used in cereals.
The bans necessitated the adoption of alternative solutions, such as approved substitute crop protection products, biological inputs, Integrated Pest Management (IPM), and cross-compliance programs. However, many farmers argue that the withdrawal of these substances has resulted in higher costs and fewer, often less effective, alternatives. They also stress that in third countries, products containing active substances banned in the EU continue to be used, creating significant disparities in production costs.
Similar concerns have been expressed by the Hellenic Crop Protection Association (ESYF), one of the main scientific and professional bodies representing the crop protection sector in Greece. ESYF has raised reservations about the bans on active substances, especially when they are not accompanied by sufficient scientific justification or viable alternatives for farmers. It has also expressed concerns regarding the proposed Sustainable Use Regulation (SUR), which aims to reduce the use and risk of pesticides by 50% by 2030.
Farmers describe this situation as a form of distributive inequity that manifests in the form of a competitiveness deficit compared to imports from third countries. While they are obliged to use milder and more expensive products—often insufficient for crop protection—they receive no equivalent compensation or protection from unfair competition, since imports from third countries are allowed without being subject to the EU’s regulatory requirements.
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Differences in irrigation practices across regions create unequal conditions for balancing production costs, directly linked to the available infrastructure and the geographical position of farmers. In the case of Zarko, this inequity also affects crop earliness (e.g., in cotton) as well as limits the range of crops that can be planted due to the uncertainty of frequent floods. Based on past experience of how easily their farmland floods, farmers in Zarko avoid cultivating orchards, legumes, and vegetables—crops that are highly vulnerable—since even a single flood can destroy both the harvest and the plant capital. In earlier years, torrents of water often swept away the pipes used for irrigation (before the closed network was built), putting entire harvests at risk. These conditions fostered a spirit of voluntarism and mutual support among farmers, who would share equipment whenever needed. Today, a large share of farmers in Zarko use drip irrigation, particularly after the expansion of the closed irrigation network, which is sufficient to provide high pressure and significantly reduces water consumption. However, the development of this closed network was not primarily state-funded but initiated and implemented through the voluntary contributions of TOEV community members. Rather than seeking yearly funding to replace damaged pipes—which frequently corroded due to methane released from boreholes, another local particularity—farmers chose to invest in a permanent, long-term solution. Working with local engineers, and using their own equipment, farmers themselves decided on water intake points and pressure levels, while also contributing personal labor and oversight for the excavation and construction of the network. This collective effort highlights both the inequities farmers face and the community-based resilience strategies they employ to address them.
Water shortage or insufficiency, particularly during the summer months, constitutes a distributive inequity as it directly relates to the fair allocation of resources and access to them. In the Regional Unit of Trikala, one of the largest irrigation organizations is the TOEV of Zarko in Farkadona, which manages 25,000 stremmata of irrigated land through 29 boreholes. Due to the area’s specific topography, representatives described their region as the “zero point” of the confluence of seven rivers (including the Enipeas, Kaletzis, Pineios, and their tributaries). While this condition frequently replenishes the local aquifers—keeping pumping depths relatively shallow, at 45 to 70 meters, and thus maintaining low pumping costs—it also creates recurring flooding problems. Floods often destroy critical equipment, including borehole mechanisms and irrigation systems (e.g., reels), forcing farmers and the TOEV to repeatedly replace or repair damaged infrastructure. This challenge led to the need for undergrounding the open irrigation network, transitioning to a closed network system for farmers. The transition is largely complete (about 85%), with 16 km still pending tender out of the total 75 km of the network. Although the closed system has temporarily mitigated some of the issues, substantial support works are still required to retain and manage water more effectively and reduce flood risks. This situation constitutes a distributive inequity because it restricts farmers’ ability to choose their crops. They are often limited to varieties that can withstand frequent flooding, leaving them with fewer viable options. Furthermore, during periods of extreme drought, the region plays a critical role as a supply node: it reinforces the Pineios River with water from the Plastiras and Smokovo reservoirs, ensuring both its own irrigation sufficiency and water availability for wider areas.
The inability of the State to regulate the price of electricity for agricultural use, along with its failure to prioritize TOEVs for funding energy projects that would contribute to their energy autonomy (such as net metering, other forms of interconnected networks, or autonomous systems with batteries), is recognized as a critical recognition injustice. This injustice directly leads to an increase in the fixed operating costs of irrigation-dependent crops. Nearly 80% of production costs are attributed to electricity expenses. The area managed by the TOEV of Tausanis relies exclusively on the irrigation of groundwater, which means that the cost of electricity is the most significant expense for irrigated crops in this region. The consequences of this injustice have a dual dimension. On the one hand, it acts as an additional burden for farmers, increasing cultivation costs compared to other irrigators who rely on closed networks, surface waters, or even flood irrigation. On the other hand, the increase in irrigation costs leads some farmers to be unable to meet their contractual obligations and pay their irrigation fees to the organizations. As a result, this debt is carried as a “loss” by the TOEV, undermining its financial resilience while also straining the social relations between the organization’s board members and producers in the local community. According to TOEV representatives, the installation and exploitation of a photovoltaic park to reduce irrigation costs during the summer months is the only viable solution to lower production expenses. However, due to their inability to support such an investment with their own means, the contribution of the Region and, more broadly, the State is deemed necessary to support and implement this infrastructure, which would contribute to their energy autonomy. In the same context, it was noted that after privatization, service from PPC/ HEDNO – Hellenic Electricity Distribution Network Operator, has deteriorated significantly, as repair crews now take much longer to fix damages to the distribution network. This often prevents timely irrigation, which is critical for the survival of crops within specific time windows.
An important issue raised by the representatives concerns the equal treatment of TOEVs by the State, namely inclusion. Inclusion and the recognition of local needs, particularly of smaller TOEVs in terms of size and capacity, in critical decisions that affect the future of a community’s irrigators, are seen as essential. There is a prevailing sense that the larger TOEVs in geographic extent, as well as those located closer to the centers of political decision-making, receive preferential treatment, both in terms of the resolution of their problems and in the prioritization of decisions. A characteristic example of this inequity is the issue of post-flood restoration, which represents a significant injustice and creates serious problems for irrigation and the survival of producers in the community. Specifically, out of the 70 boreholes, 35 were destroyed “flooded up to the top,” as the TOEV representatives described, who recorded the extent of the damages. Most of these boreholes now require complete repairs, including replacement of electric motors, control panels, and other equipment.
The need for direct interaction with producers was understood by most stakeholders as a potential injustice in the event that TOEV administrations are removed under a possible centralized organization of the new irrigation management body (O.D.Y.TH.). The mediation and immediacy provided by TOEBs are critical factors in smoothing relations among irrigators, especially in cases of conflict over irrigation priority, water availability, and the distribution of water resources, as well as in organizing the irrigation cycle. Within this framework, it was argued that a major gap the new organization could address lies in the design and implementation of new infrastructures essential for irrigation, tailored to the specific needs of each local area. However, TOEV representatives stressed that the immediacy characterizing the current functioning of irrigation should not be lost, as it is a crucial factor for the smooth operation of production. They also noted that due to the limited automation of networks, human presence remains indispensable until systems are fully automated, since it provides both local knowledge of issues and direct capacity to resolve them.
Access to funding and investment opportunities for irrigation networks constitutes a distributive injustice that affects both the smaller TOEVs, as well as those whose fixed expenses, such as electricity costs, leave little room for further investment from the organizations’ available reserves. Investments in network maintenance and modernization are critical actions to ensure system stability and to save water consumption. However, access to funding frameworks requires the preparation of technical studies and a range of other bureaucratic requirements that exceed the capacities of these TOEVs. A major injustice for the irrigators of Koilada and the surrounding serviced areas is the lack of significant water storage infrastructures. Such infrastructures could protect the region both in terms of flood prevention and by offering alternative irrigation methods, thereby relieving the area from the overexploitation of underground water resources, which are already at the brink of exhaustion.
The insufficient conditions for balancing competition in production costs arise from the different irrigation practices across each area, constituting a distributive injustice as they are directly linked to the available infrastructure and the geographical position of irrigators. The method of irrigation directly affects whether production costs increase or decrease. In the Koilada area, all irrigators rely exclusively on boreholes. The largest share of production costs around 80%, is the electricity required to operate a borehole. Farmers in the area recognize that this practice (use of pumps) dramatically raises production costs and thus reduces net income, since they are forced to irrigate from great depths due to the gradual decline of the local aquifer. This decline increases irrigation costs in terms of electricity consumption and is attributed to the absence of infrastructure for groundwater recharge, namely its connection with reservoirs of the Pinios River. In other words, the irrigation fee is driven upward by electricity costs, which severely reduce profit margins for local producers. The irrigation fee has traditionally been determined as a cost per borehole based on the cultivated hectares irrigated, while in 2024 a time-based billing system (via electronic cards) was introduced, following the installation of electronic monitoring systems along with supervision by water guards. The administration of the TOEV has managed to participate in funded programs to install automation systems in their network, which are estimated to reduce electricity consumption by up to 30% as well as save irrigation water. Nonetheless, the replenishment of groundwater remains a central issue, the resolution of which would address major injustices related to irrigation costs in the wider area.
The lack of water or the insufficiency of water availability, especially during the summer months due to local particularities [depleted aquifers, drought], constitutes a distributive injustice in the sense that it relates to the equal sharing of resources and access to them. In the case of the Regional Unit of Larissa, the Local Land Reclamation Organization – TOEV of Tausanis, which serves approximately 6,800 irrigators from Koilada and some nearby villages, faces a serious irrigation issue. In the Koilada area, as well as for irrigators in the wider Farsala region, there is no access to surface water, since irrigation relies exclusively on boreholes, meaning on the availability of underground aquifers. The TOEV manages around 70 active boreholes, which irrigate approximately 10,000 acres. Signs of drought are evident in the area, as in the past 10 years pumping from the boreholes has extended to greater depths from 100 meters down to 250 meters. As a result, from the 22,500 acres that were irrigated until the early 2010s, only half remain under irrigation today, serving villages of the Municipality of Larissa (Koilada, Mandra, Rachoula, Koutsochero, Kastro, Terpsithea) and of the Municipality of Kileler (Mavrovouni, Krannonas, Mesorachi). Furthermore, the prolonged drought period has reduced the irrigation cycle to at most 7 days, making irrigation essential within this timeframe for the survival of the crops.
An important issue raised by the representatives concerns the equal treatment of TOEVs by the State, namely inclusion. Inclusion here refers to the recognition of the local needs of smaller-scale TOEVs and their consideration in critical decisions affecting the future of irrigators within a community. There is a prevailing perception that the larger TOEVs in terms of geographic coverage, and those located closer to political centers of decision-making, enjoy preferential treatment both in the resolution of their problems and in the prioritization of various decisions. Representatives of these TOEVs emphasized that, due to their distance from the political center of Thessaly (Larissa), they feel excluded from important decisions, where proximity and interpersonal relations often play a decisive role. Larger TOEVs acknowledged the State’s efforts to support recovery from the recent damages, yet some of their representatives pointed out that one significant issue arising from the floods has been the destruction of field boundaries, which creates uncertainty in agricultural production until the matter is resolved.
The inability of the State to regulate electricity prices for agricultural use, combined with the lack of prioritization of TOEVs in accessing funding for energy projects that would support their energy autonomy (such as net metering, interconnected networks, or stand-alone battery systems), is recognized as a pivotal recognition injustice. This situation leads to a sharp increase in the fixed operational costs of cultivation systems that rely on well-based irrigation. It was also noted that rising electricity prices have had a deterrent effect on well irrigation, where costs nearly doubled. Moreover, TOEV representatives highlighted their inability to monitor and engage effectively with the energy stock market to track electricity prices. In fact, electricity accounts for almost 80% of production costs. Additionally, representatives pointed out that the power capacity of a well pump is directly linked to the crop it can irrigate, or more precisely, the efficiency with which it irrigates. The variation in pump power is thus a decisive factor in determining irrigation costs, as it is directly correlated with electricity consumption. At the same time, pump power also shapes crop selection. For example, higher pump power (120–150 watts) can prove destructive and is highly discouraging for cotton cultivation, due to the particular vulnerability of its flower.
The need for direct communication with producers was framed by the majority of stakeholders as a potential justice concern in the event that the management of TOEVs is removed under a possible centralized organization of the new irrigation management authority (O.DY.TH.). The mediation and immediacy offered by the TOEVs is considered a crucial factor in smoothing relations among irrigators in cases of conflict over irrigation priority, the availability and distribution of water resources, as well as the organization of the irrigation cycle. Within this framework, it was argued that a major gap the new organization could fill is the planning and implementation of new infrastructures critical for irrigation, designed according to the specific needs of each locality. However, representatives of the TOEVs stressed that the immediacy with which irrigation currently operates must not be lost, as it is a key factor for the smooth functioning of production. In the event of a unification of TOEVs under a single administration, the issue of inequality is expected to arise, since a recurring concern expressed by representatives was that irrigation needs should be met immediately, particularly when problems occur. The time available to resolve such issues is critical to prevent the loss of production and, by extension, the reduction of farmers’ income in the affected areas.
The risk of devaluation of investments and the fixed capital of large-scale TOEVs, such as the TOEV Thessaliotidos, constitutes a recognition injustice, in the sense that with the establishment of O.DY.TH., the property and assets of the Organization, according to the law abolishing the OEBs, will be transferred to O.DY.TH. This means that a significant part of the equipment such as maintenance machinery and, more importantly, spare parts for the irrigation network needed for the immediate replacement of damages, acquired through the capital contributions of the members of the Organization, will cease to be their property, without any compensation or priority in use and repair. This development will pose a serious obstacle to the smooth irrigation of producers in the area, who, due to their geographical location, are often affected by sabotage and damages to their irrigation infrastructure.
Access to funding and opportunities for investment in the irrigation network constitutes a distributive injustice that affects both the smaller-scale TOEVs (Local Land Reclamation Organizations) and those whose high fixed costs, such as electricity expenses, leave little room for further investments in the network from the organizations’ available reserves. Investments in the maintenance and modernization of the network are crucial for ensuring its stability as well as for saving water. However, access to funding frameworks requires the preparation of technical studies and a range of other bureaucratic requirements that exceed the organizational capacity of many TOEVs. A significant injustice for the irrigators of Sofades and the wider area under the TOEV’s management is the delay in the implementation of the expansion of the closed irrigation network. The closed network would not only save significant amounts of water since there would be no water loss as currently happens in areas where irrigation is still carried out via open channels, but also improve the distribution of available resources. Moreover, the lack of water has forced many farmers outside the closed network to abandon their land or switch to less water-demanding crops such as wheat. Another issue raised is the limited capacity of the technical departments of the TOEVs. For example, in the TOEV of Sofades, which is responsible for managing the Smokovo dam, there is no specialized staff for its operation, nor any corresponding technical position within the organization. Instead, the management of the dam relies on private contractors, who were also responsible for completing the construction of the project. This situation creates serious concerns regarding the continuity of the dam’s operation as well as the transfer of knowledge about its use and importance for the region. Furthermore, there is no specialized staff for the organization and preparation of studies for similar infrastructure projects. Even in the case of Smokovo, the TOEV was fully dependent on state services and the slow pace of public administration.
The inadequate conditions for balancing competition in production costs, arising from differentiated irrigation practices across regions, constitute a distributive injustice as they are directly linked to the availability of infrastructure and the geographical position of irrigators. Irrigation methods determine the increase or decrease in production costs. In the wider area of Sofades, irrigation relies primarily on the closed irrigation network supplied by Lake Smokovo (with a capacity of approximately 237 million cubic meters of water). However, this project has not been completed to the extent originally planned, particularly regarding the closed network, which was designed to serve 250,000 stremmata of farmland and provide drinking water to large parts of the eastern plain of Karditsa. Farmers not yet connected to the Smokovo network depend exclusively on groundwater through some 200 boreholes (197 currently active). This differentiation generates injustices even within the same TOEV, since irrigators acknowledge that borehole irrigation (using pumping systems) significantly raises production costs and reduces net farm income compared to those benefiting from the closed network. The closed network was repeatedly described by stakeholders as the “future” of irrigation and the only viable solution for combating drought and water waste. Such networks were characterized as “civilized infrastructures” due to the efficiency and conservation benefits they offer, providing irrigators with a competitive advantage. Expanding the closed network is thus seen as a decisive factor for both intensifying cultivation and reducing inequalities in irrigation costs, once the planned extension is implemented. Representatives also highlighted that the power capacity of borehole pumps directly affects both irrigation costs through energy consumption and crop choices, since higher motor power determines which crops can be irrigated more effectively. For example, motors of 120–150 watts were considered unsuitable for cotton cultivation, as the strong water pressure could damage the flower. By contrast, users of the closed network enjoy abundant water without restrictions, unlike borehole users who face both scarcity and higher expenses. Respondents also noted incidents of water “theft” from the closed network, where farmers living near but not connected to it resorted to drawing water through hoses stretching for kilometers. This highlights the sharp inequalities in both cost and access to irrigation: farmers close to the infrastructure but excluded from the network attempted to capture its benefits informally, underscoring the urgency of addressing such disparities in water governance.
The state’s inability to regulate electricity prices for agricultural use, along with the failure to prioritize TOEVs for funding energy projects that would promote their energy autonomy (e.g., through net metering, interconnected systems, or battery-based autonomous systems), is recognized as a key recognition injustice. This leads to an increase in the fixed operating costs of irrigation-based agriculture, especially when dependent on groundwater extraction. It was also noted that rising electricity prices have discouraged the use of groundwater for irrigation, nearly doubling the associated costs. The expansion of the closed (pressurized) irrigation network beyond the 30% currently planned and funded through PPP schemes is of critical importance for mitigating the injustice experienced by irrigators in the TOEV-managed area. Such expansion would significantly reduce production costs by enabling more efficient water use and, more importantly, lowering electricity demand.
The need for direct communication with producers was framed by the majority of stakeholders as a potential injustice in the event of distancing governance from the TOEVs, especially in the case of a centralized structure under a new irrigation management body (O.D.Y.TH.). The mediation and immediacy provided by TOEVs is a critical factor in smoothing relations among irrigators during conflicts over irrigation priority, water availability, and distribution of water resources, as well as in organizing the irrigation cycle. It was argued that a major gap the new organization could fill is the planning and implementation of new infrastructure essential for irrigation, according to the specific local needs of each area. However, as noted by TOEV representatives, the immediacy that currently characterizes irrigation management should not be lost, as it is crucial for the smooth functioning of agricultural production. In a potential consolidation of TOEVs under a single administration, issues of inequality could emerge, particularly because, as emphasized by the representatives, irrigation needs must be addressed immediately, especially in times of crisis, since any delay can jeopardize the harvest and consequently harm the income of the affected producers.
An important issue raised by the representatives concerned the equal treatment of TOEVs by the State namely, the principle of inclusion. Inclusion and recognition of the local needs of smaller and less powerful TOEVs in critical decisions that affect the future of a community’s irrigators were seen as essential. There is a prevailing sense that the geographically larger TOEVs, and those located closer to political centers of power, receive preferential treatment, both in the resolution of their problems and in the prioritization of relevant decisions. Representatives of other TOEVs feel that, due to their physical distance from the political center of Thessaly (i.e., Larisa), they are effectively excluded and are not involved in significant decision-making processes, where proximity and interpersonal relations often play a decisive role. While TOEVs acknowledged the State’s efforts to support recovery from recent disasters, some representatives noted that the issue of exclusion persists for smaller, more decentralized regions located farther from the centers of political decision-making.
Water shortage or insufficient water availability, especially during the summer months—due to local particularities (e.g., depleted aquifers, water scarcity) constitutes a distributive injustice, in that it concerns the equitable sharing of resources and access to them. In the case of the Regional Unit of Karditsa, TOEB Thessaliotidos is one of the largest TOEBs in Karditsa and among the largest in all of Thessaly. Water scarcity represents a major injustice that hinders the smooth irrigation of the area served by the TOEB. As its representatives report, even the Smokovo artificial lake—one of the main water reserves for irrigation in the region—has seen its level drop dangerously in recent years. This creates significant problems for allocating irrigation among the areas the TOEB serves as manager of Smokovo’s water. From the 148.5 million m³ that Smokovo held in 2023, in 2024 it managed to retain only 91 million m³ from rainfall, while irrigated areas remain stable and needs are estimated at about 80 million m³. Of this, the TOEB must cover 270,000 stremmas (approximately 27,000 ha) irrigated under its responsibility, as well as 30,000 stremmas (about 3,000 ha) outside its formal jurisdiction (the TOEBs of Ekkara and Neo Monastiri), which it is nevertheless obliged to serve as the lake’s manager. Finally, a particular distributive injustice linked to this TOEB’s geographic area of management is that near Sofades there is an established Roma settlement, one of the largest in Greece relative to local population—which further complicates local water governance dynamics.
Limited access to funding and investment opportunities for irrigation infrastructure constitutes a form of distributive injustice, particularly affecting smaller TOEVs or those burdened by high fixed operational costs, especially electricity expenses, which leave little room for reinvestment from existing reserves. Infrastructure investments are essential not only for ensuring network reliability but also for improving water-use efficiency. However, accessing funding frameworks often requires the submission of detailed technical studies and meeting a series of bureaucratic conditions that exceed the administrative capacities of many TOEVs.In the case of TOEV Sellanon, approximately 30% of the irrigation network is currently undergoing underground piping installation, a project expected to mitigate existing inequalities among irrigators. Priority was given to major irrigation arteries serving multiple users, which will yield significant water savings and redistribute water availability across the remaining network. At parcel boundaries, iron pipe fittings will be installed for water intake, allowing farmers to autonomously connect and disconnect from the system using remote water management technologies. Additionally, inverter-equipped electric control panels will enable remote operation of the pumping station. The new system is expected to reduce irrigation costs from €45 to €25 at the designated service points, thus significantly improving both affordability and water governance.
The inadequate conditions for balancing production costs stem from differentiated irrigation practices across regions and constitute a form of distributive injustice, as they are directly linked to available infrastructure and the geographical location of irrigators. The mode of irrigation is intrinsically tied to either the increase or decrease in production costs. In the wider Sellana region, irrigation relies exclusively on groundwater drilling, since there is no access to surface water or connection to the nearby artificial lakes of Plastiras or Smokovo.A significant injustice faced by local irrigators, compared to those in eastern Thessaly or even other areas within the Karditsa regional unit, is that due to the presence of numerous private wells in the region, the irrigation period is forcibly limited typically ending by mid-August. This restriction occurs because water is insufficient to extend the irrigation period, as both TOEV-operated and private wells draw from the same aquifers. To avoid damage to the infrastructure, farmers themselves often choose to end irrigation prematurely.
Water shortage or insufficient water availability, particularly during the summer months due to local specificities (e.g., depleted aquifers, drought), constitutes a distributive injustice, in the sense that it relates to the equitable sharing of resources and access to them. In the case of the Regional Unit of Karditsa, the TOEV Sellanon serves irrigators from four municipalities (Mouzaki, Farkadona, Karditsa, Palamas) via groundwater drillings. The total area of activity covers 112,000–120,000 stremmas (approx. 11,200–12,000 ha), with 138 drillings across 10 agricultural holdings.Since 2016, as TOEB representatives pointed out, the groundwater level has dramatically declined, from the usual 30–75 meters down to depths of 300 meters, where drill shafts now need to reach, accompanied by a significant drop in irrigation pressure. This sharp decline of the aquifer led many producers to abandon their irrigated crops, shifting either to dryland farming or exiting production altogether. According to regional estimates, of the 120,000 stremmas under TOEB’s management, as of 2024, only 11,000 stremmas are still irrigated due to the unbearable cost of production. In most cases, the irrigation cycle has been reduced to just three months, during which the available water can support a single crop depending on the year and coinciding rainfall.
Since 2016, systematic efforts have been made to implement a mechanism for the indirect payment of seed cotton based on the ginning yield of each variety. This initiative stems from the collaboration between the Interprofessional Cotton Organization (DOV) and the National Centre for Quality Control, Classification, and Standardization of Cotton. Each growing season is accompanied by the compilation of a “National Quality Dossier,” which is based on a random inspection of 1% of the bales produced and includes detailed data on the quality characteristics and yields of varieties by growing region. Using this data, ginning mills draw up quality premiums and contract farming programmes, thereby seeking to reduce inequalities between producers and ginners. However, this system operates mainly on a limited scale, as it primarily concerns producers who participate in contract farming schemes, where cultivation is monitored and certified by the ginning mills’ technical networks. Despite the advantages of this mechanism, the proportion of producers participating in such programmes remains small, limiting its overall effectiveness. More critically, however, are the trust issues that arise, which act as a deterrent to the broader adoption of the system. Most producers maintain strong reservations both towards the ginners and towards the indirect payment system itself. On one hand, many cite past incidents of breaches of agreement or lack of transparency in transactions with ginning mills, which have reinforced their distrust of the market. On the other, they face practical difficulties in proving the quality of their production, especially when they do not participate in organised contract schemes with access to technical support and certification. Beyond this, the credibility of the institutional framework is further undermined by the lack of trust in the Interprofessional Cotton Organization. According to producers and representatives of farmers’ associations, there are frequent reports of opaque processes regarding the selection and representation of farmers within the DOV. The absence of meaningful participation and accountability of producers in decision-making processes fuels feelings of exclusion and powerlessness, undermining the legitimacy of the institution in the eyes of farmers. Thus, while the system of quality assessment and differentiated payment represents a positive step towards a fairer and more quality-oriented market, its implementation encounters deeper institutional weaknesses and an entrenched culture of mistrust, making a radical re-evaluation of trust relations between producers, institutions, and ginning enterprises essential.
Farmers depict a picture of the complete absence of a state service tasked with educating, training, informing, and advising them. Such a service would provide them with reliable and impartial advice on the issues they face daily in the field, whether related to new crops or cultivation practices such as proper fertilisation, pest and disease control, and so forth. The withdrawal of the state from agricultural advisory services has gradually been replaced by ad hoc briefings and advice from private agronomists whose main occupation is the sale of agricultural inputs. As a result, the advice provided is shaped by the products the agronomist wishes to promote and is often indirectly influenced by the commercial policies of agricultural input manufacturing or trading companies. Many farmers report losses in their production due to these practices. In essence, they express a grievance concerning the lack of impartial advisory services, comparing the current situation with the past, when advisory services were primarily delivered by the public Agricultural Extension Service.
Since its establishment in the early 1950s, the Ministry of Agriculture’s Agricultural Extension Service played a decisive role in disseminating agricultural knowledge and innovation, ultimately contributing to the modernisation of Greek agriculture. Agronomists of this service maintained a constant presence in rural areas, provided on-field advice, and had earned the trust of farming communities. From the 1990s and especially after 2000, the Agricultural Extension Service began to weaken gradually due to staff reductions, underfunding, and the transfer of responsibilities to other agencies and/or private consultants. With the establishment and consolidation of the CAP as the dominant agricultural policy and the corresponding erosion of national policies, the service gradually acquired a bureaucratic role, focusing mainly on handling matters related to EU subsidies. After 2010, the service was transferred to the elected Regional Authorities, where agronomists, previously employees of the Ministry of Agriculture, became employees of the Regions. This reorganisation resulted in the closure or merger of services, including the Agricultural Extension Service. This development further severed Ministry agronomists from the training and advisory work of farmers, marking the final withdrawal of the state from this role. Today, the only official provider of non-formal agricultural education and training is the state-run Hellenic Agricultural Organization – DEMETER (Hellenic Agricultural Organization “DIMITRA” – Organization of Agricultural Vocational Education, Training and Employment) which offers agricultural training programmes to farmers eligible for EU subsidies under schemes such as Improvement Plans, Young Farmers Installation, and others. The state’s withdrawal from agricultural advisory services—and particularly from an on-field presence constitutes a procedural injustice. Through a series of decisions in which farmers’ opinions and knowledge were not considered, the state has deprived them of critical knowledge resources essential for practising their profession, ultimately worsening their production conditions and prospects for survival.
The majority of cotton producers report a significant injustice stemming from the fact that cotton in Greece is sold as seed cotton (σύσπορο) rather than as ginned cotton. This arrangement recognized as a distinct Greek peculiarity is imposed by ginning companies, which exercise control over the entire commercial chain. As a result, producers are deprived of any substantive capacity to evaluate or negotiate the qualitative value of their harvest, since ginning yield (i.e., the percentage of clean fiber per kilogram of seed cotton) and other critical quality characteristics (such as fiber length, strength, and color) remain outside their control. From their side, ginners do not acknowledge the marketing of seed cotton as a problem. However, for organizational and technical reasons, they argue that they cannot accommodate the producers’ long-standing demand for individual quality assessment through the sale of ginned cotton. The absence of on-farm storage facilities, combined with the mass and simultaneous delivery of harvested cotton during the ginning season, often leads to the mixing of cotton from different fields and of varying quality characteristics. This makes it impossible to maintain quality segregation and individualized valuation for each bale. In this context, the exclusion of producers from the ability to showcase the qualitative superiority of their cotton not only reproduces a structural inequality in their market relationship with ginneries, but also incentivizes practices that compromise quality (e.g., the increasing use of stripper-type harvesters).
A form of procedural injustice highlighted by farmers’ experiences concerns the unreliability of the organic farming inspection system, particularly when applied to large-scale crops such as cereals and cotton. Farmers report that their participation in organic schemes is often not accompanied by substantial changes in cultivation practices or by thorough and systematic inspections. Cotton is a characteristic example, as producers themselves note the lack of technical expertise necessary to make the genuine implementation of organic farming feasible. In practice, they stress, organic farming is conducted largely “on paper,” with the primary motivation for participation being access to subsidies linked to the scheme. This situation constitutes a serious procedural injustice toward consumers, who are misled regarding the quality and production methods of organic products, and toward taxpayers, who finance through subsidies a system with unreliable compliance mechanisms. Within this context, organic farming, instead of functioning as a tool for sustainable transition, risks degenerating into a formalistic and often pretextual subsidy mechanism.
Many farmers who have transitioned, or are considering transitioning, to organic farming express frustration over the absence in Greece of an organized and stable market for the absorption of specific large-scale organic crops, such as wheat or forage crops (e.g., alfalfa). Although they comply with the rules of organic cultivation entailing reduced yields, they are not meaningfully rewarded through the sale of their products in the market. As they point out, even when they hold organic certification, their products are often sold as conventional or at prices that do not reflect their increased value. The only occasional benefit is the facilitation of sales due to the existence of the certification “paper,” without this translating into economic profit for themselves. As a result, for many large-scale crop farmers, organic farming ends up being purely a subsidy-driven practice: applied for the financial support it brings rather than for the intrinsic value the product carries in the market, potentially undermining the credibility of the entire organic grain value chain in Greece. By contrast, in countries such as Italy, organic value chains are more developed and offer better prices and stable absorption. This situation constitutes a distributive injustice: producers of organic grains and forage crops bear the cost of a more demanding production process without being adequately compensated. Even when they are committed to strictly following organic practices, they see the added value of their work dissipate because the system for marketing and distributing organic grains in the country has not been “built” in a way that supports them.
Regulation (EC) No. 834/2007 on organic production, as well as the new Regulation (EU) 2018/848 that replaced it and entered into force in 2022, does not set out specific minimum distances between organic and conventional crops. Farmers highlight this omission as a recognition injustice of a fundamental agronomic and spatial requirement. In areas with highly fragmented landholdings and the coexistence of different farming systems, the absence of clear spatial boundaries makes it extremely difficult to prevent contamination and undermines the credibility of organic production. Farmers express doubts about the feasibility of genuine compliance, given the limited technical options and the lack of institutional provisions for the protection of organic crops. This gap results not only in a formalistic application of organic farming—driven primarily by eligibility for subsidy schemes, but also in deep scepticism regarding the credibility of the production system itself. The indirect injustice expressed in this case does not concern unequal access to resources, but rather the absence of institutional recognition of a decisive precondition for meaningful participation in organic farming: the need for zoning. Many farmers question the possibility of producing reliable organic products under conditions of spatial incompatibility, a reality that undermines their confidence not only in the certification system but also in organic farming as a viable and realistic choice. The lack of recognition and planning regarding cultivation zones that are more suitable than others for organic production leads to frustration, a sense of injustice, and, in many cases, abandonment of organic farming status.
One of the less visible yet structurally significant injustices arising from the implementation of agricultural policies concerns the failure to recognize geographical specificities, even within highly productive lowland regions. Within a broader area, different local ecosystems and agricultural landscapes coexist: from fertile plains of high productivity to hilly and disadvantaged areas with more difficult access, mechanical limitations, or restricted irrigation potential. Farmers point out that policies for crop restructuring and the promotion of specific cultivation systems are applied in a blanket manner, without taking into account critical parameters such as differences in irrigation capacity, exposure to erosion risks, or productive variation between areas within the same plain. Even regulations that appear rational on the surface, such as the prohibition of ploughing on parcels with a slope greater than 15%, seem to be applied without geographical adaptation, leading to measures that are either meaningless or unnecessarily hinder agricultural activity. The disregard of these geographical specificities constitutes a form of recognition injustice, both because it ignores or homogenizes unequal capabilities and challenges between areas (e.g., rainfed vs. irrigated land) and because it undermines elements that form part of farmers’ identity and local knowledge. For some, this translates into reduced access to subsidies or support measures, while for others it results in the loss of potential comparative advantages linked to their distinctive geomorphology, locality, and the “authenticity” of their production characteristics that could be leveraged through certification schemes, local markets, or differentiated farming systems (e.g., regenerative, organic, or integrated management). Farmers perceive a need for cultivation zones or special support regimes that reflect local capacities. For example, organic farming in hilly fodder-producing areas, or strict integrated management in intensively irrigated parcels of the plain. However, current measures do not respond to this need. The lack of flexibility and participatory design reinforces the perception that policy ignores not only the material conditions of production but also the cognitive experience of farmers. Moreover, the potential to turn local specificities into productive advantages remains untapped. As a result, this injustice extends beyond the allocation of subsidies and touches upon deeper issues of recognition and inclusion within the transformation of the agri-food sector.
The quality of cotton is an issue that consistently pits producers against ginners. Around this issue, significant organizational and technological asymmetries appear to emerge, influencing economic relations, negotiation terms between the parties involved, and ultimately the quality of the final product. In the current framework of cotton production, the farmer aims for seed cotton yield, the ginning plant for ginning outturn (lint cotton), and the ginner’s client (the spinning mill) for quality (fiber length, strength, micronaire). In this way, ginning plants act as regulatory intermediaries within the cotton production system, determining the quality of the product. The majority of farmers recognize what they consider a significant injustice on the part of ginners, as they claim they are not adequately compensated for producing higher-quality cotton. This, they argue, discourages further efforts toward quality improvement. Indeed, some producers report deliberately targeting lower-quality output, asserting that in doing so they achieve maximum profit, since the additional costs required to produce higher quality are not offset by purchase prices. In this process, an important advantage is lost, the long-standing experience that has been accumulated in cotton cultivation in Thessaly. Many farmers express the belief that they possess the technical expertise and inherited knowledge to meet the demand for higher-quality production, but this experience remains underutilized due to the lack of incentives and rewards.
The issue of the quality of Greek cotton constitutes a point of contention between the technological and organizational logics of producers and ginners. At a deeper level, however, it reflects a more fundamental lack: the absence of recognition of farmers’ need to orient their production towards higher-quality, higher value-added products. Many producers, perceiving that superior quality is not tangibly rewarded, adopt technologies that maximize short-term economic efficiency at the expense of quality. A characteristic example is the growing use of stripper-type harvesters which, unlike the conventional picker harvester that selectively collects the boll, strip the entire plant, resulting in a greater harvested mass but with high foreign matter content. This choice is not intended to profit from weigh, tsince foreign matter is deducted in the ginning plant’s pricing, but rather to reduce costs, as stripper harvesters have lower operating expenses, thereby cutting total harvesting costs by up to 50%. However, the result is a significant degradation of the final product, with lower ginning yields and inferior quality characteristics (color degradation, shorter fiber length, and high levels of foreign matter). The burden of this quality degradation is also passed on to the ginning industry, which faces increased sorting costs and a lower commercial value for the product. Consequently, a vicious cycle emerges in which the lack of incentives for producing quality cotton, combined with the absence of institutional and commercial recognition of its added value, leads to practices that perpetuate low quality and the broader inability of the sector to upgrade its quality profile and achieve competitive differentiation in international markets.
The risk of devaluation of investments and fixed capital in large-scale TOEVs, such as TOEV Tavropos, constitutes a recognition injustice, in the sense that with the establishment of O.DY.TH. (the Thessaly Water Management Organization), the assets and investments (in the network) made by the Organization will, under the law abolishing the OEVs, be transferred to O.DY.TH. This means that a substantial part of the equipment, such as network maintenance machinery, drones, and harvesting machines, purchased with the members’ own capital will cease to be their property, without any compensation or priority in use. Furthermore, TOEV Tavropos’s network is currently undergoing a transition to an underground pressurized system, with approved studies in place and the Organization’s staff actively engaged in its implementation. Under a centralized organization with limited bureaucratic flexibility and conditions of private employment (in contrast to the voluntary, unpaid work historically provided by producer representatives on the TOEV’s board), concerns have been expressed over the potential devaluation of the HYDROR 2 program, as well as possible delays in the project, which could increase its costs and, consequently, undermine its viability.
The restriction of the number of cultivated varieties entails a different, less visible but equally critical risk: the reduction of genetic biodiversity. Cotton, and particularly cottonseed, is characterized by high phenotypic variability compared to other seed species. A systematic focus on just four or five genetically similar varieties can lead to a narrower genetic base, limiting the range of genetic traits that may prove valuable in the future, especially in the context of breeding programs. As experts have noted, excessive uniformity, while offering advantages in standardization, carries the risk of losing genes that may be crucial for resilience against emerging pathogens or extreme climatic conditions. Therefore, while the argument of varietal dispersion as a market barrier is not empirically substantiated, legitimate concerns are raised regarding genetic resilience and the long-term sustainability of production.
The tightening of European plant protection policy, under Regulation (EC) No. 1107/2009, has in recent years led to the withdrawal of many active substances that were widely used in agricultural production. Their prohibition was based on documented concerns regarding human health, toxicity to pollinators, or environmental pollution, as established through assessments by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). Among these are substances critical to key crops, such as phosmet (an insecticide for cotton bollworm), glufosinate and S-metolachlor (herbicides), as well as the fungicides cyproconazole and mancozeb, which were extensively applied in cereals. The bans have necessitated the search for alternatives, including approved alternative plant protection products, biological formulations, Integrated Pest Management (IPM) strategies, and cross-compliance schemes. On the other hand, many producers argue that the withdrawal of these substances has resulted in higher costs and limited, often less effective, alternatives. They also stress that in third countries, products banned in the EU continue to be used, creating significant disparities in production costs. Similar concerns have been voiced by the Hellenic Crop Protection Association (HCPA), one of the principal scientific and professional bodies representing the plant protection sector in Greece, which includes companies marketing plant protection products. The HCPA has expressed reservations about EU bans on active substances, particularly when these are not accompanied by sufficient scientific justification or viable alternative solutions for farmers. It has also raised concerns regarding the proposed Sustainable Use of Pesticides Regulation (SUR), which aims to reduce the use and risk of pesticides by 50% by 2030. Farmers describe this situation as a form of distributive injustice, manifesting as a competitiveness deficit in relation to imports from third countries. They emphasize that while they are required to use milder, more expensive products, often insufficient to adequately protect crops, they receive no equivalent support or protection from unfair competition, as imported products from third countries are allowed onto the market without being subject to EU regulations.
One of the issues frequently raised in public discourse concerning the quality of agricultural products relates to the unequal competitiveness of Greek cotton in international markets. This perceived injustice is linked to the so-called “varietal dispersion” (panspermia of varieties) problem, as highlighted by certain experts, farmers, and seed companies. Experts argue that the simultaneous cultivation of multiple varieties complicates quality control, uniformity, and product standardization. Seed companies appear to adopt this position as well, since it aligns with their interest in promoting and marketing their own varieties. This concern, however, has its roots in the era of the Cotton Organization (Organismos Vamvakos), which, until the early 2000s, centrally regulated production and varietal distribution within a public framework. Prior to the dissolution of the Cotton Organization, production derived primarily from just two varieties (Acala and Zeta-2), resulting in a high degree of homogeneity and standardization in Greek production. Today, however, the so-called “varietal dispersion” problem appears to be of limited substance. While hundreds of varieties circulate in the market, five account for approximately 80% of the total cultivated area, with the remaining 20 varieties sharing the remaining 20%. This trend suggests that the “panspermia” argument may be overstated and that it does not constitute a significant limiting factor for the competitiveness of Greek cotton, contrary to claims made by certain actors within the agri-food sector.
Two key forms of distributive injustice faced by irrigators under the water management practices of previous TOEV Tavropos administrations concerned the just allocation of irrigation water, the transparency of its distribution, and the modernization of the network (from open-channel to closed system). The modernization is currently underway through the undergrounding of the existing network, which has been included in the Recovery and Resilience Facility (HYDROR 2), following comprehensive studies designed and completed by the Organization, alongside the recruitment of a legal representative and an engineer. These studies incorporated both current and future irrigation needs in relation to the pressure of the gravity-fed network at intake points, including the potential for installing sprinkler irrigation systems. The first two injustices were addressed using the resources, personal time, and expertise of the current board members. Initial steps involved an extensive registration of members and an assessment of their irrigation needs. Subsequently, a culture of “scheduled water demand” was cultivated among network irrigators. To ensure transparency in the irrigation cycle between producers, the Organization’s members designed an application that scheduled irrigation based on demand while also enabling “real-time” monitoring of active irrigation events.
The insufficient conditions for balancing competition in production costs, arising from different irrigation practices in each area, constitute a form of distributive injustice as they are directly linked to the available infrastructure and the geographical location of irrigators. The method of irrigation is directly dependent on whether production costs increase or decrease. In the wider Karditsa area, irrigation relies exclusively on open concrete-lined channels (cement block – tsimentavlaka) using surface flooding, where irrigation costs are particularly low, not exceeding €4–8. However, the network is outdated in its coverage, dating back to the mid-1960s, and suffers from significant water losses in the process of distribution. In addition, due to entrenched choices of previous TOEV administrations, there is no electrical network available for irrigators in Tavropos. With successive increases in diesel fuel prices in recent years, used by producers for managing their farm instead of electricity, the energy problem continues to constitute a distributive injustice for TOEV irrigators, as it rapidly increases production costs despite the particularly low irrigation fee, especially during the early growth stages of crops such as cotton and maize. Development programs for drip irrigation with a 70% subsidy, planned by certain prefectural authorities in 2006–2007, were not implemented in Tavropos because they could not be applied or adopted by producers unless the electrification issue was first resolved. Furthermore, due to surface flooding, there has been a significant decline in soil fertility, which in turn raises production costs through increased use of fossil fuels and fertilizers. With the closed underground pressurized network—whose design has been approved and is in the tendering process (Public–Private Partnership – HYDROR 2 Project, included in the Recovery and Resilience Facility). Τhese injustices are expected to be resolved, as the network, due to the area’s morphology (gravity-driven), is designed to provide natural pressure for irrigation with zero energy input.
In the Regional Unit of Karditsa, the TOEV Tavropos, one of the largest local land reclamation and improvement organizations in Karditsa and among the largest in Greece in terms of operational area. It manages an open irrigation network spanning 886 kilometers of concrete channels, serving 160,000 acres around the city of Karditsa, of which 114,750 acres are irrigated primarily through surface flooding. Seasonal water shortages, particularly during the summer months, arise from local conditions such as depleted aquifers and recurring drought, representing a form of distributive injustice insofar as they concern the equitable allocation of resources and access to them. While TOEV Tavropos itself does not face direct shortages, being both the manager and primary recipient of water from Lake Tavropou – Plastiras. The lake has, since 1976, been designated by state authorities as critical infrastructure for mitigating water scarcity and drought across the wider Thessaly region. Consequently, its reserves have been allocated not only within the Municipality of Karditsa but also to other areas, including Sellana, Titanio, Farkadona, and even Larissa, in part to supplement the flow of the Pineios River. In this context, the absence of water-saving measures by the entitled manager and primary recipient risks creating potential distributive injustices for the other regions to which the lake’s reserves are informally shared. Historically, this practice generated significant pressure on water distribution within the network itself, perpetuating inequities even among TOEV members, particularly those who, for political or other reasons, were marginalized by previous administrations, a situation that persisted until 2016. The introduction of rational and transparent irrigation management, notably through the establishment of a fixed seven-day irrigation cycle, was among the first reforms implemented to promote fair resource allocation. These measures were supported by daily water-use recording and, subsequently, the installation of electronic monitoring through metering devices, ensuring more equitable distribution and improved accountability.
The inability of the State to regulate the price of electricity for agricultural use, alongside the inability to prioritize TOEVs (Local Land Reclamation Organizations) for the financing of energy projects that could contribute to their energy autonomy (through net metering, interconnected networks, or autonomous systems with battery storage), is recognized as a pivotal injustice of recognition. This leads to an increase in the fixed operating costs of cultivation that depends on irrigation through boreholes. Almost 80% of production costs are attributed to electricity expenses. In the region of Farsala (TOEV Enippeas Farsalon), irrigation relies exclusively on groundwater, making the cost of electricity the most significant expense of irrigated farming for local producers. The consequence of this injustice has a dual dimension. On the one hand, it represents an additional burden for producers, increasing their cultivation costs compared to other irrigators who use closed networks, surface water, or even flood irrigation. On the other hand, the rising irrigation costs render some producers unable to meet their contractual obligations and cover their irrigation payments to the organizations. As a result, this debt is transferred as a “loss” to the TOEV, leading to the deterioration of its financial viability and, at the same time, straining the social relations between the organization’s board and those producers within the local community. Although Enippeas Farsalon attempted to resolve this issue by developing photovoltaic parks that would serve exclusively the needs of local producers, the main obstacle was financing (due to bank guarantee requirements). This was further compounded by the limited transmission capacity of the local electricity networks, which are already occupied by private electricity providers’ investments, exploiting the finite infrastructure.
The need for directness with producers was framed by the majority of stakeholders as a potential injustice in the event that the administration is distanced from the Local Land Reclamation Organizations (TOEΩ) through a possible centralization of the new irrigation management authority (ODYTH). The mediation role of the TOEB is considered crucial in smoothing relations among irrigators in cases of conflict over irrigation priority, the availability and distribution of water resources, as well as the organization of the irrigation cycle. Within this framework, it was argued that a major gap that the new organization could address is the design and implementation of new infrastructure deemed critical for irrigation, as determined locally on the basis of the specific needs of each region.
Farmers in the Regional Unit of Larissa argue that the design of eco-schemes is problematic and, in many cases, not feasible in practice. Specifically, they refer to instances where the prescribed crop rotation within a given eco-scheme cannot be implemented because the harvest period of the previous crop occurs later than the sowing period of the subsequent one. In this way, certain eco-schemes become unfeasible, and as a result, farmers who select them but are unable to implement them are excluded from the corresponding subsidies. The problematic design is attributed to the fact that it is carried out by officials of the Ministry of Rural Development and Food, together with university academics acting as advisors, without taking into account the local Directorates of Rural Development, which possess accumulated field-based knowledge and could therefore contribute decisively to the feasibility of eco-schemes. The design of eco-schemes through a “top-down” process that excludes both farmers themselves and actors of local knowledge constitutes a form of procedural injustice. This procedural injustice also entails distributive injustice, since poor design, responsible for the non-feasibility of eco-schemes deprives farmers of the opportunity to benefit from them and, in some cases, directly excludes them from additional subsidies.
In Greece, the domestic genetic improvement of varieties is carried out by seed production companies and by the Research Institutes of ELGO-DIMITΕR. Farmers’ participation is limited to the use of their fields for seed multiplication, receiving in return the higher selling price of seed as sowing material. Their position in the seed production chain is thus that of cultivator–multiplier of varieties, without any involvement in the actual “shaping” of varieties and, naturally, without any share in the rights (royalties) of the seeds they reproduce. In the process of varietal improvement, the knowledge considered appropriate and valid is the official technical expertise of agronomists working either in universities and research institutes or in seed companies. Farmers’ knowledge, whether technical or tacit, is not regarded as relevant and therefore goes unrecognized. Many farmers in the Regional Unit of Larissa, as well as elsewhere, have expressed their willingness to participate in participatory plant breeding programs, while several civil society organizations have also developed initiatives in this direction. These farmers and organizations envision the development of breeding programs in which farmers’ knowledge would be taken into account in the very “shaping” of varieties. Farmers would thus become critical actors in varietal development, moving beyond a merely procedural role in seed production as multipliers of varieties already designed by others. Moreover, through such a process, farmers could also gain a share in the rights of the resulting varieties. The vision of participatory plant breeding is often linked to the demand for the development of organic crops and crops resilient to climate change, since the focus of these initiatives is the creation of varieties that perform well under conditions of water scarcity and reduced inputs. For the time being, however, farmers are excluded from breeding programs. This exclusion results from the non-recognition of their knowledge and experience as relevant and appropriate for varietal development. At present, the knowledge practically deemed suitable for this purpose by the dominant actors is only academic and corporate scientific-technical expertise.
Farmers in the Regional Unit of Larissa observe that, in order to safeguard the very character of organic cultivation, it is necessary to establish designated organic farming zones. These zones should in some way be demarcated or shielded from adjacent conventional fields. This is essential to prevent organic crops and their products from being affected by potentially harmful practices applied in neighboring conventional farming. Farmers further note that the establishment of such zones is particularly important in countries like Greece, where small and fragmented landholdings dominate. Otherwise, the integrity of organic farming as an endeavor is placed at risk, as it remains vulnerable to accusations that it does not fully meet organic standards. Organic farming essentially differs from conventional agriculture. The need for the development of cultivation zones is not clearly stipulated in EU and national regulations for organic farming. Even when such a need is mentioned, it is not explicitly linked to the risk of contamination of organic crops from practices applied in neighboring conventional fields. Although the Greek government has only recently (Minister of Rural Development and Food, December 2024) initiated a tentative discussion on the delineation of cultivation zones, much remains to be done before this debate leads to tangible results. The policy of not designating specific zones for organic farming constitutes a form of misrecognition against farmers who wish to invest in organic agriculture and consistently practice the profession of organic producer. This is because the proximity of organic to conventional fields creates conditions for qualitative, symbolic, and commercial downgrading of the former, thereby generating unfavorable terms for their development. Misrecognition also lies in the non-recognition of the local knowledge of the farmers involved knowledge that could otherwise be incorporated into the design of organic farming regulations.
One of the less visible but structurally significant injustices arising from the implementation of agricultural policies concerns the inability to recognize geographical specificities, even within the most productive lowland areas. Within a wider region, diverse local ecosystems and agricultural landscapes coexist: from highly productive plains to hilly and disadvantaged areas with more difficult access, mechanical limitations, or restricted irrigability. Farmers stress that restructuring policies and the promotion of crops or cultivation systems are applied in a horizontal manner, without taking into account critical parameters such as differences in irrigation potential, exposure to erosion risks, or productive differentiation between areas within the same plain. Even regulations with an ostensibly rational character, such as the prohibition of plowing in plots with a slope greater than 15%, appear to be applied without geographical adaptation, resulting in measures that are either meaningless or unjustifiably burdensome for agricultural activity. The disregard of these geographical particularities constitutes a form of misrecognition, both because it ignores or homogenizes unequal capacities and challenges among areas (e.g., rainfed vs. irrigated lands), and because it cancels elements that constitute the identity and local knowledge of farmers. For some, this translates into limited access to subsidies or support schemes, while for others it means the loss of potential comparative advantages linked to their specific geomorphology, locality, and the “authenticity” of their production, characteristics that could be promoted, for example, through certification schemes, local markets, or differentiated farming systems (e.g., regenerative, organic, or integrated management). Farmers recognize the need for cultivation zones or for special support regimes that reflect local capabilities, for instance, the application of organic farming in hilly areas with fodder crops, or the implementation of strict integrated management in intensively irrigated lowland plots. However, the current measures do not meet this need. The lack of flexibility and participatory planning reinforces the perception that policy ignores not only the material conditions of production but also the experiential knowledge of farmers. Moreover, the possibility of transforming local particularities into productive advantages remains unexploited. Thus, this injustice is not limited to the distribution of subsidies but extends to deeper issues of recognition and inclusion in the transformation of the agri-food system.
A form of misrecognition injustice that is systematically reported by farmers concerns the regulatory and technical framework of Integrated Management, particularly in arable crops such as cereals and cotton. The implementation of Integrated Management appears to exhibit strong characteristics of formality and bureaucratization. As farmers’ experiences demonstrate, the system operates almost exclusively “on paper”: producers are required to fill in logs, collaborate with agronomists, and maintain records of cultivation practices, yet in practice neither the applied methods are differentiated, nor does substantive compliance control exist. This dynamic is also confirmed by the broader European experience. According to the European Commission report (2020), the implementation of Directive 2009/128/EC on the sustainable use of pesticides remains limited, as member states have not introduced sufficient controls, mandatory compliance indicators, or effective monitoring mechanisms. This amounts to a double weakness: on the one hand, supervisory authorities do not carry out adequate or targeted inspections, while on the other hand, farmers, lacking pressure or incentives do not change their practices. In fact, for products such as cotton, which are not intended for human consumption, farmers point out that there are not even superficial checks, a situation that entrenches a lack of recognition of environmental degradation. This condition constitutes a misrecognition injustice not only on the part of policymakers and the enforcement mechanism, but also on the part of farmers themselves. As a result, the real environmental footprint of cultivation practices is downplayed, while at the same time a form of compliance is projected that functions sometimes as superficial, sometimes as misleading. Integrated Management is used as a tool for securing subsidies or commercial certification, without leading to any actual environmental improvement. This situation also constitutes an injustice of misrecognition regarding the professional responsibility of those farmers who may wish to comply meaningfully but operate within a delegitimized framework of implementation.
Refences:
Helepciuc, F. E., & Todor, A. (2021). Evaluating the effectiveness of the EU’s approach to the sustainable use of pesticides. PLoS ONE, 16(9), e0256719.
Pesticide Action Network Europe. EU pesticide reduction (Sustainable Use Regulation SUR). https://www.pan-europe.info/eu-legislation/eu-pesticide-reduction-sustainable-use-regulation-sur
The issue of the quality of Greek cotton constitutes a point of conflict between the technological and organizational logics of farmers and ginners. At a deeper level, however, it reflects a more fundamental lack: the absence of recognition of farmers’ need to orient their production toward higher-quality, higher–added value products. Many farmers, realizing that superior quality is not practically rewarded, adopt technologies that maximize short-term economic efficiency at the expense of quality. A telling example is the increasing use of stripper-type harvesters, which, unlike the classic picker machines that selectively collect the bolls, strip the entire plant, leading to a larger harvest mass but with a high content of foreign matter. This choice is not aimed at profiteering by weight, since foreign matter is deducted in pricing by the ginneries, but rather at saving costs, as stripper machines have lower operating expenses, reducing the total harvesting cost by up to 50%. However, the result is a significant degradation of the final product, with lower ginning yield and inferior quality characteristics (color downgrading, shorter fiber, higher proportion of foreign matter). The burden of this quality downgrading, however, is also transferred to the ginning industry, which faces increased sorting costs and lower commercial value of the product. Consequently, this situation produces a vicious circle: the lack of incentives for producing high-quality cotton, combined with the absence of institutional and commercial recognition of its added value, leads to practices that perpetuate low quality and reinforce the broader inability of the sector to upgrade qualitatively and achieve competitive differentiation in international markets.
Climate change appears to be affecting plant–pathogen interactions, with key consequences including the emergence of more severe diseases and the development of resistance to active substances in use. According to many farmers, in recent years crop infestations have increased, and combined with the limited effectiveness of available control methods, the cost of crop protection has risen, not only in Greece but across the EU as a whole. Eurostat data for 2023 show that the average cost of plant protection products rose by 9% compared to the previous year, despite the decline in the cost of other inputs such as fertilizers and fuels. Moreover, the European Commission estimates that the agrochemical industry spends around €300 million annually to prepare dossiers for the approval and renewal of active substances, while the cost of developing and proving the safety of a new active substance ranges between €200–250 million. In this context, the distributive injustice lies in the disproportionate burden placed on farmers, who must shoulder the escalating cost of crop protection while their agricultural income remains compressed. Although farmers themselves acknowledge the need to limit environmental degradation, they are confronted with increasingly severe phytopathological pressures, which they are forced to manage through either conventional crop protection products or more expensive biological formulations promoted under the environmental transition framework. This situation deepens a sense of frustration regarding both economic and environmental sustainability, as farmers feel they bear the cost of environmental policies without being adequately compensated through the prices they receive for their products on the market.
Refences:
Eurostat. (2024, 19 Ιανουαρίου). News release: Agricultural statistics – main results for 2023 [Press release]. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20240119-1
European Commission. Evaluation report of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 on the placing of plant protection products on the market [Evaluation report].
A characteristic case of multiple injustices arising from seed variety choice concerns chickpeas. Since the early 2000s, Greek production has been dominated by a large-seeded, white chickpea originating from Mexico, preferred in the market mainly for its attractive appearance. However, the use of this seed is based on a significant misunderstanding: it is a grain seed (for consumption) and not a certified seed (for sowing). In other words, it is not a registered variety but uncertified material that is simply packaged and sold to farmers as seed.The use of this seed generates serious injustices on three levels. First, toward consumers, who unknowingly consume a product heavily burdened with pesticides. The Mexican seed is highly susceptible to fungal diseases, particularly Ascochyta blight, and requires 4 to 6 pesticide sprays per growing season to remain productive. Second, it is an injustice against farmers themselves. Although many recognize the value of Greek varieties, such as Thiva, Amorgos, and Gavdos, which are disease-resistant and require minimal or no spraying, they are driven to cultivate the Mexican seed. This happens because Greek varieties, being medium- or small-seeded and darker in color, do not meet dominant consumer aesthetic preferences and are thus considered commercially less attractive. As a result, farmers face increased cultivation costs without access to markets that would reward the choice of more sustainable varieties. Finally, this practice entails a severe environmental cost, as the extensive spraying significantly increases the chemical burden on agricultural ecosystems.In essence, this is a vicious cycle where lack of awareness and insufficient institutional regulation lead to practices that benefit neither farmers, nor consumers, nor the environment.
One of the issues often raised in public discourse concerning the quality of agricultural products relates to the unequal competition faced by Greek cotton in international markets. This perceived injustice is linked to the so-called problem of the “varietal diversity” (panspermia of varieties), which is emphasized by certain experts, farmers, and seed multiplication companies. Experts point out that the simultaneous cultivation of multiple varieties makes quality control, uniformity, and product standardization more difficult. On the other hand, seed companies appear to adopt and reinforce this position, as it serves their interest in promoting and marketing their own varieties. However, this concern seems to have its roots in the era of the Cotton Organization, which until the early 2000s centrally regulated production and the distribution of varieties within a public framework. Before the abolition of the Cotton Organization, production mainly relied on two varieties, Acala and Zeta-2, indeed ensuring a high degree of homogeneity and standardization in Greek production.Today, however, the so-called panspermia problem appears to no longer exist to a significant extent, since although hundreds of varieties circulate in the market, five of them account for about 80% of the total, while the remaining twenty share the remaining 20%. This trend indicates that the argument of “panspermia” may be overstated and does not constitute a serious limiting factor for the competitiveness of Greek cotton, despite claims made by certain actors within the agri-food sector.
Access to funding and opportunities for investment in irrigation networks constitutes a distributive injustice, affecting both smaller TOEVs and those whose fixed operating costs, such as electricity, leave little room for reinvestment from the organization’s reserves. Investments in maintenance and modernization are crucial for ensuring the stability of irrigation networks and for saving water consumption. The most significant transition currently underway is the shift toward closed irrigation networks, which maximize water savings in distribution, an essential step in further reducing water use in areas where drip irrigation already dominates at the farm level. However, the financial burden of making this transition remains a major obstacle. Access to financing frameworks requires the preparation of technical studies and a host of bureaucratic procedures that go beyond the capacity of many TOEVs. A key injustice for farmers in Farsala is the absence of essential storage infrastructures. Such infrastructures could both protect the region from floods and provide alternative irrigation sources, thereby easing pressure on already overexploited and depleted aquifers. Representatives acknowledge that several projects announced by successive governments have never advanced. The most critical of these, which could genuinely alleviate irrigation problems in the area, are the completion of the Skopia and Pyli dams, as well as the planning and construction of the Narthaki (Loutziakorema) and Dilofo (Kaklitzorema) dams, together with a range of smaller reservoirs and retention basins. The latter two dams at Narthaki and Dilofo will have capacities of 711,000 and 1,700,000 cubic meters of water respectively, and are expected to relieve the current irrigation pressures in the region. In addition, the enrichment project of the Ypereia–Orfana reservoirs comprising eight reservoirs for the province of Farsala and three for the prefecture of Karditsa, along with 180,000 meters of underground pipelines to irrigate 50,000 acres is considered by local representatives as a fundamental prerequisite to prevent the continued abandonment of farmland in the region.
The insufficient conditions for balancing competitiveness in production costs, arising from different irrigation practices, constitute a distributive injustice, as they are directly linked to the available infrastructures, the geographical position of irrigators, and the geological composition of soils. The method of irrigation is directly dependent on whether production costs increase or decrease. The largest share of production costs stems from electricity consumption needed to operate boreholes, since in the Farsala area irrigation is almost exclusively dependent on this practice given the infrastructures currently in place. Farmers in the region acknowledge that this practice (use of pumping) significantly raises production costs and thus reduces their net income. Because irrigation relies exclusively on boreholes, annual electricity expenses amount to approximately €2–2.5 million euros, a burden borne by the irrigators of Farsala, which directly undermines their competitiveness compared to other regions with access to surface waters or artificial lakes and reservoirs. This reliance sharply increases the costs of irrigation for each cultivation cycle. In other words, the irrigation fee is driven upward by electricity costs, which dramatically shrink the profit margins of the area’s producers.
The lack of water or the insufficiency of available water, especially during the summer months due to local specificities, constitutes a distributive injustice, in the sense that it concerns the fair allocation of resources and access to them. In the case of the Regional Unit of Larissa, particularly the city of Farsala and the TOEV of Enipeas Farsalon, which serves approximately 6,800 irrigators from Farsala and nearby villages—the issue of irrigation is pressing. Unlike the hydrological conditions of Larissa, the TOEV of Farsala has no access to surface waters, as irrigation relies exclusively on boreholes, that is, on the availability of groundwater aquifers. The TOEV manages around 187–197 active boreholes, 11–12 pumping stations, an irrigation network of about 550 kilometers, and approximately 1.5 million meters of drainage ditches. Signs of water scarcity have become evident in the region, as in the past decade pumping depths from boreholes have extended from 100 meters down to 300–350 meters. The problem is particularly acute given that in the wider province of Farsala, 2,500 boreholes are officially licensed. Under these conditions, irrigators in Farsala are especially vulnerable during periods of drought when groundwater levels are low, an essential factor for crop development and the productivity of the local farming population. These conditions have led to the adoption of drip irrigation by more than 95% of the farming population in order to save water. Furthermore, due to the climatic conditions of the area, most crops have been concentrated into specific irrigated zones, accompanied by the necessary investments in equipment.
Η πλειονότητα των βαμβακοπαραγωγών αναφέρει ότι υφίσταται σημαντική αδικία λόγω της πώλησης του βάμβακος στην Ελλάδα ως σύσπορου και όχι ως εκκοκκισμένου προϊόντος. Η συγκεκριμένη συνθήκη αναγνωρίζεται ως μια ελληνική ιδιαιτερότητα η οποία επιβάλλεται από τις εκκοκκιστικές επιχειρήσεις, οι οποίες ασκούν τον έλεγχο σε όλη την εμπορική αλυσίδα. Ως αποτέλεσμα, η συγκεκριμένη μορφή εμπορίας στερεί από τον παραγωγό μια δυνατότητα ουσιαστικής αξιολόγησης και διαπραγμάτευσης της ποιοτικής αξίας της παραγωγής του, καθώς η εκκοκκιστική απόδοση (δηλαδή το ποσοστό καθαρού ίνας βάμβακος ανά κιλό σύσπορου) και τα κρίσιμα ποιοτικά χαρακτηριστικά του προϊόντος (όπως το μήκος, η αντοχή και το χρώμα της ίνας) παραμένουν έξω από τον έλεγχό του.
Από την πλευρά τους, οι εκκοκκιστές δεν αναγνωρίζουν την εμπορία του σύσπορου ως πρόβλημα. Παρ’ όλα αυτά, για οργανωτικούς και τεχνικούς λόγους δεν μπορούν να ανταποκριθούν στο πάγιο αίτημα των παραγωγών για ατομική ποιοτική αποτίμηση μέσω της πώλησης του βάμβακος ως εκκοκκισμένου. Η απουσία αποθηκευτικών υποδομών σε επίπεδο εκμετάλλευσης, σε συνδυασμό με τη μαζική και ταυτόχρονη μεταφορά της συγκομισμένης παραγωγής κατά την εκκοκκιστική περίοδο, οδηγεί συχνά στην ανάμιξη προϊόντων από διαφορετικά αγροτεμάχια και ποιοτικά χαρακτηριστικά. Αυτό καθιστά αδύνατο τον ποιοτικό διαχωρισμό και την εξατομικευμένη αποτίμηση κάθε δέματος βάμβακος. Σε αυτό το πλαίσιο, ο αποκλεισμός των παραγωγών από τη δυνατότητα ανάδειξης της ποιοτικής υπεροχής της παραγωγής τους όχι μόνο αναπαράγει μια δομική ανισότητα στην αγοραία σχέση με τα εκκοκκιστήρια, αλλά οδηγεί και σε προβληματικές ως προς την ποιότητα πρακτικές (βλ. χρήση μηχανών τύπου stripper).
Απόσπασμα 1
«- Η ανώτερη ποιότητα πληρώνεται;
– Δεν πληρώνει… Να πει 10 λεπτά παραπάνω εδώ στον ****** γιατί έχει καλύτερο…
– Να μου δώσει κίνητρο…
– Δεν την πληρώνει… Δεν δίνεται δηλαδή μεγάλο κίνητρο για…
– Ο εκκοκκιστής πληρώνεται με την ποιότητα, εμείς όχι…
– Δεν μας ενδιαφέρει η ποιότητα αφού αυτοί πληρώνουν με τα κιλά.
– Και είμαστε η μόνη χώρα παγκοσμίως που πουλάμε σύσπορο. Τριτοκοσμικοί…
– Πληρώνουν τον εκκοκκιστή και πουλάω εγώ μπάλα…
– Αυτό είναι σημαντικό να ακουστεί…
– Την ποιότητα δεν μας την πληρώνουν. Μας την πληρώνουν μέσα από τα προγράμματα μόνο…
– Αυτό πρέπει να αλλάξει.
– Πρέπει… Ας το αλλάξουν…
– Κάποια χρήματα που παίρνουμε για την ποιότητα την οποία την βγάζουν μόνοι τους. Μόνοι τους το βαφτίζουν το παιδί, μόνοι τους τον παπά, μόνοι τους την κολυμπήθρα… 2 με 3 λεπτά… Το οποίο το προσδιορίζουν αυτοί πόσο είναι… Εγώ δεν έχω λόγο, απλά μου δίνουν ένα χαρτί και μου λένε το βαμβάκι σου ήταν έτσι… Ενώ υπό κανονικές συνθήκες την ώρα που πάω εγώ να το παραδώσω, πρέπει εκείνη την ώρα face to face…»
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με αγρότες της ΠΕ Τρικάλων)
Η αδυναμία ρύθμισης της τιμής του ηλεκτρικού ρεύματος για αγροτική χρήση από την Πολιτεία παράλληλα την αδυναμία προτεραιοποίησης των ΤΟΕΒ για την χρηματοδότηση ενεργειακών έργων που θα συμβάλουν στην ενεργειακή τους αυτονόμηση (ενεργειακός συμψηφισμός ή άλλη μορφή διασυνδεδεμένων δικτύων ή αυτόνομων με μπαταρία) αναγνωρίζεται ως μια κομβική αδικία αναγνώρισης που οδηγεί στην αύξηση των λειτουργικών πάγιων εξόδων μιας καλλιέργειας που στηρίζεται στην άρδευση με γεώτρηση. Σημειώθηκε επίσης ότι οι αυξανόμενες τιμές του ηλεκτρισμού λειτούργησαν αποτρεπτικά στην άρδευση με γεώτρηση, όπου σχεδόν διπλασιάστηκε το κόστος. Λόγω μεγάλης παλαιότητας των εγκαταστάσεων των μηχανικών μερών (μοτέρ) της άρδευσης (γεωτρήσεις), οι αρδευτές στο Ζάρκο επιβαρύνονται ιδιαίτερα με το κόστος του ηλεκτρικού ρεύματος, παρόλο που αντλούν από σχετικά μικρό βάθος (μέχρι 70 μέτρα). Επίσης λόγω παλαιότητας των εγκαταστάσεων των γεωτρήσεων, που κατασκευάστηκαν από τα μέσα της δεκαετίας του 1970, οι περισσότερες παρουσιάζουν ανομοιομορφία στις δυνατότητες άντλησης και στην αντιμετώπιση αυτού του προβλήματος ο ΤΟΕΒ έχει προβεί στην σταδιακή εγκατάσταση Inverter προκειμένου να εξισορροπούν τις αρδευτικές τους ανάγκες και στην εξοικονόμηση του ηλεκτρικού ρεύματος. Ενώ το ΤΟΕΒ επιχείρησε να αιτηθεί για φωτοβολταϊκό πάρκο, όπου θα λειτουργούσε με ανταπόδοση (net metering), δεν υπήρχε δυνατότητα σύνδεσης με το δίκτυο, καθώς η χωρητικότητα των γραμμών είχαν φτάσει το μέγιστο των δυνατοτήτων τους. Η μόνη λύση προς αυτή την αδικία, δηλαδή της προτεραιοποίησης, στην σύνδεση των γραμμών, των ιδιωτικών εταιρειών έναντι των αγροτικών χρήσεων, είναι η επέκταση της χωρητικότητας του δικτύου, όπου όπως παρατηρούν οι εκπρόσωποι του ΤΟΕΒ, τα δίκτυα αυτή τη στιγμή είναι σε διαδικασία επέκτασης με επενδύσεις στις υπάρχουσες εγκαταστάσεις του διαχειριστή του δικτύου.
Αποσπασμα 1
“- έχουμε γεώτρηση που βγαίνει 28€ η ώρα
– 28€ η ώρα .. γιατί υπάρχει αυτή η ανισότητα;
– μεγάλα τα μοτέρια
– α είναι απαρχαιωμένα, είναι πιο παλιά
– τύπου τραβάνε…
– κι αυτή η πομόνα το στέλνει 4,5 χλμ αγωγό το οποίο εκεί κάναμε μια δεξαμενή και έχουμε άλλα μοτέρια και πληρώνουμε παραπάνω
– για να πάει σε χωράφια, σε πολλά σημεία … φεύγει από αυτή τη γωνιά και πηγαίνει πίσω σε εκείνα τα βουνά.
– τέρμα απέναντι στα βουνά
-τα ρίχνει στη δεξαμενή, σε 2 δεξαμενές υπάρχουν δύο ηλεκτρομοτέρ κι από κει και πέρα μετά, με τον ίδιο τρόπο”
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με εκπρόσωπο ΤΟΕΒ της ΠΕ Τρικάλων)
Αποσπασμα 2
“- ανταποδοτικό, δηλαδή εμείς τι συμφωνία κάναμε, ότι ρεύμα καίμε εμείς ως πομώνες, και τον υπόλοιπο καιρό να το παίρνει η ΔΕΗ
– αυτό λέω, όλοι μας λένε αυτό θέλουν να κάνουν αλλά ο νόμος δεν τους αφήνει
– έχουν όμως μας υποχρεώνουν
– και τα δίνουν σε ιδιώτες
– τα δίνουν σε ιδιώτες και ο λόγος αυτός είναι ότι δεν αντέχουν οι γραμμές
– να βάλεις δικό σου φωτοβολταϊκό…
– με τις γραμμές κι ότι δεν χωράμε να μπουν μέσα…
-επειδή εμείς εδώ είναι φορτωμένο το δίκτυο και τώρα γίνεται αυτή τη στιγμή, γίνεται τώρα αλλαγή, αλλαγή δικτύου,
– θα μεγαλώσουν;
– αλλάζουν τα καλώδια αλλάζουνε τα καλώδια τώρα
– άρα θα μεγαλώσει η χωρητικότητα
– αλλάζει η χωρητικότητα
– κι απ’ ότι μας είπανε ότι έχουν καβάντζα γραμμές, ότι έχουν χώρο
– απλώς ο ιδιώτης τι κάνει; Ο ιδιώτης κάνει δικό του υποσταθμό, και τον μοιράζει σιγά σιγά…
-δεν θέλω να μας χαρίσουν κάτι.. χρηματοδότησε το, εμείς χρησιμοποιούμε ρεύμα από τον Ιούνιο στην ουσία, η φουλ περίοδος ξεκινάει από Ιούνιο
-το μπαμπάκι τελειώνει 25 με 28 Αυγούστου… Τουτέστιν, όλο το υπόλοιπο παρτω.. παρτω, καντω, διαχειρίσου το όπως θέλεις.. δεν ζητάμε κάτι, απλά να το περπατήσουνε, να το χρηματοδοτήσουνε, και να το ξεχρεώσουμε σαν ΤΟΕΒ που είμαστε αυτή τη στιγμή δεν ξέρω το ΤΟΕΒ παραπέρα, με τα χρόνια παίρνοντας εκμεταλλεύονται το ρεύμα το δικό μας σου λέω που παράγουμε.”
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με εκπρόσωπο ΤΟΕΒ της ΠΕ Τρικάλων)
Μία από τις λιγότερο ορατές, αλλά δομικά σημαντικές αδικίες που αναδύονται από την εφαρμογή των γεωργικών πολιτικών, αφορά στην αδυναμία αναγνώρισης των γεωγραφικών ιδιαιτεροτήτων εντός ακόμη και των κατεξοχήν παραγωγικών πεδινών περιοχών. Εντός μιας ευρύτερης περιοχής συνυπάρχουν διαφορετικά τοπικά οικοσυστήματα και αγροτικά τοπία: από πεδινές εκτάσεις υψηλής παραγωγικότητας έως λοφώδεις και μειονεκτικές περιοχές με δυσκολότερη πρόσβαση, μηχανική αδυναμία ή περιορισμένη αρδευσιμότητα. Οι αγρότες τονίζουν ότι οι πολιτικές αναδιαρθρώσεων και προώθησης καλλιεργειών ή καλλιεργητικών συστημάτων εφαρμόζονται με τρόπο οριζόντιο, χωρίς να λαμβάνουν υπόψη κρίσιμες παραμέτρους όπως η διαφορά αρδευτικής δυνατότητας, η έκθεση σε κινδύνους διάβρωσης, ή η παραγωγική διαφοροποίηση μεταξύ περιοχών εντός του ίδιου κάμπου. Ακόμη και κανονισμοί με φαινομενικά ορθολογικό χαρακτήρα, όπως η απαγόρευση οργώματος σε αγροτεμάχια με κλίση άνω του 15%, φαίνεται να εφαρμόζονται χωρίς γεωγραφική προσαρμογή, οδηγώντας σε εφαρμογές που είτε δεν έχουν νόημα είτε δυσχεραίνουν αδικαιολόγητα τη γεωργική δραστηριότητα.
Η παραγνώριση αυτών των γεωγραφικών ιδιαιτεροτήτων συνιστά μια μορφή αδικίας μη-αναγνώρισης, αφενός επειδή αγνοεί ή εξομοιώνει άνισες δυνατότητες και προκλήσεις μεταξύ περιοχών (π.χ. ξηρικές vs. ποτιστικές εκτάσεις), αφετέρου επειδή ακυρώνει στοιχεία που συγκροτούν την ταυτότητα και την τοπική γνώση των αγροτών. Για ορισμένους, αυτό μεταφράζεται σε περιορισμένη πρόσβαση σε επιδοτήσεις ή δυνατότητες ενίσχυσης, ενώ για άλλους σε απώλεια εν δυνάμει συγκριτικών πλεονεκτημάτων που συνδέονται με την ιδιαίτερη γεωμορφολογία, την τοπικότητα και τη «γνησιότητα» της παραγωγής τους — χαρακτηριστικά που θα μπορούσαν να προβάλλονται, π.χ. μέσω σχημάτων πιστοποίησης, τοπικών αγορών ή διαφοροποιημένων συστημάτων γεωργίας (π.χ. αναγεννητική, βιολογική ή ολοκληρωμένη διαχείριση).
Οι αγρότες αντιλαμβάνονται την ανάγκη για καλλιεργητικές ζώνες ή για ειδικά καθεστώτα στήριξης που να αντανακλούν τις τοπικές δυνατότητες, π.χ. εφαρμογή βιολογικής γεωργίας σε λοφώδεις περιοχές με ζωοτροφές ή εφαρμογή αυστηρής ολοκληρωμένης διαχείρισης σε εντατικά αρδευόμενα αγροτεμάχια του κάμπου. Ωστόσο, τα ισχύοντα μέτρα δεν ανταποκρίνονται σε αυτή την ανάγκη.
Η απουσία ευελιξίας και συμμετοχικού σχεδιασμού εντείνει την αίσθηση ότι η πολιτική αγνοεί όχι μόνο τις υλικές συνθήκες της παραγωγής, αλλά και τη γνωσιακή εμπειρία των παραγωγών. Επίσης η δυνατότητα μετατροπής των τοπικών ιδιαιτεροτήτων σε παραγωγικά πλεονεκτήματα παραμένει ανεκμετάλλευτη. Έτσι, η αδικία αυτή δεν περιορίζεται στην κατανομή ενισχύσεων, αλλά αγγίζει βαθύτερα ζητήματα αναγνώρισης και ένταξης στον μετασχηματισμό του αγροδιατροφικού συστήματος.
Απόσπασμα 1
«- Ρε παιδιά είχε βγει αυτό εδώ πέρα και σταμάτησαν να οργώνουνε. Εμείς εδώ δεν έχουμε χωράφια με κλίση. Δεν έχουμε τέτοια χωράφια, και έπρεπε να κάνουμε και αναβαθμίδες δηλαδή στα 50 μέτρα να αφήνουμε 15 μέτρα κενό. Ποιος να τα κάνεις αυτά τα πράγματα εδώ πέρα; Και ποιος πάει να ελέγξει αυτά;
– Δηλαδή αμολάνε πράγματα στον αέρα που πρακτικά δεν γίνονται. Εμείς εδώ καλλιεργούμε τα χωράφια μας κανονικά δεν έχουμε τέτοια θέματα αλλά δεν έχουμε και 15% κλίση. Δεν ξέρω…»
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με αγρότες της ΠΕ Τρικάλων)
Οι αγρότες της ΠΕ Τρικάλων εκφράζουν τη δυσαρέσκειά τους για το γεγονός ότι οι πολιτικές αναδιάρθρωσης των καλλιεργειών που προτείνονται από τις κυβερνήσεις και τους προνομιακούς συνομιλητές της δεν λαμβάνουν υπόψη την πραγματική τους κατάσταση. Οι ίδιοι τονίζουν ότι στις αποφάσεις για την αλλαγή καλλιεργειών αγνοούνται οι σημαντικές επενδύσεις που έχουν ήδη πραγματοποιήσει σε εξειδικευμένο γεωργικό εξοπλισμό, αλλά και η συσσωρευμένη τεχνογνωσία που έχουν αποκτήσει μέσω της μακροχρόνιας ενασχόλησής τους με συγκεκριμένες καλλιέργειες, όπως για παράδειγμα το βαμβάκι. Αν και αυτό το γεγονός συνδέεται στενά με φαινόμενα εξάρτησης από προηγούμενες αποφάσεις και επενδύσεις που περιορίζουν τις δυνατότητες προσαρμογής στο παρόν, δεν μπορεί να αγνοηθεί αυτή η δυσαρέσκεια που εκφράζεται από τη μεριά των παραγωγών.
Η κατάσταση αυτή, όπως την περιγράφουν, είναι ξεκάθαρα μια αδικία μη-αναγνώρισης. Οι κυβερνήσεις και οι εμπλεκόμενοι στη διαμόρφωση των πολιτικών δεν αναγνωρίζουν την ευάλωτη θέση στην οποία βρίσκονται οι αγρότες κατά την προώθηση αναδιαρθρώσεων. Πολλά από τα γεωργικά μηχανήματα που κατέχουν οι παραγωγοί είναι εξειδικευμένα για συγκεκριμένες καλλιέργειες, γεγονός που σημαίνει ότι ενδεχόμενη αναδιάρθρωση των καλλιεργειών μπορεί να τα καταστήσει άχρηστα. Αυτό ενδέχεται να οδηγήσει στην αναγκαστική εκποίησή τους, με αποτέλεσμα σημαντική απώλεια κεφαλαίου. Επιπλέον, ορισμένοι αγρότες εξακολουθούν να χρωστούν δόσεις αυτών των επενδύσεων, οπότε η πώληση του εξοπλισμού υπό πίεση μπορεί να επιδεινώσει τη πιστοληπτική τους ικανότητα αλλά και των ίδιων των συνθηκών επιβίωσής τους. Αντίστοιχα, η μετάβαση από αρδευόμενες σε ξηρικές καλλιέργειες απειλεί με αχρηστία ολόκληρα αρδευτικά δίκτυα και υποδομές, οδηγώντας σε επιπλέον απώλειες κεφαλαίου. Έτσι, οι αγρότες της ΠΕ Τρικάλων είναι ευάλωτοι σε περιπτώσεις αναδιάρθρωσης των καλλιεργειών εξαιτίας των επενδύσεών τους αν και σε μικρότερο βαθμό από τους συναδέλφους τους στις υπόλοιπες ΠΕ της Θεσσαλίας, όπως προκύπτει από τα στοιχεία της ΕΛΣΤΑΤ.
Πέρα από τις οικονομικές συνέπειες, οι αγρότες αναδεικνύουν και την αδικία που συνδέεται με την μη αναγνώριση του γνωσιακού κεφαλαίου τους, το οποίο έχουν αποκτήσει από τη μακρόχρονη εμπειρία τους στις συγκεκριμένες καλλιέργειες. Η γνώση αυτή των αγροτών, τεχνική αλλά και άρρητη, είναι χρήσιμη και κρίσιμη για την απόδοση των καλλιεργειών και την ίδια την αγροτική ανάπτυξη. Σε περίπτωση αναδιάρθρωσης των καλλιεργειών αυτή η γνώση κινδυνεύει να απαξιωθεί ή να χαθεί οριστικά, στερώντας από τους αγρότες ένα πολύτιμο εφόδιο και υπονομεύοντας τη βιωσιμότητα τους.
Απόσπασμα 1
«- Είπατε βαμβάκι, σιτάρι, καλαμπόκι έτσι; Αυτά τα 3 είναι;
– Ναι, ναι.
– Και λίγη μηδική…
– Σκέφτεστε γενικά για άλλες καλλιέργειες;
– Ψαράδες
– Δεν υπάρχουν άλλες καλλιέργειες εδώ.
– Ψαράδες. Αν οι Ολλανδοί μας πουν να γίνει εδώ ζώνη ανάσχεσης νερού… εάν εδώ η περιοχή μας γίνει ζώνη ανάσχεσης νερού, ε ας μας απαλλοτριώσει και ας μας δώσει ένα γρι γρι και μια άδεια να γίνουμε ψαράδες…
– Για να είμαστε και σοβαροί πέρα από το χιούμορ, προς το παρόν δεν το σκέφτεται κανένας. Έχουμε επενδύσει, όλες μας οι επενδύσεις και όλη μας η γνώση είναι επάνω σε αυτές τις καλλιέργειες..
– Γνώση, μηχανήματα, όλα είναι πάνω σε αυτά…
– 100.000 έχει το εργαλείο που βλέπεις εδώ πάνω. 100 χιλιάρικα….
– Εδώ το χωριό έχει 25 βαμβακοσυλλεκτικές μηχανές, ο καθένας ανά δύο δύο, τρεις τρεις, έχουμε από μία.»
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με αγρότες της ΠΕ Τρικάλων)
Το ζήτημα της ποιότητας του ελληνικού βάμβακος αποτελεί σημείο σύγκρουσης τεχνολογικών και οργανωτικών λογικών μεταξύ παραγωγών και εκκοκκιστών. Βαθύτερα, όμως, αντανακλά και μια πιο θεμελιώδη έλλειψη: την απουσία αναγνώρισης της ανάγκης των παραγωγών να προσανατολίσουν την παραγωγή τους σε προϊόντα υψηλότερης ποιότητας και προστιθέμενης αξίας.
Πολλοί παραγωγοί, αντιλαμβανόμενοι ότι η ανώτερη ποιότητα δεν επιβραβεύεται έμπρακτα, υιοθετούν τεχνολογίες που μεγιστοποιούν τη βραχυπρόθεσμη οικονομική αποδοτικότητα εις βάρος της ποιότητας. Ενδεικτική είναι η ολοένα αυξανόμενη χρήση μηχανών τύπου stripper, οι οποίες σε αντίθεση με την κλασσική βαμβακοσυλλεκτική μηχανή (picker), αντί να συλλέγουν επιλεκτικά τον καρπό, απογυμνώνουν ολόκληρο το φυτό, οδηγώντας σε συγκομιδή μεγαλύτερης μάζας αλλά με υψηλή περιεκτικότητα σε ξένες ύλες. Η επιλογή αυτή, ωστόσο, δεν αποσκοπεί σε κερδοσκοπία μέσω βάρους—καθώς οι ξένες ύλες αφαιρούνται στην τιμολόγηση από το εκκοκκιστήριο—αλλά στην εξοικονόμηση κόστους, καθώς οι μηχανές stripper έχουν μικρότερα έξοδα λειτουργίας, μειώνοντας έτσι το συνολικό κόστος συγκομιδής έως και κατά 50%. Όμως, το αποτέλεσμα είναι η σημαντική υποβάθμιση του τελικού προϊόντος, με χαμηλότερη εκκοκκιστική απόδοση και υποδεέστερα ποιοτικά χαρακτηριστικά (υποβάθμιση χρώματος, κοντύτερη ίνα, υψηλό ποσοστό ξένων υλών). Το βάρος της ποιοτικής υποβάθμισης, ωστόσο, μετακυλίεται και στην εκκοκκιστική βιομηχανία, η οποία αντιμετωπίζει αυξημένα κόστη διαλογής και χαμηλότερη εμπορική αξία του προϊόντος.
Κατά συνέπεια, πρόκειται για έναν φαύλο κύκλο, στον οποίο η έλλειψη κινήτρων για την παραγωγή ποιοτικού βάμβακος, σε συνδυασμό με την απουσία θεσμικής και εμπορικής αναγνώρισης της προστιθέμενης αξίας του, οδηγεί σε πρακτικές που ενισχύουν τη χαμηλή ποιότητα και τη γενικότερη αδυναμία του κλάδου να αναβαθμιστεί ποιοτικά και να διαφοροποιηθεί ανταγωνιστικά στις διεθνείς αγορές.
Απόσπασμα 1
«- Γιατί μας πληρώνανε εμάς ποιότητα;
– Δεν μας απασχόλησε η ποιότητα ποτέ…
– Δεν την πληρώνουνε…
– Άμα τη πληρώσει δεν μας είναι καθόλου δύσκολο πίστεψέ το…
– Όλοι 32 απόδοση [σε ίνα] έχουμε; μα όλοι 32 απόδοση; Και μιλάμε τώρα για ποικιλία ****** που βγάζει 38, 40 απόδοση…
– Δεν πληρώνουν. Εγώ καλλιεργώ τη ****** ας πούμε… Δεν δίνεται, δηλαδή, μεγάλο κίνητρο για…
– Δεν πληρώνει… να πει 10 λεπτά παραπάνω εδώ τον ****** γιατί και εργαλείο καλύτερο έχει… ρίχνει τα πάντα….
– Να μου δώσει κίνητρο…
– Ο εκκοκκιστής πληρώνεται με την ποιότητα, εμείς όχι.
– Δεν μας ενδιαφέρει (αφού αυτοί πληρώνουν με τα κιλά). […] Την ποιότητα δεν μας την πληρώνουν.. μας την πληρώνουν μέσα από τα προγράμματα μόνο… […] Κάποια χρήματα που παίρνουμε για την ποιότητα την οποία, τώρα την βγάζουν μόνοι τους, μόνοι τους το βαφτίζουν το παιδί, μόνοι τους τον παπά, μόνοι τους την κολυμπήθρα… 2 με 3 λεπτά.. το οποίο το προσδιορίζουν αυτοί πώς είναι.. εγώ δεν έχω λόγο.. απλά μου δίνουν ένα χαρτί και μου λένε το μπαμπάκι σου ήταν έτσι… ενώ υπό κανονικές συνθήκες, την ώρα που πάω εγώ να το παραδώσω.. εκείνη την ώρα face to face»
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με αγρότες της ΠΕ Τρικάλων)
Απόσπασμα 2
«- Μεγάλο πρόβλημα, να σου δώσω να καταλάβεις… τώρα ένα μεγάλο κομμάτι της αγοράς έχει η ποικιλία ****** της εταιρείας ******* πολλά στρέμματα δηλαδή… Η οποία δεν έχει απόδοση [σε ίνα] αλλά κυλάει σε εμένα, έχει παραγωγή. Κι όλος ο κόσμος θα πάει στην παραγωγή γιατί δεν μας πληρώνουν. Στα κιλά θα πληρωθώ εγώ, δεν θα πληρωθώ εγώ στη ποιότητα…»
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με αγρότες της ΠΕ Τρικάλων)
Αν και η πλειονότητα των αγροτών εμφανίζεται ικανοποιημένη από τα αγρονομικά χαρακτηριστικά και τις αποδόσεις των ποικιλιών που διατίθενται στην εγχώρια αγορά, εντούτοις εκφράζεται συχνά δυσαρέσκεια σε ό,τι αφορά την ποιότητα του σπόρου συγκεκριμένων καλλιεργειών που προέρχεται από την εγχώρια σποροπαραγωγή. Η δυσαρέσκεια αφορά στις συνθήκες και στις πρακτικές υπό τις οποίες διεξάγεται η σποροπαραγωγή, οι οποίες θεωρούνται από παραγωγούς ανεπαρκώς ελεγχόμενες και υποβαθμισμένες, με αποτέλεσμα την κυκλοφορία στην αγορά σπόρων μειωμένης καθαρότητας και ποιότητας. Το πρόβλημα εντοπίζεται κυρίως στον σπόρο Α αναπαραγωγής (R1) στο σιτάρι και στο βαμβάκι. Σε αυτές τις καλλιέργειες, αναφέρονται φαινόμενα ανάμιξης γενετικού υλικού μεταξύ διαφορετικών ποικιλιών εξαιτίας της μη τήρησης των απαιτούμενων αποστάσεων μεταξύ σποροπαραγωγικών αγροτεμαχίων, καθώς και εξαιτίας του πλημμελούς καθαρισμού των γεωργικών μηχανημάτων κατά τη συγκομιδή. Τέτοιες αστοχίες επηρεάζουν την καθαρότητα των σπόρων, υπονομεύοντας την ομοιομορφία και τις προβλέψιμες αποδόσεις των καλλιεργειών.
Αξίζει να σημειωθεί ότι το φαινόμενο αυτό δεν παρατηρείται σε καλλιέργειες όπως η βιομηχανική τομάτα και το καλαμπόκι, όπου κυριαρχούν εισαγόμενα υβρίδια. Επιπλέον, ιδιαίτερη περίπτωση αποτελούν τα ψυχανθή και τα όσπρια, όπου επικρατούν γηγενής ποικιλίες του ΕΛΓΟ-Δήμητρα. Το Ινστιτούτο Βιομηχανικών και Κτηνοτροφικών Φυτών του ΕΛΓΟ-Δήμητρα, από το 2012 και έπειτα, φαίνεται να έχει επιτύχει έναν πιο αποτελεσματικό έλεγχο της σποροπαραγωγικής διαδικασίας μέσω ενός καινοτόμου μοντέλου διαγωνιστικών αναθέσεων, το οποίο επιτρέπει την επιλογή των συνεργαζόμενων σποροπαραγωγικών εταιρειών με αυστηρά ποιοτικά και τεχνικά κριτήρια.
Από την πλευρά τους, οι εταιρείες σποροπαραγωγής εκ θέσεως απορρίπτουν τις κριτικές των αγροτών ως προς αυτό το ζήτημα, αλλά ταυτόχρονα αναγνωρίζουν ότι υπάρχουν και προβλήματα στην όλη διαδικασία από τη στιγμή που είναι αδύνατον η εταιρεία να ελέγξει πλήρως τις εργασίες που εφαρμόζει στο σπορόκεντρό του ο κάθε συνεργαζόμενος αγρότης. Επίσης, σημαντικό ρόλο στο πρόβλημα διαδραματίζει και η ανεπαρκής κρατική εποπτεία. Τα Τμήματα Αγροτικής Ανάπτυξης και Ελέγχων (ΤΑΑΕ – πρώην ΚΕΠΠΥΕΛ), τα οποία φέρουν την ευθύνη για την επίσημη εποπτεία της σποροπαραγωγής για λογαριασμό του Υπουργείου Αγροτικής Ανάπτυξης και Τροφίμων, αντιμετωπίζουν σοβαρά προβλήματα υποστελέχωσης και υποχρηματοδότησης, γεγονός που περιορίζει σημαντικά τη δυνατότητα διενέργειας ουσιαστικών ελέγχων και παρεμβάσεων σε περιπτώσεις παραβάσεων ή κακής πρακτικής.
Σε τελική ανάλυση, η ευθύνη για την υποβαθμισμένη ποιότητα σπόρων δεν μπορεί να αποδοθεί μονομερώς. Σε κάθε περίπτωση, το συγκεκριμένο πρόβλημα σχετίζεται άμεσα με την εταιρεία σποροπαραγωγής («υπάρχουν καλές και κακές εταιρείες», όπως αναφέρεται) ενώ μέρος της ευθύνης έχει και ο συνεργαζόμενος αγρότης της εταιρείας σποροπαραγωγής για τον βαθμό επιμέλειας που επιδεικνύει σε όλα τα στάδια της διαδικασίας.
Απόσπασμα 1
«- Η σποροπαραγωγή είναι στην Ελλάδα αλλά και εκεί μας είπαν ότι έχουν προβλήματα, μας είπαν ότι η ελληνική σποροπαραγωγή έχει πρόβλημα…
– Ναι καλά, δεν το συζητάμε αυτό… δηλαδή το πρωτόκολλο δε νομίζω… επειδή έβαλα εγώ σποροπαραγωγή…
– Κι εγώ έβαλα… και επειδή υπάρχει πολυσπερμία, υπάρχει πολυσπερμία, και δεν μπορούμε να συνεννοηθούμε εμείς τώρα ποιος…
[…]
– Μετά ψηφίστηκε… πριν ήταν λίγο πιο αυστηρά, ήθελε 700 μέτρα μακριά, να κάνουν ζώνες ασφαλείας… τώρα με μία τροπολογία που έκαναν…
– Εγώ έβαλα σποροπαραγωγή και ο διπλανός μου είχε…
– Να σταματήσουν να μας φέρνουνε 200 σπόρια.. μας έχουν τρελάνει…»
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με αγρότες της ΠΕ Τρικάλων)
Απόσπασμα 2
«- Υπάρχουν προβλήματα στη σποροπαραγωγή; Μου έχουν επισημάνει πολλοί ότι δεν είναι καθαρός ο σπόρος…
– Ποιοι στο έχουν πει; Παραγωγοί;
– Ναι…
– Υπάρχουν. Να μην παίρνουν από αυτόν που αγοράζαν τα προηγούμενα χρόνια. Να κοιτάνε εταιρείες οι οποίες κάνουν σωστή δουλειά…
– Μου έχουν αναφέρει ότι δεν γίνεται σωστά η σποροπαραγωγή… Είναι πολύ στενά οι γραμμές… Μπλέκονται ποικιλίες…
– Λοιπόν. Καταρχήν, η σποροπαραγωγή ξεκινάει από τον ίδιο τον παραγωγό. Έχει κι αυτός κάποιες υποχρεώσεις. Με τη σύμβαση που κάνουμε για να του δίνουμε τα 5 λεπτά παραπάνω που παίρνει πχ. στο σιτάρι ή στο κριθάρι, πρέπει να κάνει κι αυτός σωστή ζιζανιοκτονία, να έχει καθαρισμένη τη μηχανή όταν θα πάει να σπείρει, τα τηρεί, όλα αυτά; Ξεκινάει από εκεί η πρώτη φάση.
– Εσείς ελέγχετε;
– Εμείς ελέγχουμε, αλλά δεν μπορείς να πας στον κάθε παραγωγό…
– Δεν μπορεί να είσαι εκεί 24 ώρες…
– Ε ναι, είσαι καλά… Όταν εγώ έχω ένα όγκο 4.500 τόνων στα σιτηρά που θα διακινήσω, μπορώ να πάω να παρατηρώ σε κάθε χωράφι; Έχω εμπιστοσύνη σε αυτόν που θα το σπείρει. Είμαι όμως παρόν στον αλωνισμό. Δεν θα μου βάζεις από ό,τι να ‘ναι. Εκεί έχουμε άλλο πρόβλημα. Καθάρισες τη μηχανή; Δηλαδή δεν είναι ένας παράγοντας. Αλλά εμείς προσπαθούμε να κάνουμε την καλύτερη δουλειά. Υπάρχουν κάποιοι που δεν έχουν δικά τους μηχανήματα και βάζουν περιφερόμενα τα οποία δεν είναι και αξιόπιστα αυτά. Δεν κάνουν και καλή δουλειά. Αυτοί ενδεχομένως να έχουν προβλήματα. Είναι επιλογή του παραγωγού μετά ας βάλει… Να μην ξαναπάρει από αυτό που αν μια χρονιά πήρε του ******* το σπόρο και δεν έμεινε ικανοποιημένος να μην ξαναπάρει, να πάρει από αλλού, από άλλη εταιρεία.»
(Εκπρόσωπος εταιρείας σποροπαραγωγής και ανάπτυξης πολλαπλασιαστικού υλικού)
Απόσπασμα 3
«- Συγκεκριμένα μας έχουν πεί ότι οι γραμμές είναι πολύ κοντά όταν σποροπαράγονται…
– Παλιά έπρεπε να είχες 250 μέτρα και 500 στρέμματα και 500 μέτρα και 1000 στρέμματα, plots δηλαδή, και να έχεις και 200 μέτρα από άλλη ποικιλία. Αλλά τώρα όμως είναι πια 25 μέτρα.
– Άρα μειώθηκε;
– Ναι, δεν υπάρχει πρόβλημα σε αυτό όμως. Γιατί υπάρχουν οι δικοί μας άνθρωποι από πάνω που ελέγχουν την κατάσταση.
– Άρα θεωρείτε ότι δεν υπάρχει πρόβλημα;
– Όχι. Το πρόβλημα φαίνεται πια στο χωράφι. Όταν βλέπεις πχ. μια ποικιλία… Υπάρχουν παράπονα για συγκεκριμένες εταιρείες και ποικιλίες οι οποίες όμως δεν μπορούν αυτοί να κάνουν αυτή τη δουλειά γιατί αυτή η δουλειά κοστίζει, δεν είναι μόνο ο γενετιστής, είναι καθαρές σειρές, γονικές σειρές…»
(Εκπρόσωπος εταιρείας σποροπαραγωγής και ανάπτυξης πολλαπλασιαστικού υλικού)
Στην Θεσσαλία, οι αγρότες αντιμετωπίζουν σοβαρά εμπόδια στην εγκατάσταση μικρών φωτοβολταϊκών συστημάτων ακόμη και όταν αυτά προορίζονται αποκλειστικά για την κάλυψη των αρδευτικών αναγκών των γεωργικών εκμεταλλεύσεων. Η εξάρτηση από την άρδευση είναι δομική για βασικές καλλιέργειες της Θεσσαλίας όπως το βαμβάκι και το καλαμπόκι, και η αδυναμία υλοποίησης τέτοιων έργων αυξάνει την ενεργειακή εξάρτηση των αγροτών και εντείνει την οικονομική επισφάλεια. Σύμφωνα με στοιχεία του ΔΕΔΔΗΕ, ήδη από το 2022 οι περιοχές της Λάρισας και της Καρδίτσας παρουσίαζαν υπερκάλυψη αιτημάτων ισχύος, ενώ σήμερα το διαθέσιμο περιθώριο για νέες συνδέσεις αναφέρεται ως μηδενικό (Deddie.gr, 2024).
Παράλληλα, η κατάργηση της προτεραιότητας των αγροτών στις αιτήσεις σύνδεσης φωτοβολταϊκών (που ίσχυε μέχρι το 2019), και η ανεπαρκής κρατική στήριξη για εφαρμογές αυτοπαραγωγής με αποθήκευση (π.χ. Net Metering με μπαταρία), συντηρούν αυτό το διάχυτο αίσθημα αδικίας στις κοινότητες των αγροτών. Ο αποκλεισμός αυτός πλήττει τόσο τους μεμονωμένους αγρότες όσο και τα συλλογικά σχήματα όπως είναι οι ΤΟΕΒ, που επιδιώκουν να μειώσουν το ενεργειακό κόστος της άρδευσης, χωρίς πρόθεση εμπορικής εκμετάλλευσης της επιπλέον παραγόμενης ενέργειας.
Η κατάσταση αυτή, κατά μαρτυρίες αγροτών, βιώνεται ως διπλή αδικία: από τη μία πλευρά αδυνατούν να αξιοποιήσουν το δίκτυο για να μειώσουν το κόστος άρδευσης, και από την άλλη θεωρούν ότι έχουν ήδη πληρώσει το κόστος υποδομής του δικτύου μέχρι το αγροτεμάχιό τους με ίδια μέσα από τις προηγούμενες δεκαετίες. Πλέον, βλέπουν να αποκλείονται από τη χρήση αυτού του δικτύου, τη στιγμή που μεγάλες ιδιωτικές εταιρείες ΑΠΕ αποκτούν άδεια για τη χρήση του ίδιου κορεσμένου δικτύου σε παρακείμενες εκτάσεις. Αυτή η κατάσταση συνιστά διανεμητική αδικία, αφού το υπάρχον θεσμικό και τεχνικό πλαίσιο στερεί από πολλούς αγρότες τη δυνατότητα ενεργειακής αυτονόμησης και μείωσης του κόστους άρδευσης.
Απόσπασμα 1
«- Γιατί εμείς τώρα για να μην τα μπερδεύουμε κιόλας τα θέματα, τα πάρκα, είναι γνωστό ότι δεν έχουμε χώρο…
– Βασικά δεν υπήρχε και η βούληση έτσι;
– Η βούληση από την πολιτική;
– Ε ναι τι… Δεν θέλω να μας χαρίσουν κάτι… Χρηματοδότησε το, εμείς να χρησιμοποιούμε ρεύμα από τον Ιούνιο στην ουσία, η φουλ περίοδος ξεκινάει από… 20 Ιουνίου ξεκινάει η περίοδος…
– Στο βαμβάκι;
– Βαμβάκι, καλαμπόκι, άντε το καλαμπόκι λίγο νωρίτερα, γιατί έχουμε πρώιμες καλλιέργειες. Το καλαμπόκι ξεκινάει Μάη, θα τελειώσει τέλος Ιουλίου, εε αρχές Αυγούστου. Το πρώτο 5ήμερο-10ήμερο του Αυγούστου τέλος το καλαμπόκι, είναι οι πρώιμες καλλιέργειες…
– Ναι ναι…
– Το βαμβάκι τελειώνει 25 με 28 Αυγούστου… Τουτέστιν, όλο το υπόλοιπο παρ’ το.. παρ’ το, καν’ το, διαχειρίσου το όπως θέλεις… Δεν ζητάμε κάτι, απλά να το περπατήσουνε, να το χρηματοδοτήσουνε, και να το ξεχρεώσουμε σαν ΤΟΕΒ που είμαστε αυτή τη στιγμή. […] Όσο χρειαζόμαστε εμείς και το υπόλοιπο να το παίρνει η ΔΕΗ… Αυτά 2,5 μήνες δουλεύουν… 2,5 μήνες, 3… σβήνει το κουμπί, τέλος… κατεβαίνει ο γενικός…»
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με αγρότες της ΠΕ Τρικάλων)
Η αυστηροποίηση της ευρωπαϊκής πολιτικής φυτοπροστασίας, με βάση τον Κανονισμό (ΕΚ) 1107/2009, έχει οδηγήσει τα τελευταία χρόνια στην απόσυρση πολλών δραστικών ουσιών που χρησιμοποιούνταν ευρέως στη γεωργική παραγωγή. Η απαγόρευσή τους βασίστηκε σε τεκμηριωμένες ανησυχίες για την ανθρώπινη υγεία, την τοξικότητα στους επικονιαστές ή την περιβαλλοντική ρύπανση, όπως προκύπτει από τις αξιολογήσεις της Ευρωπαϊκής Αρχής για την Ασφάλεια των Τροφίμων (EFSA). Ανάμεσα σε αυτές περιλαμβάνονται ουσίες κρίσιμες για βασικές καλλιέργειες, όπως το phosmet (εντομοκτόνο για σκουλήκι στο βαμβάκι), το glufosinate και το S-metolachlor (ζιζανιοκτόνα), καθώς και τα μυκητοκτόνα cyproconazole και mancozeb, που χρησιμοποιούνταν ευρέως σε σιτηρά. Οι απαγορεύσεις δραστικών ουσιών οδήγησε στην ανάγκη ανεύρεσης εναλλακτικών λύσεων, οι οποίες περιλαμβάνουν εγκεκριμένα Εναλλακτικά Φυτοπροστατευτικά Προϊόντα, Βιολογικά Σκευάσματα, Ολοκληρωμένη Διαχείριση Εχθρών και Ασθενειών (IPM) και Προγράμματα Πολλαπλής Συμμόρφωσης. Από την άλλη μεριά, πολλοί παραγωγοί υποστηρίζουν ότι η απόσυρση αυτών των ουσιών οδήγησε σε αυξημένο κόστος και περιορισμένες εναλλακτικές, συχνά λιγότερο αποτελεσματικές. Επίσης, τονίζουν ότι σε τρίτες χώρες συνεχίζουν να χρησιμοποιούνται σκευάσματα απαγορευμένα στην Ε.Ε., με αποτέλεσμα σημαντική διαφοροποίηση στο κόστος παραγωγής.
Αντίστοιχες ανησυχίες εκφράζονται και από τον Ελληνικό Σύνδεσμο Φυτοπροστασίας (ΕΣΥΦ) ο οποίος αποτελεί έναν από τους κύριους επιστημονικούς και επαγγελματικούς φορείς που εκπροσωπούν τον τομέα της φυτοπροστασίας στην Ελλάδα, αντιπροσωπεύοντας εταιρείες που διακινούν τα φυτοπροστατευτικά προϊόντα στην αγορά. Ο ΕΣΥΦ έχει εκφράσει επιφυλάξεις σχετικά με τις απαγορεύσεις δραστικών ουσιών στην Ε.Ε., ιδιαίτερα όταν αυτές δεν συνοδεύονται από επαρκή επιστημονική τεκμηρίωση ή δεν παρέχονται βιώσιμες εναλλακτικές λύσεις για τους παραγωγούς. Επίσης, έχει εκφράσει επιφυλάξεις σχετικά με την πρόταση Κανονισμού για την Ορθολογική Χρήση των Φυτοπροστατευτικών Προϊόντων (SUR) που στοχεύει στη μείωση της χρήσης και του κινδύνου των φυτοφαρμάκων κατά 50% έως το 2030.
Οι αγρότες περιγράφουν αυτή την κατάσταση ως μια μορφή διανεμητικής αδικίας που εκδηλώνεται με τη μορφή ελλείμματος ανταγωνιστικότητας σε σχέση με τις εισαγωγές προϊόντων από τρίτες χώρες. Όπως τονίζουν, ενώ οι ίδιοι υποχρεώνονται να χρησιμοποιούν πιο ήπια, ακριβότερα σκευάσματα, που συχνά δεν επαρκούν για την προστασία της καλλιέργειας, δεν απολαμβάνουν αντίστοιχη ενίσχυση ή προστασία από τον άνισο ανταγωνισμό, καθώς οι εισαγωγές προϊόντων από τρίτες χώρες επιτρέπονται χωρίς υποχρέωση εφαρμογής των κανονισμών της Ε.Ε.
Σχετικές αναφορές:
Ε.ΣΥ.Φ. (2022). Ενημερωτική έκδοση για το έργο του Ε.ΣΥ.Φ. (Τεύχος 18). https://esyf.gr/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/ESYF_NL18.pdf
Απόσπασμα 1
«- Αν όμως βγάλουν φάρμακο βιολογικό, ίδια τιμή με το άλλο, θα το προτιμήσετε;
– Συγγνώμη λίγο εδώ πέρα, κι αυτό θέλω να ακουστεί. Δηλαδή όλη η Ευρώπη κάνει εισαγωγές από τις Τρίτες Χώρες το ίδιο σκεύασμα…
– Άλλο αυτό…
– Περίμενε, περίμενε, κι εμάς το ίδιο σκεύασμα στην Τουρκία βγαίνει 2 ευρώ το στρέμμα και εμάς μας βγαίνει 7,5… Το ίδιο σκεύασμα έτσι; Ίδια δραστική…
– Ναι, ναι…
– Μα είναι παρασύνθημα…
– Και το μεγάλο πρόβλημα; Πάνε στην Τουρκία και μας φέρνουν πορτοκάλια, λεμόνια, πατάτες…
– Αυτό λέω, κοροϊδία, όλο το σύστημα…»
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με αγρότες της ΠΕ Τρικάλων)
Οι ελλιπείς συνθήκες εξισορρόπησης του ανταγωνισμού στο κόστος παραγωγής προκύπτει μέσα από διαφορετικές πρακτικές άρδευσης σε κάθε περιοχή, αποτελεί μια διανεμητική αδικία καθώς συνδέεται άμεσα με τις διαθέσιμες υποδομές, την γεωγραφική θέση των αρδευτών. Ο τρόπος άρδευσης είναι σε άμεση εξάρτηση με την αύξηση ή μείωση του κόστους παραγωγής αλλά στην περίπτωση του Ζάρκου, αποτελεί μια διανεμητική αδικία καθώς επηρεάζει τόσο την πρωιμότητα των καλλιεργειών, όπως στο βαμβάκι, όσο και τον περιορισμό των καλλιεργειών που μπορούν να σπαρθούν λόγω της αβεβαιότητας των πλημμυρών. Έχοντας παρατηρήσει ιστορικά την ευκολία με την οποία πλημμυρίζουν τα αγροκτήματά τους, οι παραγωγοί στο Ζάρκο αποφεύγουν εμπειρικά, τόσο τις δενδρώδεις όσο και τα όσπρια και λαχανικά που είναι ευπαθή φυτά, διότι με την πρώτη πλημμύρα είναι πολύ εύκολο να καταστραφεί η σοδειά αλλά και το φυτικό κεφάλαιο στην περιοχή. Επιπλέον οι χείμαρροι του νερού παρέσερναν τους σωλήνες που χρησιμοποιούσαν (πριν το κλειστό δίκτυο) για την άρδευση, με αποτέλεσμα να κινδυνεύει η παραγωγή. Οι συνθήκες αυτές οδήγησαν στον εθελοντισμό και την αλληλο-υποστήριξη των αρδευτών, ώστε να μοιράζονται τον εξοπλισμό όπου υπήρχε ανάγκη. Σε μεγάλο ποσοστό οι αρδευτές στο Ζάρκο χρησιμοποιούν στάγδην άρδευση, ειδικά με την επέκταση του κλειστού αρδευτικού δικτύου, καθώς το δίκτυο είναι επαρκές να προσφέρει υψηλές πιέσεις και εξοικονομεί σημαντικές ποσότητες νερού. Η επέκταση όμως αυτού του κλειστού δικτύου ξεκίνησε και υλοποιήθηκε με την αφιλοκερδή συνεισφορά των μελών της κοινότητας του ΤΟΕΒ, καθώς επέλεξαν αντί να αναζητούν κάθε χρόνο χρηματοδοτήσεις για την αντικατάσταση των κατεστραμμένων σωλήνων που χρησιμοποιούσαν για την άρδευση, που συχνά οξειδώνονταν καθώς ερχόντουσαν σε επαφή με το μεθάνιο που τραβούσαν οι γεωτρήσεις (μια ακόμα ιδιαιτερότητα της περιοχής), να επενδύσουν σε μόνιμη μακροχρόνια επιλογή του κλειστού. Σε συνεργασία με μηχανικούς της περιοχής, χρησιμοποιώντας τον προσωπικό τους εξοπλισμό επέλεξαν τόσο τα σημεία υδροληψίας και τις αντίστοιχες πιέσεις, αλλά και με προσωπική εργασία και επίβλεψη για την εκσκαφή και υλοποίηση του δικτύου.
Αποσπασμα 1
“- 2 είναι τα προβλήματα εδώ πέρα.. αναγκαζόμαστε να βάλουμε βαμβάκι και καλαμπόκι…
– λόγω του πολύ νερού;
– λόγω της πλημμύρας δεν μπορούμε να βάλουμε δέντρα μέσα,
– ούτε σιτάρι…
– όταν κάναμε και καρυδιές
– Βάλαν οι συνάδελφοι, συγχωριανοί μας
– τώρα με τον Ντάνιελ χάσαμε και το φυτικό κεφάλαιο, όχι τη χρονιά μόνο
– χάσαμε τα δέντρα..
– δηλαδή ένας συνάδελφός σου εδώ πιο πίσω, από Τρίκαλα ήδη με περιβόλι βερίκοκα
– τα ξηλώνει, τα κόβει
– οπότε βαμβάκι και καλαμπόκι και τι επηρεάζει, πρόσεξε.. αν οι πλημμύρες είναι πίσω, γιατί έχει βγει και Απρίλη, έχει βγει και Μάη, έχουμε πάθει ζημιές και με φυτά μέσα, επηρεάζει την πρωιμότητα..
– πάμε πιο πίσω σπορά, πιο πίσω σύλλεξη αυξάνω τις πιθανότητες στον Οκτώβρη
– δηλαδή δεν μας αφήνει να κάνουμε τη δουλειά μας όπως πρέπει δηλαδή είναι πολλά τα προβλήματα” […]
– το μεγαλύτερο πρόβλημα είναι επειδή έβγαινε Πηνειός, μας έπαιρνε τις σωλήνες
– τις ξήλωνε;
– τις ξήλωνε και άντε από την αρχή όλο το δίκτυο φτιάξιμο..
– μαζευόμασταν ομάδες με τρακτέρια, καρότσια και γαλότσες και φτιάχναμε
– τι γινόταν πριν; ήταν μία τραγική κατάσταση… πετούσαμε πολύ νερό, είμασταν μονίμως με ένα γκασμά, με ένα στο χέρι”
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με εκπρόσωπο ΤΟΕΒ της ΠΕ Τρικάλων)
H έλλειψη νερού ή η ανεπάρκεια διαθεσιμότητας νερού που συναντάται ιδιαίτερα στους καλοκαιρινούς μήνες λόγω τοπικών ιδιαιτεροτήτων, είναι μία διανεμητική αδικία με την έννοια ότι σχετίζεται με τον ισότιμο διαμοιρασμό των πόρων και της πρόσβασης σε αυτούς. Στην περίπτωση της Περιφερειακής Ενότητας Τρικάλων, το ΤΟΕΒ Ζάρκου στην Φαρκαδώνα, ένα από τα μεγαλύτερα σε έκταση ΤΟΕΒ στα Τρίκαλα. Το ΤΟΕΒ εξυπηρετεί μία έκταση 25.000 αρδευόμενων στρεμμάτων με 29 γεωτρήσεις. Λόγω του ιδιαίτερου ανάγλυφου της περιοχής, οι εκπρόσωποι του ΤΟΕΒ περιέγραψαν την περιοχή τους ως το «σημείο μηδέν» της ένωσης εφτά ποταμών (ανάμεσα στους οποίους ο Ενιπέας, ο Καλέτζης, ο Πηνειός και άλλοι παραπόταμοι αυτών), ένα από τα μεγαλύτερα προβλήματα που αντιμετωπίζουν είναι οι χείμαρροι που κατακλύζουν συχνά την περιοχή τους. Η συνθήκη αυτή έχει το προτέρημα ότι ανανεώνονται συχνά οι υδροφόροι ορίζοντες της περιοχής με αποτέλεσμα οι αντλήσεις από τις γεωτρήσεις να μην ξεπερνούν τα 45 με 70 μέτρα βάθος, που οδηγεί σε χαμηλό κόστος άντλησης, όμως οι πλημμύρες είναι πολύ συχνό φαινόμενο με αποτέλεσμα της καταστροφής του εξοπλισμού τους, τόσο ως προς τα κινητά μέρη των γεωτρήσεων όσο και τα μέσα άρδευσης (καρούλια κτλ). Αυτό οδήγησε στην ανάγκη υπογειοποίησης του ανοιχτού δικτύου, δηλαδή σε κλειστό δίκτυο στην άρδευση των χρηστών, μία μετάβαση που έχει ολοκληρωθεί σε μεγάλο βαθμό (85%), ενώ απομένουν προς δημοπράτηση άλλα 16 χλμ. (από τα περίπου 75χλμ της έκτασης του δικτύου). Το κλειστό δίκτυο έλυσε προσωρινά το ζήτημα, όμως απαιτούνται και σημαντικά έργα στήριξης και παρακράτησης των νερών ώστε να μειωθούν οι πλημμύρες. Η συνθήκη αυτή είναι μια διανεμητική αδικία καθώς επηρεάζει και περιορίζει και την επιλογή καλλιεργειών, με καλλιέργειες που μπορούν να επιβιώσουν πλημμυρικά φαινόμενα να είναι μονόδρομος για τους παραγωγούς της περιοχής. Εκτός αυτού, σε περιόδους ακραίας ξηρασίας, η περιοχή είναι κρίσιμος κόμβος για την ενίσχυση του Πηνειού από τις Λίμνες Πλαστήρα και Σμοκόβου, αλλά και για την επάρκεια της άρδευσης της περιοχής.
Αποσπασμα 1
“- είναι το σημείο μηδέν εδώ που είμαστε, για να καταλάβετε το ανάγλυφο της περιοχής είμαστε πριν τη Λάρισα είμαστε (- στη μέση) στη μέση ακριβώς, 8 χιλιόμετρα από ‘δω, δίνει το ποτάμι πλέον, ούτε και μπορεί να πάει το νερό εκεί, γιατί κλείνει.[..]
– ούτε σε επίπεδο αποστράγγισης κανάλια, ούτε σε επίπεδο κοίτης Πηνειού, ποτέ κάτι [δεν έγινε].. αλλά και το θέμα είναι αυτό που ανέφερε ο *** ότι, ότι ο όγκος νερού που συγκεντρώνεται από τα βουνά, έρχεται εδώ, είναι το σημείο 0 που σας είπα..
– πριν πάει στη Λάρισα, αποστραγγιστικό κάτι θα γίνει θα μπορούσε να λυθεί το θέμα..
– πρέπει να γίνουν μικροέργα, φράγματα,
– ποια, ποια συγκεκριμένα; Εσείς δηλαδή έχετε κάποιες προτάσεις ως προς αυτό;
– το φράγμα του Ενιπέα πρέπει να γίνει οπωσδήποτε γιατί πολλά νερά μας έρχονται από κει, το φράγμα του Νεοχωρίτη
– βρέχει στα Τρίκαλα, βρέχει στη Καρδίτσα Δομοκό και το Ζάρκο πλημμυρίζει
– Κι άλλα πολλά φράγματα που μπορούν να γίνουν προς..πώς λένε το χωριό εκεί προς την Μαυροκούκα;
– α κατάλαβα που λες, προς τη Πύλη..το Μουζάκι
– το Μουζάκι ναι ναι
– δηλαδή μία πρόταση δικά μας είναι, η οποία δεν ξέρω πόσο βέβαια είναι βιώσιμη κτλ
– για πείτε
– να κρατήσουμε το νερό στο παρυφές.. αυτό βέβαια, αυτά που ακούμε από αυτούς είναι μη βιώσιμο, είναι κοστοβόρο και χρόνια πολλά θα πάρει..
– μη βιώσιμο; Από ποια έννοια; δεν είναι οικονομικά ρεαλιστικό να γίνει;
– δεν αξίζει η επένδυση λένε
– λένε.. τώρα βέβαια πρέπει να μπεί και στο master plan, έτσι από αυτούς αλλά εδώ η φύση, εδώ η φύση που είστε, έχει κάνει από μόνη της λεκάνη ελεγχόμενης πλημμύρας, απορροής.”
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με εκπρόσωπο ΤΟΕΒ της ΠΕ Τρικάλων)
Οι αγρότες παρουσιάζουν μια εικόνα παντελούς απουσίας μιας κρατικής υπηρεσίας επιφορτισμένης με την εκπαίδευση, επιμόρφωση, ενημέρωση και συμβουλευτική των αγροτών. Μια τέτοια υπηρεσία θα τους παρείχε έγκυρες και αμερόληπτες συμβουλές για τα ζητήματα που τους απασχολούν καθημερινά στο χωράφι είτε αυτά αφορούν στις νέες καλλιέργειες, είτε στις καλλιεργητικές πρακτικές, όπως η ορθή λίπανση, η καταπολέμηση των ασθενειών, κλπ. Η αποχώρηση του κράτους από τη συμβουλευτική των αγροτών έδωσε σταδιακά την θέση της σε μια διαδικασία ad hoc ενημερώσεων και συμβουλών από ιδιώτες γεωπόνους οι οποίοι έχουν σαν κύρια ενασχόληση την εμπορία αγροεφοδίων. Έτσι οι συμβουλές που δίνει ο γεωπόνος είναι συνάρτηση των προϊόντων που θέλει να προωθήσει και συχνά έμμεσα εμπλέκεται σε αυτό και η εμπορική πολιτική των εταιριών ανάπτυξης ή εμπορίας αγροεφοδίων. Πολλοί αγρότες αναφέρουν ζημιές στην παραγωγή τους από αυτές τις πρακτικές. Ουσιαστικά εκφράζουν μια αδικία σχετικά με την έλλειψη αμερόληπτων συμβουλευτικών υπηρεσιών, συγκρίνοντας την παρούσα κατάσταση με το παρελθόν που οι συμβουλευτικές υπηρεσίες του κράτους διεξάγονταν κυρίως από τις δημόσιες Υπηρεσίες Γεωργικών Εφαρμογών.
Από τις αρχές της δεκαετίας του 1950 που ιδρύθηκε η Υπηρεσία Γεωργικών Εφαρμογών του Υπουργείου Γεωργίας συνέβαλε καθοριστικά στην διάχυση της αγροτικής γνώσης και της καινοτομίας και τελικά στον εκμοντερνισμό της ελληνικής γεωργίας. Οι γεωπόνοι της συγκεκριμένης Υπηρεσίας είχαν συνεχή παρουσία στις αγροτικές περιοχές, έδιναν συμβουλές στο πεδίο και είχαν κερδίσει την εμπιστοσύνη του αγροτικού κόσμου. Από τη δεκαετία του 1990 και ιδιαίτερα μετά το 2000, η Υπηρεσία Γεωργικών Εφαρμογών άρχισε να αποδυναμώνεται σταδιακά λόγω μείωσης του, υποχρηματοδότησης και μεταφοράς αρμοδιοτήτων σε άλλους φορείς ή/και σε ιδιωτικούς συμβούλους. Δηλαδή, με την εγκαθίδρυση και ισχυροποίηση της ΚΑΠ και την αντίστοιχη αποδυνάμωση των εθνικών πολιτικών, η εν λόγω υπηρεσία σταδιακά απέκτησε γραφειοκρατικό ρόλο που ασχολούνταν κατά βάση με την διεκπεραίωση ζητημάτων σχετικών με τις κοινοτικές επιδοτήσεις. Επιπλέον, μετά το 2010 η υπηρεσία αυτή πέρασε στις αιρετές Περιφέρειες όπου οι γεωπόνοι από υπάλληλοι του Υπουργείου Γεωργίας έγιναν υπάλληλοι των Περιφερειών. Αποτέλεσμα αυτού, αποτέλεσε η κατάργηση ή συγχώνευση υπηρεσιών, περιλαμβανομένων των Γεωργικών Εφαρμογών. Αυτή η εξέλιξη επιδείνωσε περεταίρω την αποκοπή των γεωπόνων του Υπουργείου Γεωργίας από την εκπαίδευση και την συμβουλευτική των αγροτών και σηματοδότησε την οριστική αποχώρηση του κράτους από αυτήν. Σήμερα επίσημη υπηρεσία άτυπης γεωργικής εκπαίδευσης και κατάρτισης είναι ο ΟΓΕΕΚΑ Δήμητρα ο οποίος παρέχει προγράμματα γεωργικής εκπαίδευσης και κατάρτισης για αγρότες που είναι δικαιούχοι επιδοτήσεων της ΕΕ για προγράμματα Σχεδίων Βελτίωσης, Εγκατάστασης Νέων Γεωργών, κ.α.
Η αποχώρηση του κράτους από τη συμβουλευτική των αγροτών και ειδικά από την παρουσία στο χωράφι αποτελεί μια διαδικαστική αδικία. Το κράτος μέσα από μια σειρά αποφάσεων όπου η γνώμη και η γνώση των αγροτών δεν λήφθηκε υπόψη κατέληξε να στερεί τους αγρότες από γνωσιακούς πόρους κρίσιμους για την άσκηση του επαγγέλματός τους και εν τέλει να επιδεινώσει τους όρους παραγωγής και επιβίωσής τους.
Απόσπασμα 1
«- Έχει μπερδευτεί η δουλειά γεωπόνου και έμπορα. Ο γεωπόνος έχει γίνει και έμπορας. Δε γίνεται αυτό το πράγμα. Παλιά είχαν ας πούμε εδώ στη νομαρχία κάποιους γεωπόνους που οι περισσότεροι ήταν ουδέτεροι ας πούμε.
– Αυτό ακριβώς μου έλεγε, στη Διεύθυνση Γεωργίας…
– Ναι στη Διεύθυνση Γεωργίας. Σου έλεγε ο γεωπόνος, κοίταξε θα ρίξεις αυτό το φάρμακο. Ο γεωπόνος άμα θα πας εκεί τώρα δε θα σου πει αυτό που χρειάζεται. Θα σου δώσει αυτό που θα βγάλει περισσότερα.
[…]
– Δε γίνεται να είσαι και γεωπόνος και έμπορας. Είσαι γεωπόνος κύριε; Πάρε 50 ευρώ, έλα να μου δεις τα βαμβάκια. Έτσι; Και να μου πεις και τι φάρμακο θέλει αυτό. Αυτό που χρειάζεται. Και θα πάω εγώ στον έμπορα να το αγοράσω. Έτσι είναι το σωστό. Γιατί χώνονται οι εταιρείες και σου λένε, κοίταξε άμα με ακολουθήσεις σε αυτό το φάρμακο θα σου δώσω και 10 κουτιά δώρο. Δηλαδή από τα 5 ευρώ που θα το κοστολογήσει αυτός θα το δίνει 4 και θα μου το πουλήσει εμένα 7. Κατάλαβες; Έτσι πάει. Και έρχεται ο γεωπόνος και λέει, α αυτό είναι καλό. Μας δώσαν φέτος ένα εξτρά φάρμακο, πιάνει την περικοκλάδα, δεν ξέρω αν τα ξέρεις τα χόρτα, και αυτό άμα σε πάρει η βροχή, εξαπλώνεται και παθαίνεις ζημιά. Και μετά από αυτό το βαμβάκι ξεραίνονταν. Ήταν καινούριο και το προωθήσαν οι γεωπόνοι, όλοι οι γεωπόνοι. Ήρθαν οι εταιρίες και λένε πάρτε τα…
– Έχουν κέρδος μεγάλο…
– Και πολλοί παραγωγοί πάθαν ζημιά. Εγώ για καλή μου τύχη το έριξα και μπερδεύτηκα με το ψεκαστικό και αντί να ρίξω για 20 στρέμματα έριξα για 25. Και έπεσε αραιωμένο το φάρμακο και δεν έπαθα ζημιά. Αυτοί που το ρίξανε ακριβώς πάθαν όλοι ζημιά κα ξανασπείραν πάλι.
– Αυτός ο γεωπόνος ήταν εδώ ο τοπικός;
– Ναι. Και λέει τάχα μου ότι δεν φταίει αυτό και έφταιγε εκείνο…
– Ναι ότι φταίει το άλλο…
– Και ήρθε η εταιρεία και λέει δεν έχουμε εμείς καμιά ευθύνη…»
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με αγρότες της ΠΕ Τρικάλων)
Απόσπασμα 2
«- Σεμινάρια η εταιρεία μόνο.
– Αυτό λέω. Οι γεωπόνοι της Διεύθυνση Γεωργίας κάναν σεμινάρια. Σε μαζεύαν στο χωριό και σου λέγανε… μάθαινες πέντε πράγματα. Ενημερωνόσουν για αυτές τις τεχνολογίες.
– Δεν υπάρχει αυτό. Σεμινάρια μας κάναν οι εταιρείες που προωθούσαν τα δικά τους σπόρια, σου λέει να πάρεις αυτήν την ποικιλία, είναι καλή, πάρε και ένα καπέλο δώρο, ε σου κάνουν και κανά τραπέζι δώρο, και λες, α τι ωραίο βαμβάκι είναι.
– Αυτό είναι πολύ σημαντικό. Εμένα με ενδιαφέρει και για να το καταγράψω.
– Δεν υπάρχει αυτό. Ουδέτεροι γεωπόνοι, έτσι; Ουδέτεροι.»
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με αγρότες της ΠΕ Τρικάλων)
Η πλειονότητα των βαμβακοπαραγωγών αναφέρει ότι υφίσταται σημαντική αδικία λόγω της πώλησης του βάμβακος στην Ελλάδα ως σύσπορου και όχι ως εκκοκκισμένου προϊόντος. Η συγκεκριμένη συνθήκη αναγνωρίζεται ως μια ελληνική ιδιαιτερότητα η οποία επιβάλλεται από τις εκκοκκιστικές επιχειρήσεις, οι οποίες ασκούν τον έλεγχο σε όλη την εμπορική αλυσίδα. Ως αποτέλεσμα, η συγκεκριμένη μορφή εμπορίας στερεί από τον παραγωγό μια δυνατότητα ουσιαστικής αξιολόγησης και διαπραγμάτευσης της ποιοτικής αξίας της παραγωγής του, καθώς η εκκοκκιστική απόδοση (δηλαδή το ποσοστό καθαρού ίνας βάμβακος ανά κιλό σύσπορου) και τα κρίσιμα ποιοτικά χαρακτηριστικά του προϊόντος (όπως το μήκος, η αντοχή και το χρώμα της ίνας) παραμένουν έξω από τον έλεγχό του.
Από την πλευρά τους, οι εκκοκκιστές δεν αναγνωρίζουν την εμπορία του σύσπορου ως πρόβλημα. Παρ’ όλα αυτά, για οργανωτικούς και τεχνικούς λόγους δεν μπορούν να ανταποκριθούν στο πάγιο αίτημα των παραγωγών για ατομική ποιοτική αποτίμηση μέσω της πώλησης του βάμβακος ως εκκοκκισμένου. Η απουσία αποθηκευτικών υποδομών σε επίπεδο εκμετάλλευσης, σε συνδυασμό με τη μαζική και ταυτόχρονη μεταφορά της συγκομισμένης παραγωγής κατά την εκκοκκιστική περίοδο, οδηγεί συχνά στην ανάμιξη προϊόντων από διαφορετικά αγροτεμάχια και ποιοτικά χαρακτηριστικά. Αυτό καθιστά αδύνατο τον ποιοτικό διαχωρισμό και την εξατομικευμένη αποτίμηση κάθε δέματος βάμβακος. Σε αυτό το πλαίσιο, ο αποκλεισμός των παραγωγών από τη δυνατότητα ανάδειξης της ποιοτικής υπεροχής της παραγωγής τους όχι μόνο αναπαράγει μια δομική ανισότητα στην αγοραία σχέση με τα εκκοκκιστήρια, αλλά οδηγεί και σε προβληματικές ως προς την ποιότητα πρακτικές (βλ. χρήση μηχανών τύπου stripper).
Απόσπασμα 1
«- Τώρα αγοράζουνε τα εκκοκκιστήρια αυτά όλες τις ποσότητες; Τα αγοράζουν όλα; Ή ζητάνε ποιότητα συγκεκριμένη; Η σας λένε δε στο παίρνω;
– Ζητάνε ποιότητα. Και τι γίνεται; Όταν θα έρθει το φορτηγό να φορτώσει εμένα και έχω 5 διαφορετικές ποικιλίες θα τα βάλει σε ένα φορτηγό, και όταν θα πάει να το αδειάσει και θα μπερδευτεί. Τίποτα. Τίποτα!
– Όπως τα λέει ακριβώς είναι…
– Άρα τα αγοράζουν όλα. Σας ρίχνουν την τιμή αλλά το παίρνουν.
– Ναι. Ότι δεν έχεις καλή ποιότητα για να στο πάρουν πιο φθηνά. Δηλαδή άμα έχεις καλό θα πλήρωναν ακριβά; Με τίποτα. Απλώς χρησιμοποιούν την ποιότητα για να σου κατεβάσουν την τιμή.»
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με αγρότες της ΠΕ Τρικάλων)
Η αδυναμία ρύθμισης της τιμής του ηλεκτρικού ρεύματος για αγροτική χρήση από την πολιτεία παράλληλα την αδυναμία προτεραιοποίησης των ΤΟΕΒ για την χρηματοδότηση ενεργειακών έργων που θα συμβάλουν στην ενεργειακή τους αυτονόμηση (ενεργειακός συμψηφισμός ή άλλη μορφή διασυνδεδεμένων δικτύων ή αυτόνομων με μπαταρία) αναγνωρίζεται ως μια κομβική αδικία αναγνώρισης που οδηγεί στην αύξηση των λειτουργικών πάγιων εξόδων μιας καλλιέργειας που στηρίζεται στην άρδευση με γεώτρηση. Σχεδόν το 80% του κόστους της παραγωγής αποτελεί το κόστος του ηλεκτρισμού. Η περιοχή διαχείρισης του ΤΟΕΒ Μ. Καλυβίων στηρίζεται στην άρδευση των υπόγειων υδάτων, επομένως το κόστος της ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας είναι το σημαντικότερο κόστος των αρδευόμενων καλλιεργειών για τους παραγωγούς της περιοχής. Οι εκπρόσωποι της περιοχής διαπιστώνουν μεγάλο έλλειμα στην τιμολογιακή πολιτική της Πολιτείας, ως προς την χρήση του αγροτικού ρεύματος, ειδικά σε ΤΟΕΒ που βρίσκονται σε καθεστώς αποπληρωμής χρεών προς τον πάροχο του ηλεκτρισμού. Επιπλέον η χρηματιστηριακή αξία του ρεύματος αποτελεί μεγάλο εμπόδιο στην άρδευση καθώς πρέπει συνεχώς να παρακολουθείτε. Όπως παρατηρούν τα πανωτόκια (τόκος, που δεν έχει αποπληρωθεί και κεφαλαιοποιείται, με αποτέλεσμα να ξανατοκίζεται), δημιουργούν καθεστώς οικονομικού στραγγαλισμού για τα ΤΟΕΒ, και πλήττουν έναν κυρίαρχο παραγωγικό τομέα όπως η γεωργία. Επιπλέον όπως επισημαίνουν, η δημιουργία ενός φωτοβολταϊκού πάρκου, θα ήταν διπλής σημασίας για τα ΤΟΕΒ που βρίσκονται σε οικονομικό αδιέξοδο, διότι από την μία πλευρά θα μπορούσαν να μειώσουν το κόστος του ηλεκτρισμού που απαιτείται από την άρδευση, και επιπλέον θα μπορούσαν σταδιακά να χρησιμοποιήσουν το περισσευούμενο ρεύμα εκτός αρδευτικής περιόδου για την αποπληρωμή του χρέους τους.
Απόσπασμα 1
“Το μόνο θέμα με το πότισμα το πολύ σοβαρό τώρα είναι το ρεύμα, όπως είπαμε και τον κύριο ***** δεν γίνεται μία γεώτρηση να έχει 1.500€ να πάρουμε από το πότισμα, 940€ το ρεύμα και να έρχεται και 850€ πανωτόκια από *****. Δηλαδή κάτι γίνεται λάθος σε όλο αυτό, αλλά οι γεωτρήσεις ως νερό που είπατε έγινε αυτή η παρασπονδία που είπαμε για να πάρουν όλοι”.
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με εκπρόσωπο ΤΟΕΒ της ΠΕ Τρικάλων)
Απόσπασμα 2
“-πολλά ΤΟΕΒ βάζουν το ζήτημα της αυτοκατανάλωσης
– το είπα και εγώ εδώ και δύο χρόνια δίνω αγώνα, λοιπόν προσπαθούμε να κάνουμε μία μελέτη γιατί ο δήμος μας δίνει χώρο να βάλουμε φωτοβολταϊκά, τι θα έκανα λοιπόν; Δεν θα πλήρωνα ***** 50-70.000, έχει 8.000 η δεκάρα άμα φτιάξουμε, και θα έφτιαχνα 10 δεκάρες και άντε μετά και του χρόνου. Και μετά που θα έφτανε το χρέος από 500 σε 700 θα έλεγα παιδιά ελάτε εδώ, πάρτε τα 100, τι χρωστάμε και θα άρχιζε να γίνεται να γυρίσει από την άλλη μεριά. Απλά δεν έχει χρόνο κανένας να ασχοληθεί σοβαρά με φωτοβολταϊκά, γιατί φοβούνται όλοι, ούτε θα ασχοληθεί κανένας, γιατί τους ζητάς ρε παιδί μου, βρε μετρητά να φτιάξουμε μία εικοσάρα εδώ”.
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με εκπρόσωπο ΤΟΕΒ της ΠΕ Τρικάλων)
Μέρος των αγροτών εκφράζει επιφυλάξεις για τις επιπτώσεις που μπορεί να έχουν οι φωτοβολταϊκές εγκαταστάσεις όταν τοποθετούνται σε παραγωγικά αγροτεμάχια ή σε γειτονικά χωράφια. Μια βασική ανησυχία αφορά την κατάσταση του εδάφους μετά την πάροδο των ετών λειτουργίας των φωτοβολταϊκών εγκαταστάσεων και την πιθανότητα να μην είναι πλέον δυνατή η επιστροφή του σε γεωργική χρήση. Όπως αναφέρουν, η εγκατάσταση περιλαμβάνει κατασκευαστικές παρεμβάσεις (τσιμεντώσεις, χωματουργικά, βάσεις στήριξης) που μπορούν να επηρεάσουν την ποιότητα και τη δομή του εδάφους. Επίσης, σε ορισμένες περιπτώσεις, γόνιμα χωράφια παραχωρούνται για φωτοβολταϊκές εγκαταστάσεις, ενώ άλλες διαθέσιμες εκτάσεις – π.χ. ξερικά ή λιγότερο παραγωγικά εδάφη – δεν επιλέγονται, κάτι που προκαλεί αντιδράσεις.
Η σχετική βιβλιογραφία αναδεικνύει ότι οι φωτοβολταϊκές εγκαταστάσεις πράγματι επιφέρουν μεταβολές στο έδαφος. Έρευνες έχουν δείξει ότι η τοποθέτηση φωτοβολταϊκών συστημάτων οδηγεί σε υποβάθμιση της δομής του εδάφους, λόγω της ισοπέδωσης και της απομάκρυνσης της βλάστησης, παρόλο που η χημική του σύσταση μπορεί να παραμένει ανεπηρέαστη (Lambert et al., 2021). Ανησυχία προκαλεί επίσης η πιθανότητα μόλυνσης του εδάφους από βαρέα μέταλλα που περιέχονται στα υλικά κατασκευής των φωτοβολταϊκών πάνελ ή στις κατασκευές στήριξής τους. Οι μελέτες ως προς αυτή την διάσταση των επιπτώσεων φωτοβολταϊκών εγκαταστάσεων παραμένουν περιορισμένες. Σε μια πρόσφατη μελέτη περίπτωσης (Yousuf et al., 2024) δεν καταγράφηκαν ανησυχητικές συγκεντρώσεις βαρέων μετάλλων σε γειτονικά εδάφη, ωστόσο άλλες μελέτες επισημαίνουν πιθανούς κινδύνους διαρροής μετάλλων όπως κάδμιο, χαλκός, αρσενικό, υδράργυρος και νικέλιο, είτε μέσω έκπλυσης είτε μέσω απορροής από τις φωτοβολταϊκές εγκαταστάσεις (White et al., 2017; Robinson et al., 2019; Tawalbeh et al., 2021;). Τα υλικά που χρησιμοποιούνται συνήθως (όπως χάλυβας και αλουμίνιο) μπορούν, υπό προϋποθέσεις, να συμβάλουν στη ρύπανση του εδάφους και των υδάτων, γι’ αυτό και επισημαίνεται η ανάγκη για αξιολόγηση του ρίσκου και των περιβαλλοντικών επιπτώσεων ανά περίπτωση (Brown et al., 2022).
Μέσα σε αυτό το πλαίσιο, η ανησυχία των αγροτών για τις μακροχρόνιες επιπτώσεις των φωτοβολταϊκών εγκαταστάσεων στα χωράφια τους δεν είναι αβάσιμη. Η απουσία θεσμικού πλαισίου που να αναγνωρίζει τις πιθανές επιπτώσεις των φωτοβολταϊκών εγκαταστάσεων στα παραγωγικά αγροτεμάχια και τη μελλοντική τους χρήση συνιστά μια μορφή αδικίας αναγνώρισης. Οι ανησυχίες τους για την ακαταλληλότητα γόνιμης γης για τέτοιες επενδύσεις, καθώς και η ανάγκη για μακροπρόθεσμη βιωσιμότητα της γεωργικής παραγωγής δεν εισακούονται. Αντίθετα, προτεραιότητα φαίνεται να δίνεται στο χαμηλότερο κόστος εγκατάστασης ή στη διαθεσιμότητα γης, ανεξαρτήτως της αγροτικής της αξίας.
Σχετικές αναφορές:
Brown, A., Green, B., & White, C. (2022). Mitigating environmental impacts of PV systems in agriculture: Best practices and case studies. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 25(4), 123–137.
Lambert, Q., Bischoff, A., Cueff, S., Cluchier, A., & Gros, R. (2021). Effects of solar park construction and solar panels on soil quality, microclimate, CO₂ effluxes, and vegetation under a Mediterranean climate. Land Degradation & Development, 32(18), 5190–5202.
Robinson, S. A., & Meindl, G. A. (2019). Potential for leaching of heavy metals and metalloids from crystalline silicon photovoltaic systems. Journal of Natural Resources and Development, 9, 19–24.
Tawalbeh, M., Al-Othman, A., Kafiah, F., Abdelsalam, E., Almomani, F., & Alkasraw, M. (2021). Environmental impacts of solar photovoltaic systems: A critical review of recent progress and future outlook. Science of the Total Environment, 759, 143528.
White, H., & Black, S. (2017). Assessing the risk of heavy metal leaching from photovoltaic system components. Environmental Science & Technology, 32(3), 145–158.
Yousuf, H., Zahid, M. A., Madara, P. C., Jony, J. A., Park, S., Song, J. C., & Yi, J. (2024). Assessing soil pollution concerns in proximity to fence-type solar photovoltaic system installations. Heliyon, 10(11).
Απόσπασμα 1
«- Γιατί η εταιρεία να μην το αγοράσει το χωράφι και να το νοικιάσει;
– Δεν ξέρω. Για ποιο λόγο το κάνει; Δεν το έχω σκεφτεί.
– Στα 20 χρόνια άμα σου δίνει 250 ευρώ το στρέμμα είναι 5.000 το στρέμμα. Έτσι δεν είναι; 100.000 θα δώσει. Εάν τα αγοράσει τα 20 στρέμματα θα δώσει 40 χιλιάδες. Τι είναι καλύτερο;
– Για ποιο λόγο το κάνει; Πείτε μου.
– Άρα κάποιος λόγος υπάρχει. Θέλεις εμένα που είμαι αγρότης. Όλα τα χαρτιά φαίνονται σε αυτόν, στον παραγωγό. Απλώς η εταιρεία το εκμεταλλεύεται.
[…]
– Η εταιρεία. Όλα εξαρτώνται από την εταιρεία. Και το χωράφι αν δεν στο πάρει εσένα και όταν θα περάσουνε 20, 25 χρόνια, τότε το χωράφι δε θα υπάρχει. Πάει το χωράφι, τελείωσε.
– Γιατί δε θα υπάρχει;
– Γιατί μέσα πέφτουν τσιμέντα, πέφτει το ένα, πέφτει το άλλο…
[…]
– Εδώ έχουνε δώσει χωράφια για φωτοβολταϊκά;
– Έχουν δώσει.
– Έχουνε γίνει όμως τα πάρκα;
– Έχουνε γίνει.
– Έχουνε γίνει. Και έχουνε γίνει απ’ ό, τι μου λένε και σε γόνιμα χωράφια.
– Μα εκεί είναι το ερώτημα. Θες να κάνεις φωτοβολταϊκά, τόσα ξεροβούνια έχουμε. Μπες στα ξεροβούνια και φτιάξε. Αλλά εκεί έχουνε κοστολόγιο να τα εγκαταστήσουνε…»
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με αγρότες της ΠΕ Τρικάλων)
Το ζήτημα της ποιότητας του ελληνικού βάμβακος αποτελεί σημείο σύγκρουσης τεχνολογικών και οργανωτικών λογικών μεταξύ παραγωγών και εκκοκκιστών. Βαθύτερα, όμως, αντανακλά και μια πιο θεμελιώδη έλλειψη: την απουσία αναγνώρισης της ανάγκης των παραγωγών να προσανατολίσουν την παραγωγή τους σε προϊόντα υψηλότερης ποιότητας και προστιθέμενης αξίας.
Πολλοί παραγωγοί, αντιλαμβανόμενοι ότι η ανώτερη ποιότητα δεν επιβραβεύεται έμπρακτα, υιοθετούν τεχνολογίες που μεγιστοποιούν τη βραχυπρόθεσμη οικονομική αποδοτικότητα εις βάρος της ποιότητας. Ενδεικτική είναι η ολοένα αυξανόμενη χρήση μηχανών τύπου stripper, οι οποίες σε αντίθεση με την κλασσική βαμβακοσυλλεκτική μηχανή (picker), αντί να συλλέγουν επιλεκτικά τον καρπό, απογυμνώνουν ολόκληρο το φυτό, οδηγώντας σε συγκομιδή μεγαλύτερης μάζας αλλά με υψηλή περιεκτικότητα σε ξένες ύλες. Η επιλογή αυτή, ωστόσο, δεν αποσκοπεί σε κερδοσκοπία μέσω βάρους—καθώς οι ξένες ύλες αφαιρούνται στην τιμολόγηση από το εκκοκκιστήριο—αλλά στην εξοικονόμηση κόστους, καθώς οι μηχανές stripper έχουν μικρότερα έξοδα λειτουργίας, μειώνοντας έτσι το συνολικό κόστος συγκομιδής έως και κατά 50%. Όμως, το αποτέλεσμα είναι η σημαντική υποβάθμιση του τελικού προϊόντος, με χαμηλότερη εκκοκκιστική απόδοση και υποδεέστερα ποιοτικά χαρακτηριστικά (υποβάθμιση χρώματος, κοντύτερη ίνα, υψηλό ποσοστό ξένων υλών). Το βάρος της ποιοτικής υποβάθμισης, ωστόσο, μετακυλίεται και στην εκκοκκιστική βιομηχανία, η οποία αντιμετωπίζει αυξημένα κόστη διαλογής και χαμηλότερη εμπορική αξία του προϊόντος.
Κατά συνέπεια, πρόκειται για έναν φαύλο κύκλο, στον οποίο η έλλειψη κινήτρων για την παραγωγή ποιοτικού βάμβακος, σε συνδυασμό με την απουσία θεσμικής και εμπορικής αναγνώρισης της προστιθέμενης αξίας του, οδηγεί σε πρακτικές που ενισχύουν τη χαμηλή ποιότητα και τη γενικότερη αδυναμία του κλάδου να αναβαθμιστεί ποιοτικά και να διαφοροποιηθεί ανταγωνιστικά στις διεθνείς αγορές.
Απόσπασμα 1
«- Τώρα αγοράζουνε τα εκκοκκιστήρια αυτά όλες τις ποσότητες; Τα αγοράζουν όλα; Ή ζητάνε ποιότητα συγκεκριμένη; Ή σου λένε δε στο παίρνω;
– Ζητάνε ποιότητα. Και τι γίνεται; Όταν θα έρθει το φορτηγό να φορτώσει εμένα και έχω 5 διαφορετικές ποικιλίες θα τα βάλει σε ένα φορτηγό, και όταν θα πάει να το αδειάσει και θα μπερδευτεί. Τίποτα. Τίποτα!
– Όπως τα λέει ακριβώς είναι…
– Άρα τα αγοράζουν όλα. Σου ρίχνουν την τιμή αλλά το παίρνουν…
– Ναι. Ότι δεν έχεις καλή ποιότητα για να στο πάρουν πιο φθηνά. Δηλαδή άμα έχεις καλό θα πλήρωναν ακριβά; Με τίποτα. Απλώς χρησιμοποιούν την ποιότητα για να σου κατεβάσουν την τιμή.»
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με αγρότες της ΠΕ Τρικάλων)
Η κλιματική αλλαγή φαίνεται να επηρεάζει τις αλληλεπιδράσεις φυτών και παθογόνων, με βασικές συνέπειες την εμφάνιση ενισχυμένων ασθενειών και την ανάπτυξη ανθεκτικότητας στις χρησιμοποιούμενες δραστικές ουσίες. Σύμφωνα με πολλούς παραγωγούς, τα τελευταία χρόνια παρατηρείται αύξηση προσβολών στις καλλιέργειες και σε συνδυασμό με την περιορισμένη αποτελεσματικότητα των διαθέσιμων μεθόδων αντιμετώπισης, καταγράφεται αύξηση του κόστους φυτοπροστασίας όχι μόνο στην Ελλάδα αλλά συνολικά στην ΕΕ. Σύμφωνα με στοιχεία της Eurostat για το 2023, το μέσο κόστος των φυτοπροστατευτικών προϊόντων αυξήθηκε κατά 9% σε σχέση με το προηγούμενο έτος, παρά τη μείωση του κόστους άλλων εισροών όπως τα λιπάσματα και τα καύσιμα. Επιπλέον, η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή εκτιμά ότι η βιομηχανία αγροχημικών δαπανά περίπου 300 εκατομμύρια ευρώ ετησίως για την προετοιμασία φακέλων έγκρισης και ανανέωσης δραστικών ουσιών, με το κόστος ανάπτυξης και απόδειξης της ασφάλειας μιας νέας δραστικής ουσίας να κυμαίνεται μεταξύ 200-250 εκατομμυρίων ευρώ.
Σε αυτό το πλαίσιο, η διανεμητική αδικία συνίσταται στη δυσανάλογη επιβάρυνση των παραγωγών με το κόστος της φυτοπροστασίας, την ώρα που το αγροτικό εισόδημα παραμένει συρρικνωμένο. Αν και οι ίδιοι οι αγρότες αναγνωρίζουν την ανάγκη περιορισμού της περιβαλλοντικής υποβάθμισης, βρίσκονται αντιμέτωποι με ολοένα και εντονότερες φυτοπαθολογικές πιέσεις τις οποίες καλούνται να διαχειριστούν με ιδιαίτερα υψηλό κόστος, είτε μέσω συμβατικών φυτοπροστατευτικών σκευασμάτων είτε μέσω ακριβότερων βιολογικών σκευασμάτων που προωθούνται στο πλαίσιο της περιβαλλοντικής μετάβασης. Η κατάσταση αυτή εντείνει μια αίσθηση απογοήτευσης ως προς την οικονομική αλλά και την περιβαλλοντική βιωσιμότητα, καθώς οι αγρότες θεωρούν πως επωμίζονται το κόστος μιας περιβαλλοντικής πολιτικής, χωρίς να αποζημιώνονται επαρκώς μέσω των τιμών που λαμβάνουν για τα προϊόντα τους στην αγορά.
Σχετικές αναφορές:
Eurostat. (2024, 19 Ιανουαρίου). News release: Agricultural statistics – main results for 2023 [Press release]. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20240119-1
European Commission. Evaluation report of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 on the placing of plant protection products on the market [Evaluation report].
Απόσπασμα 1
«- Ασθένειες εμφανίζονται συχνά;
– Πολλές. Ειδικά στο βαμβάκι και στο καλαμπόκι τώρα τελευταία πολλές.
– Είναι από την κλιματική αλλαγή πιστεύεις;
– Όλα παίζουν ρόλο.
– Δηλαδή έχεις παρατηρήσει την τελευταία δεκαετία διαφορές;
– Την τελευταία δεκαετία έχουμε απελπιστεί όλοι να ρίχνουμε φάρμακα. Και ένας λόγος που δεν μου αρέσει το βαμβάκι είναι επειδή μπαίνουμε πολλές φορές να ψεκάζουμε, να ρίξουμε φάρμακα.
– Την ίδια ερώτηση την κάνω σε όλους, αν έχουν παρατηρήσει λόγω κλιματικής αλλαγής αύξηση ασθενειών κτλ.
– Ναι το πράσινο σκουλήκι…
– Μικρότερες παραγωγές, ξηρασίες κτλ., θερμοκρασίες υψηλές..
– Έχει 4 γενιές που θες 4 ψεκάσματα που στοιχίζουν από 10 ευρώ το στρέμμα, μετά έχουμε τετράνυχο, αλευρώδες, πιο νωρίς, το αλευρώδες μπορεί να σου φάει το χτένι και να μην έχεις καρύδι…
– Και πιστεύεις ότι όλα αυτά μπορεί να σχετίζονται με την κλιματική αλλαγή;
– Όλα παίζουνε. Δηλαδή πριν από 10 χρόνια εγώ δε θυμάμαι ψεκασμούς. Μόνο ένα στο τέλος να φρενάρουμε το φυτό και αυτό ήταν.
– Τελευταία χρόνια έχει όλο σκουλήκι… Όλο σκουλήκι…»
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με αγρότες της ΠΕ Τρικάλων)
Μια αδικία που αναγνωρίζεται από παραγωγούς της περιοχής αφορά τον αυξανόμενο ανταγωνισμό που δέχεται η Γη Υψηλής Παραγωγικότητας (ΓΥΠ) από την εξάπλωση των φωτοβολταϊκών πάρκων. Μεγάλοι επενδυτές και εταιρείες προσεγγίζουν κατόχους αγροτεμαχίων με ιδιαίτερα δελεαστικές οικονομικές προτάσεις είτε για ενοικίαση είτε για πώληση της γης, προσφέροντας πολλαπλάσια τιμή σε σύγκριση με τα ποσά που δίνονται για γεωργική χρήση. Η οικονομική πίεση που δημιουργείται μέσα από αυτές τις πρακτικές ανατρέπει τους όρους πρόσβασης στη γη ιδίως για τους μικρούς και μεσαίους παραγωγούς. Οι ενοικιαστές αγροτικής γης, που μέχρι πρότινος καλλιεργούσαν με όρους που διασφάλιζαν επιπλέον εισόδημα σε ιδιοκτήτες (όπως συνταξιούχων αγροτών ή ετρεοεπαγγελματιών που δεν καλλιεργούν οι ίδιοι), βρίσκονται πλέον σε μειονεκτική θέση, καθώς οι ίδιοι ιδιοκτήτες τείνουν να προτιμούν τις πιο επικερδείς λύσεις που προσφέρουν οι εταιρείες φωτοβολταϊκών. Έτσι, πολλοί ενεργοί αγρότες χάνουν πρόσβαση σε παραγωγική γη, ενώ παρατηρούνται αυξήσεις στα ενοίκια σε επίπεδα δυσανάλογα με την οικονομική απόδοση της καλλιέργειας.
Παρά το γεγονός ότι η ΓΥΠ χαρακτηρίζεται θεσμικά ως μη ανανεώσιμος εθνικός πόρος ήδη από το 1983 (Ν. 1337/83), με κριτήρια που σχετίζονται με την εδαφική σύσταση, την αρδευσιμότητα, το μικροκλίμα, τις παραδοσιακές ή ειδικές καλλιέργειες, η εφαρμογή του πλαισίου προστασίας υπήρξε εξαιρετικά ατελής. Η απαίτηση για γεωγραφικό προσδιορισμό της ΓΥΠ θεσπίστηκε με τον Ν. 2945/2001, προβλέποντας αποκλειστική χρήση της για αγροτικούς σκοπούς. Ωστόσο, οι διοικητικές αδυναμίες (υποστελέχωση, έλλειψης σχετικής ειδημοσύνης) δεν επέτρεψαν την εφαρμογή της, με αποτέλεσμα οι περισσότερες Περιφέρειες να μην έχουν χαρτογραφήσει επισήμως τη ΓΥΠ. Αντί να ενισχυθεί η προστασία της, η νομοθεσία από το 2010 και εξής έκανε πιο ευέλικτη τη δυνατότητα εγκατάστασης φωτοβολταϊκών σε τέτοια εδάφη. Ο Ν. 3851/2010 διαφοροποίησε το πλαίσιο επιτρέποντας υπό προϋποθέσεις εγκαταστάσεις ΑΠΕ σε ΓΥΠ, ενώ ο Ν. 4203/2013 έθεσε προσωρινούς περιορισμούς. Το 2019, οι δυνατότητες εγκατάστασης επανήλθαν υπό προϋποθέσεις για μονάδες έως 1 MW και με όριο κάλυψης το 0,8% του συνόλου των καλλιεργούμενων εκτάσεων ανά Περιφερειακή Ενότητα. Παρά τους περιορισμούς, η έλλειψη χαρτογράφησης της ΓΥΠ και η περιορισμένη διοικητική ικανότητα καθιστούν τον έλεγχο και την επιβολή δύσκολη, επιτρέποντας την εκμετάλλευση εύφορων εδαφών. Σύμφωνα με σχετικά πρόσφατα δεδομένα (2022), έως 320.000 στρέμματα γης υψηλής παραγωγικότητας σε εθνικό επίπεδο ενδέχεται να δεσμευτούν για φωτοβολταϊκά.
Η εξέλιξη αυτή συνιστά μια καθαρά διανεμητική αδικία, καθώς η κατανομή της γης μεταβάλλεται ραγδαία προς όφελος άλλων οικονομικών δραστηριοτήτων, περιορίζοντας τις δυνατότητες συνέχισης της γεωργικής δραστηριότητας, ιδίως από εκείνους που δεν έχουν ιδιόκτητη γη ή τα μέσα να ανταγωνιστούν τα προσφερόμενα ποσά. Η πίεση εντείνεται όταν φωτοβολταϊκά εγκαθίστανται σε κατεξοχήν παραγωγικά εδάφη, ενώ η αξιοποίηση οριακών ή φτωχότερων εκτάσεων (όπως ορεινών ή λιγότερο αποδοτικών εδαφών) δεν προκρίνεται, συνήθως λόγω υψηλότερου κόστους εγκατάστασης (έλλειψη υποδομών πρόσβασης, μεταφοράς ρεύματος, κτλ.). Με αυτόν τον τρόπο, φωτοβολταϊκές εγκαταστάσεις που προωθούνται χωρίς χωρικό σχεδιασμό λαμβάνουν χώρα εις βάρος της παραγωγικής γης και με ενδεχόμενο κίνδυνο περιβαλλοντικής υποβάθμισης στην περίπτωση που δεν ικανοποιούνται σχετικές χωροταξικές και περιβαλλοντικές προβλέψεις.
Σχετικές αναφορές:
– Νόμος 1337/1983: Επέκταση σχεδίων πόλεων, οικιστική ανάπτυξη και σχετικές ρυθμίσεις (ΦΕΚ Α’ 33/14.03.1983).
– Νόμος 2945/2001: Εθνικό Συμβούλιο Χωροταξίας και Αειφόρου Ανάπτυξης και άλλες διατάξεις (ΦΕΚ Α’ 223/05.10.2001).
– Υπουργική Απόφαση 49828/2008. (2008, 3 Δεκεμβρίου). Καθορισμός διαδικασιών εγκατάστασης φωτοβολταϊκών σταθμών (ΦΕΚ Β’ 2464/03.12.2008).
– Νόμος 3851/2010: Επιτάχυνση της ανάπτυξης των Ανανεώσιμων Πηγών Ενέργειας για την αντιμετώπιση της κλιματικής αλλαγής και άλλες διατάξεις σε θέματα αρμοδιότητας του Υπουργείου Περιβάλλοντος, Ενέργειας και Κλιματικής Αλλαγής (ΦΕΚ Α’ 85/04.06.2010).
– Υπουργική Απόφαση 168040/2010. (2010). Καθορισμός κριτηρίων με τα οποία διαβαθμίζεται η αγροτική γη σε ποιότητες και κατατάσσεται σε κατηγορίες παραγωγικότητας.
– Νόμος 4203/2013: Ρυθμίσεις θεμάτων Ανανεώσιμων Πηγών Ενέργειας και άλλες διατάξεις (ΦΕΚ Α’ 235/01.11.2013).
– Νόμος 4964/2022: Διατάξεις για την προστασία του περιβάλλοντος και την προώθηση της βιώσιμης ανάπτυξης (ΦΕΚ Α’ 150/30.07.2022).
– Solomon. (21/6/2023). Γεωργική γη στη σκιά των ηλιακών πάνελ. Solomon. https://wearesolomon.com/el/mag/format-el/erevnes/georgiki-gi-sti-skia-ton-fotovoltaikon/
Απόσπασμα 1
«- Εδώ έχουνε δώσει χωράφια για φωτοβολταϊκά;
– Έχουν δώσει.
– Έχουνε γίνει όμως τα πάρκα;
– Έχουνε γίνει.
– Έχουνε γίνει. Και έχουνε γίνει απ’ ό, τι μου λένε και σε γόνιμα χωράφια…
– Μα εκεί είναι το ερώτημα. Θες να κάνεις φωτοβολταϊκά, τόσα ξεροβούνια έχουμε. Μπες στα ξεροβούνια και φτιάξε. Αλλά εκεί έχουνε κοστολόγιο να τα εγκαταστήσουνε…»
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με αγρότες της ΠΕ Τρικάλων)
Ο μικρός γεωργικός κλήρος και η μεγάλη διασπορά των καλλιεργούμενων αγροτεμαχίων προσλαμβάνεται από τους αγρότες – παραγωγούς στην ΠΕ Τρικάλων σαν ένας παράγοντας που δημιουργεί ανισότητες κυρίως σε σχέση με τους συναδέλφους τους της ΠΕ Λάρισας. Οι αγρότες της ΠΕ ενότητας Τρικάλων υποστηρίζουν ότι ο γεωργικός κλήρος στην περιοχή τους είναι πολύ μικρότερος σε σχέση με την ΠΕ Λάρισας, ενώ και τα καλλιεργούμενα αγροτεμάχια στην ΠΕ Λάρισας είναι πολύ μεγαλύτερα από τα αντίστοιχα στην ΠΕ Τρικάλων. Ο ισχυρισμός αυτός υποστηρίζεται από τα εμπειρικά δεδομένα όπως αυτά απεικονίζονται στα στοιχεία της ΕΛΣΤΑΤ για την Διάρθρωση των αγροτικών εκμεταλλεύσεων. Συγκεκριμένα για το έτος 2016 η μέση έκταση (σε στρέμματα) ανά αμιγώς αγροτική εκμετάλλευση στην Περιφέρεια Θεσσαλίας ήταν 58,43 η οποία στις επιμέρους Περιφερειακές Ενότητες ήταν 59,50 στην ΠΕ Καρδίτσας, 73,76 στην ΠΕ Λάρισας, 46,62 στην ΠΕ Μαγνησίας και 42,98 στην ΠΕ Τρικάλων. Παρατηρούμε δηλαδή ότι η μέση έκταση ανά αμιγώς αγροτική εκμετάλλευση στην ΠΕ Τρικάλων είναι σχεδόν η μισή σε σχέση με την αντίστοιχη της ΠΕ Λάρισας.
Η πραγματικότητα αυτή δημιουργεί διανεμητικές αδικίες που σχετίζονται με δυσχέρειες στις καλλιεργητικές πρακτικές οι οποίες τελικά μεταφράζονται σε αυξημένο κόστος παραγωγής. Συγκεκριμένα ο μικρός και διασπαρμένος γεωργικός κλήρος απαιτεί πιο εκτεταμένες αρδευτικές υποδομές, μεγαλύτερη κατανάλωση νερού και ενέργειας και μεγαλύτερο κόστος εργασίας ανά στρέμμα καλλιεργούμενης έκτασης σε σχέση με τον μεγαλύτερο και πιο συγκεντρωμένο κλήρο. Η μικρή έκταση αγροτικής εκμετάλλευσης δηλαδή δεν επιτρέπει στον παραγωγό να έχει τα οφέλη της οικονομίας κλίμακας που έχει η αγροτική εκμετάλλευση με μεγάλη έκταση πράγμα που έχει σημαντική επίπτωση στην ανταγωνιστικότητα των μικρών εκμεταλλεύσεων. Η πραγματικότητα αυτή αναγνωρίζεται στην ΚΑΠ 2023-2027 η οποία έχει θεσπίσει την ‘Συμπληρωματική Αναδιανεμητική Εισοδηματική Στήριξη για τη Βιωσιμότητα’ η οποία έχει σαν στόχο την πιο ισορροπημένη κατανομή της εισοδηματικής στήριξης στις μικρές και μεσαίες γεωργικές εκμεταλλεύσεις.
Απόσπασμα 1
«- Οι αγρότες στη Λάρισα έχουν μεγάλες εκτάσεις. Εμείς δεν έχουμε μεγάλες εκτάσεις. Ο δικός μας ο κλήρος είναι 40 στρέμματα. Ήταν 80, ο παππούς μου και τώρα είναι 40.
– Και υπάρχουν αγρότες στη Λάρισα που έχουν 2.000 στρέμματα…
– Έχουνε 1.000 στρέμματα. Πας στη Χάλκη μέσα και εκεί ξέρεις τι γίνεται;
– Πας Πλατύκαμπο, πας εκεί μέσα Γλαύκη, εκεί έχουν από 2.000 στρέμματα ο ένας. Αχανείς εκτάσεις. Ξέρεις τι θα πει να είναι ένα χωράφι 500 στρέμματα;
– Ένας έχει 3.500 στρέμματα. Ένα χωριό δικό μου το έχει ένας.
– Εσάς εδώ πως είναι οι κλήροι; Πόσο διάσπαρτοι είναι; Στα δικά σας πόσο είναι;
– Ακτίνα 6 χιλιόμετρα.
– Σε πόσα σημεία έχεις χωράφια;
– 20 σημεία.
– Σε 20 σημεία χωράφια, ε; από 20, 30 το καθένα;
– Από 10 μέχρι 30 στρέμματα. Εγώ για να τα περπατήσω όλα θέλω 2 ώρες. Να τα περπατήσω, να μην κάνω τίποτα. Απλά να τα δω.
– Ξέρεις τι πάει να πει να έχεις σε 15-20 μεριές χωράφια; Να λες, τώρα που θα πάω να αλλάξω το κανόνι; Που θα πάω να αλλάξω τη βέργα;
– Έχω ξεχάσει χωράφι να ποτίζει 3 μέρες. Πλημμύρησε το νερό…»
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με αγρότες της ΠΕ Τρικάλων)
Η πρόσβαση σε χρηματοδοτήσεις και ευκαιρίες για επένδυση στο δίκτυο αποτελεί μια διανεμητική αδικία που χαρακτηρίζει τόσο τα μικρότερα σε έκταση ΤΟΕΒ, όσο και εκείνα που τα πάγια έξοδά τους, όπως το κόστος του ηλεκτρισμού, αφήνει λίγα περιθώρια για περεταίρω επενδύσεις στο δίκτυο από τα διαθέσιμα αποθεματικά του Οργανισμού. Οι επενδύσεις για την συντήρηση και τον εκσυγχρονισμό του δικτύου είναι κομβικές ενέργειες για την διασφάλιση της σταθερότητας του δικτύου αλλά και για την εξοικονόμηση της κατανάλωσης του νερού. Αλλά αυτό προϋποθέτει την ορθολογική και διαφανή διαχείριση των οικονομικών του ΤΟΕΒ, που όπως παρατηρούν ορισμένοι εκπρόσωποι αυτό αποτελεί μεγάλο πρόβλημα για τις μικρές κοινωνίες, όπου οι διαπροσωπικές σχέσεις είναι κυρίαρχες στην διαχείριση της άρδευσης. Όταν συσσωρεύονται τα χρέη του οργανισμού, λόγω κακοδιαχείρισης των οικονομικών του οργανισμού, αυτό αντανακλάτε και στην ευελιξία των επενδύσεων που μπορεί να κάνει ο οργανισμός, με αποτέλεσμα να γιγαντώνονται οι τοπικές αδικίες που δημιουργήθηκαν τα προηγούμενα χρόνια, τόσο ως προς την ποιότητα της άρδευσης όσο και ως προς την πρόσβαση σε αυτή.
Απόσπασμα 1
“και έδινε άδεια σε όλους τους φίλους του, και ξεκίνησε στο χωριό και έχουν γεμίσει όλοι [γεώτρηση] και τώρα ο οργανισμός από 400.000 έσοδα, έχει 80.000 και τώρα ποτίζουνε
-στους φίλους του, όμως αυτό σημαίνει όμως ότι κάποιοι μένανε από έξω;
– βεβαίως ακριβώς, απλά ο άνθρωπος έκανε αυτή την παράβαση, που η αλήθεια είναι ότι τώρα με ανάγκασε με ένα χαρτί που ήρθε προχθές να πιέσω εδώ σαν προϊστάμενη υπηρεσία, να μου στείλει χαρτί πού να απαγορεύει ότι όποιος χρωστάει στο οργανισμό, ενώ το έγραφε το καταστατικό δεν το τηρούσανε ποτέ, και σήμερα ενημέρωση είχαμε, πάτε και κάντε διακανονισμό το ρεύμα κτλ. δεν μπορεί ο άλλος να χρωστάει 15.000€ και να είναι και *** στον οργανισμό, έτσι δεν είναι;
-κάπως προβληματικό
– αντιδεοντολογικό, μόνο πρόβλημα, λοιπόν έφτασε τώρα ο οργανισμός να έχουμε 80-85.000 έσοδα, 700.000 έξοδα, όταν έχει 80 έσοδα και τα έξοδα παραπάνω; Είσαι εκτεθειμένος
– πείτε μου λίγο για την κατάσταση που επικρατούσε, από ότι καταλαβαίνω ήταν κάτι πολύ αδιαφανές που ήταν όλα κεντρικοποιημένο στο πρόεδρο
– οι μικρές κοινωνίες το έχουνε αυτό.”
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με εκπρόσωπο ΤΟΕΒ της ΠΕ Τρικάλων)
Οι ελλιπείς συνθήκες εξισορρόπησης του ανταγωνισμού στο κόστος παραγωγής προκύπτει μέσα από διαφορετικές πρακτικές άρδευσης σε κάθε περιοχή, αποτελεί μια διανεμητική αδικία καθώς συνδέεται άμεσα με τις διαθέσιμες υποδομές, την γεωγραφική θέση των αρδευτών. Ο τρόπος άρδευσης είναι σε άμεση εξάρτηση με την αύξηση ή μείωση του κόστους παραγωγής. Στην Κοιλάδα το σύνολο των αρδευτών είναι αποκλειστικά με την χρήση γεώτρησης, Το μεγαλύτερο κόστος στην παραγωγή, περίπου το 80% είναι η χρήση του ηλεκτρισμού που χρειάζεται για να λειτουργήσει μία γεώτρηση. Οι αρδευτές της περιοχής αναγνωρίζουν ότι η συγκεκριμένη πρακτική (χρήση πομόνας) αυξάνει κατακόρυφα το κόστος παραγωγής, άρα μειώνει και το καθαρό εισόδημα των παραγωγών. Όπως ανέφεραν οι εκπρόσωποι της περιοχής των Τρικάλων το κόστος συνολικά της άρδευσης φέρνει δημιουργεί αναστάτωση και ενστάσεις στην κοινότητά τους, γιατί με τις διαθέσιμες τεχνικές επιλογές το νερό δεν επαρκούσε και αποτελεί πολύτιμο και ακριβό αγαθό και χρειάζεται μια σημαντική μεταρρύθμιση της τιμολογιακής πολιτικής που ακολουθήθηκε ώστε να μειώσουν την αδικία που υφίστανται, με την υπογειοποίηση του δικτύου καθώς και την εισαγωγή Inverter στον εξοπλισμό. Όπως επισημάνθηκε από τους εκπροσώπους του ΤΟΕΒ, η αλλαγή της πρακτικής άρδευσης από μικροεκτοξευτήρες (μπέκ) σε συστήματα καταιονισμού με αυτοπροωθούμενο εκτοξευτήρα (καρούλια), συντέλεσε τόσο στην εξάντληση και κατασπατάληση του υδροφόρου ορίζοντα από τις διαφυγές του περισσευούμενου νερού από το χωράφι, αλλά και την σταδιακή καταστροφή του δικτύου λόγω της πίεσης που δημιουργούσε το καρούλι. Η μετάβαση σε κλειστά δίκτυα υποστηριζόμενα από προγραμματιστές-ρυθμιστές στροφών (Inverters) αντλιών, θα λύσει την σημαντική διανεμητική αδικία που υφίστανται λόγω του πεπερασμένου δικτύου τους.
Απόσπασμα 1
“Να μιλήσουμε για την υποδομή, ως μοτέρ πριν βγούμε έξω να ποτίσουμε έπρεπε να έχουμε καλύτερη διαχείριση, γιατί αν έχεις inventer 20 μπεκ ζητάει ο *** στρέμμα να πάει 25, γιατί όταν έχεις Inventer πάνω δουλεύει και σου ελέγχει τη ροή… υπάρχουν στις γεωτρήσεις που λιγόστεψέ το νερό πάρα πολύ, εμάς είχε 20, τώρα βγάζει 11-12 με το ζόρι, και του τιμολόγιο βγαίνει με βάση το τότε μπεκ, και αυτό είναι πρόβλημα, οπότε υπάρχει θέμα και είναι πανάκριβο το νερό, για αυτό θέλει όλες οι γεωτρήσεις να συνδεθούν να γίνουν με υπογειοποίηση, κλειστό δίκτυο.”
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με εκπρόσωπο ΤΟΕΒ της ΠΕ Τρικάλων)
Απόσπασμα 2
“ναι αυτό 20-16 και έφευγε το νερό, και η γεώτρηση με 60 μπέκ έφτασε ο άλλος να ποτίζει σήμερα με 12 μπεκ, και μοτέρ δεν μπορείς να αλλάξεις γιατί το νερό εδώ σήμερα διοχετεύονται εκτός χωραφιού, χάνεται… γιατί όταν οι γεωτρήσεις που σε μας ήταν πολλές με 65 μπεκ το νερό, πολύ νερό, δεν σκέφτηκαν οι ιθύνοντες τότε εδώ, να βάλουν ένα inverter γιατί ο άλλο δεν μπορούσε να χρησιμοποιήσει 65, μπορούσε να έχει 15, μόλις έφτανε η πίεση εκεί θα πότιζε όσο χρειαζόταν. Τώρα πια χανόταν όλο το νερό, ο ένας πότιζε με 20, ο άλλο 5, ο άλλος άνοιγε σπάγανε οι σωλήνες και δεν έμενε τίποτα.”
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με εκπρόσωπο ΤΟΕΒ της ΠΕ Τρικάλων)
Σε πολλές γεωργικές περιοχές, η έλλειψη νερού στο αρδευτικό δίκτυο εντείνεται ιδιαίτερα κατά τους καλοκαιρινούς μήνες, κι αυτό που συναντάμε στην περιοχή των Μεγάλων Καλυβιών της ΠΕ Τρικάλων στο δυτικό τμήμα του θεσσαλικού κάμπου, ως μια διανεμητική αδικία. Μέχρι και το 1977 οι αρδευτές της περιοχής, χρησιμοποιούσαν αποκλειστικά τον Πάμισο και τον Πηνειό για τις αρδευτικές τους ανάγκες, αλλά με τα εκτεταμένα κρατικά προγράμματα επέκτασης των γεωτρήσεων, οδηγήθηκαν στην εκμετάλλευση των υπόγειων νερών. Το ΤΟΕΒ Μεγάλων Καλυβίων που εξυπηρετεί την περιοχή, μία έκταση 22.600 στρεμμάτων, με το αρδευτικό του δίκτυο να εξυπηρετείται από 34 γεωτρήσεις. Ο μη επαρκής εμπλουτισμός και αναπλήρωση του υπόγειου υδροφορέα της περιοχής από παράλληλα έργα εκταμίευσης, όχι μόνο εξάντλησε τα αποθέματα των παραποτάμων του Πηνειού, αλλά με τον καιρό οδήγησε τις γεωτρήσεις σε πολύ μεγάλα βάθη. Η εκτεταμένη περίοδος ξηρασίας, οι κατά καιρούς ανομβρίες εντείναν το φαινόμενο της λειψυδρίας με αποτέλεσμα να υπάρχει σοβαρό αρδευτικό έλλειμα στην περιοχή. Ενδεικτικό αυτής της κατάστασης είναι ότι από 10 μέτρα που εκτεινόταν το σκέλος της γεώτρησης για την εκμετάλλευση των υπόγειων υδάτων, σήμερα αντλούν από τα 130-200 μέτρα.
Απόσπασμα 1
“Πριν από τις γεωτρήσεις ποτίζαμε από τα κανάλια από τον ποταμό. Τα παραποτάμια, από το 77 όταν γίναν οι γεωτρήσεις, δεν υπήρχε νερό το τραβούσαν οι γεωτρήσεις…έχουμε τα προβλήματα είναι ότι υπάρχουν περιοχές, είναι μια περιοχή στο χωριό μου για παράδειγμα που χτυπάνε να βρούνε νερό η οποία χτυπάνε να βρουν νερό στα 10, 20, 30 μέτρα και δεν μπορούμε να βρούμε και οι γεωτρήσεις δύο, από 70 μπέκ που είχανε πριν 30 – 40 χρόνια τώρα έχουν 10 ή καθόλου. ναι και οι δύο είναι εκεί που γκρεμιστήκαν κιόλας μία στα Αμπέλια.”
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με εκπρόσωπο ΤΟΕΒ της ΠΕ Τρικάλων)
Ένα σημαντικό ζήτημα που τέθηκε από τους εκπροσώπους, είναι ως προς την ισότιμη μεταχείριση των ΤΟΕΒ από την Πολιτεία, δηλαδή η συμπερίληψη. Η συμπερίληψη και η αναγνώριση των τοπικών αναγκών και μικρότερων σε έκταση και δυναμικότητας ΤΟΕΒ σε κρίσιμες αποφάσεις που αφορούν το μέλλον των αρδευτών μιας κοινότητας. Υπάρχει η αίσθηση ότι τα μεγαλύτερα σε γεωγραφική έκταση ΤΟΕΒ και εκείνα που βρίσκονται γεωγραφικά εγγύτερα στα κέντρα διοίκησης της πολιτικής εξουσίας, λαμβάνουν μια προνομιακή μεταχείριση, τόσο στην επίλυση των προβλημάτων τους, καθώς και προτεραιοποιούνται ως προς τις διάφορες αποφάσεις. Οι εκπρόσωποι των ΤΟΕΒ αυτών θεωρούν ότι και λόγω της χιλιομετρικής τους απόστασης από το πολιτικό κέντρο της Θεσσαλίας [Λάρισας], τους δίνεται η αίσθηση ότι αποκλείονται και δεν λαμβάνουν μέρος σε σημαντικές αποφάσεις, στις οποίες πολύ σημαντικό ρόλο παίζουν η εγγύτητα και οι διαπροσωπικές σχέσεις. Τα ΤΟΕΒ αναγνώρισαν την προσπάθεια της Πολιτείας να βοηθήσει στην αποκατάσταση από τις πληγές, αλλά παρατηρούν κάποιοι εκπρόσωποί τους ότι το ζήτημα παραμένει για τις μικρότερες και πιο αποκεντρωμένες περιοχές που βρίσκονται πιο μακριά από τα κέντρα λήψης αποφάσεων.
Αποσπασμα 1
“- εννοώ αν βλέπετε ότι σας αντιμετωπίζουν ισότιμα συγκριτικά και με άλλα μεγαλύτερα ΤΟΕΒ;
– σίγουρα υπάρχει κάποια προτεραιοποίηση
– από την εμπειρία σας;
– τώρα εντάξει είναι λίγο λεπτό, ίσως κάποια είναι πιο ψηλά
– το λέω γιατί ο αντιπρόεδρος είπε κάποια πράγματα όπως ότι αν ένα μέρος από τα κονδύλια του Ταυρωπού είχε γίνε εδώ θα είχαν λυθεί όλα τα προβλήματα
– άμα υπήρχε θα είχαν ξεκινήσει πολλά.”
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με εκπρόσωπο ΤΟΕΒ της ΠΕ Καρδίτσας)
Αποσπασμα 2
“- έχουμε 130-140 μηχανήματα, το 100% είναι κατεστραμμένο.
– για τις καταστροφές πως βλέπετε το ζήτημα, αν σας πιέζουν τα μέλη σας
– μας πιέζουν αυτό τώρα συζητήσαμε γιατί σε 10 μέρες βάζουνε πεπόνια πρέπει να κάνουν προεργασία και πρέπει να γίνουν μερικές αποκαταστάσεις.
– εμείς έχουμε ξεκινήσει ήδη, άτυπα ότι υπάρχει από τα δικά μας χρήματα, αλλά αυτά τα βασικά τα πρώτα. Παίρναμε τον Υπουργό τηλέφωνο δεν μας το σήκωνε.
– εδώ όλη η Θεσσαλία είναι πνιγμένη γίνεται της τρελής.
– αυτό το λένε και άλλες διοικήσεις ότι παρατυπούνε για να ποτίσει ο κόσμος. Ενώ λένε ότι όλα θα τα κάνει η κυβέρνηση κεντρικά
– δεν γίνεται, θα σου πω τι έκανε η κυβέρνηση για αυτό λένε κυβερνάνε. πήγαμε Νοέμβρη Δεκέμβρη πότε πήγαμε, έφτασε τώρα ο Μάρτιος δεν σου έδωσε χρήματα αλλά τι λέει όμως; Θα σου δώσω εγώ, επειδή γιατί; Γιατί εμείς έχουμε την αγροτική λύση, οι ΤΟΕΒ λειτουργούν σαν ιδιωτικού δικαίου θεσμικά, και τι κάνουμε; Έχουμε 2-3 προσφορές αυτές και παιδιά κοιτάχτε να δείτε επειδή η άλλη είναι φθηνή, δεν βγαίνουμε στην μέση και οι δυό και τέλος, θέλετε καλώς δεν θέλετε την παίρνει ο Χ,Ψ και τελειώνει το θέμα.
– αυτά γίνονται μέσα σε 2-3 μέρες
– τα υπουργεία θέλουν 2-3 μήνες και ενστάσεις κτλ
– και μας λέγαν κάντε γρήγορα για να πάρετε λεφτά. Το πρώτο 15ημερο θα σας βάλουμε λεφτά.. τίποτα δεν είδαμε”
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με εκπρόσωπο ΤΟΕΒ της ΠΕ Καρδίτσας)
Η αδυναμία ρύθμισης της τιμής του ηλεκτρικού ρεύματος για αγροτική χρήση από την Πολιτεία παράλληλα την αδυναμία προτεραιοποίησης των ΤΟΕΒ για την χρηματοδότηση ενεργειακών έργων που θα συμβάλουν στην ενεργειακή τους αυτονόμηση (ενεργειακός συμψηφισμός ή άλλη μορφή διασυνδεδεμένων δικτύων ή αυτόνομων με μπαταρία) αναγνωρίζεται ως μια κομβική αδικία αναγνώρισης που οδηγεί στην αύξηση των λειτουργικών πάγιων εξόδων μιας καλλιέργειας που στηρίζεται στην άρδευση με γεώτρηση. Σημειώθηκε επίσης ότι η αυξανόμενες τιμές του ηλεκτρισμού λειτούργησε αποτρεπτικά στην άρδευση με γεώτρηση, όπου σχεδόν διπλασιάστηκε το κόστος. Η επέκταση του κλειστού δικτύου, δηλαδή πέρα του 30% που είναι προγραμματισμένο και έχει χρηματοδότηση από τα προγράμματα ΣΔΙΤ, είναι κομβικής σημασίας για την μείωση της αδικίας που υφίστανται οι αρδευτές της περιοχής διαχείρισης του ΤΟΕΒ, καθώς θα μειώσει σημαντικό κόστος, αφού θα υπάρχει η δυνατότητα εξοικονόμησης τόσο του διαθέσιμου νερού, αλλά και κυρίως τις απαιτήσεις για ηλεκτρισμό.
Αποσπασμα 1
“-το δίκτυο να γίνει κλειστό δίκτυο, για να μειώσουμε το κόστος, γιατί έχουμε μεγάλο κόστος το ρεύμα
– πόσα σας βγαίνει εσάς στην άρδευση το κόστος; Το στρέμμα και πως ως ΤΟΕΒ κάνετε την τιμολόγηση;
– φέτος το 2023 βγήκε στα 43 ευρώ το κόστος, Βγήκε στα 26 ευρώ το ρεύμα και 17 τα λειτουργικά του ΤΟΕΒ
– χαμηλά είναι σχετικά με τα άλλα ΤΟΕΒ, ούτε εσείς έχετε δίκτυο ηλεκτρικό σωστά;
– εξαρτάται πέρυσι με τη ρήτρα είχε έρθει 36 ευρώ, από 200.000 στο σύνολο της χρονιάς πήγε στα 370.000 δύο χρονιές. Το 2022 και βγαίνει και πάνω από 30 ευρώ. Γενικά εκεί κυμαίνεται και τώρα με την υπογειοποίηση θα μειωθεί περισσότερο.
– πόσο περίπου
– Από 7-8 μέχρι 10 ευρώ το στρέμμα.”
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με εκπρόσωπο ΤΟΕΒ της ΠΕ Καρδίτσας)
Η πρόσβαση σε χρηματοδοτήσεις και ευκαιρίες για επένδυση στο δίκτυο αποτελεί μια διανεμητική αδικία που χαρακτηρίζει τόσο τα μικρότερα σε έκταση ΤΟΕΒ, όσο και εκείνα που τα πάγια έξοδά τους, όπως το κόστος του ηλεκτρισμού, αφήνει λίγα περιθώρια για περεταίρω επενδύσεις στο δίκτυο από τα διαθέσιμα αποθεματικά του Οργανισμού. Οι επενδύσεις για την συντήρηση και τον εκσυγχρονισμό του δικτύου είναι κομβικές ενέργειες για την διασφάλιση της σταθερότητας του δικτύου αλλά και για την εξοικονόμηση της κατανάλωσης του νερού. Η πρόσβαση σε χρηματοδοτικά πλαίσια, απαιτεί την κατάρτιση τεχνικών μελετών και ένα πλήθος άλλων γραφειοκρατικών αναγκών που ξεπερνούν τις δυνατότητες αυτών των ΤΟΕΒ. Μέρος (30%) του δικτύου του ΤΟΕΒ Σελλάνων είναι σε διαδικασία υπογειοποίησης, ένα πρόγραμμα που θα λύσει σημαντικές αδικίες στους αρδευτές που θα ωφεληθούν από αυτό. Στο τμήμα που θα εξυπηρετήσει, με την επιλογή των τμημάτων να γίνεται σε σημαντικές αρτηρίες οι οποίες εξυπηρετούν πολλαπλούς αρδευτές, θα υπάρχει σημαντική εξοικονόμηση ύδατος, όπου θα είναι διαθέσιμο στο υπόλοιπο δίκτυο. Στα όρια μεταξύ των ιδιοκτησιών θα τοποθετηθεί ειδικό τεμάχιο υδροληψίας από σιδερένιο σωλήνα, προκειμένου να συνδέονται και να αποσυνδέονται οι παραγωγοί μόνοι τους για να αρδεύουν τα αγροτεμάχιά τους, μέσω τηλεδιαχείρισης. Παράλληλα θα εγκατασταθούν και ηλεκτρικοί πίνακες με inverter ,για τον τηλεχειρισμό του αντλιοστασίου από οποιαδήποτε απόσταση. Με το νέο σύστημα θα είναι δυνατή η μείωση του κόστους άρδευσης από τα 45 στα 25 ευρώ για τα σημεία εξυπηρέτησης.
Αποσπασμα 1
“- είναι ανοιχτό, αυτό είναι το κακό, αλλά έχουμε κάνει σχετική μελέτη για κλειστό… 30% μονο, οι 70 από τις 138 (γεωτρήσεις) ήτανε να κάνουμε, καθυστέρησε τώρα πάμε για 40…επιλέξαμε εμείς συγκεκριμένες τοποθεσίες, τις 78
– με ποια κριτήρια κάνατε την προτεραιοποίηση;
– με τα σχέδια, κοιτάξαμε ποιες ήταν πιο πολλές γεωτρήσεις και ποιες εξυπηρετούν τα περισσότερα στρέμματα… δε μας δίναν περισσότερα χρήματα”
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με εκπρόσωπο ΤΟΕΒ της ΠΕ Καρδίτσας)
Οι ελλιπείς συνθήκες εξισορρόπησης του ανταγωνισμού στο κόστος παραγωγής προκύπτει μέσα από διαφορετικές πρακτικές άρδευσης σε κάθε περιοχή, αποτελεί μια διανεμητική αδικία καθώς συνδέεται άμεσα με τις διαθέσιμες υποδομές, την γεωγραφική θέση των αρδευτών. Ο τρόπος άρδευσης είναι σε άμεση εξάρτηση με την αύξηση ή μείωση του κόστους παραγωγής. Στην ευρύτερη περιοχή των Σελλάνων η άρδευση στηρίζεται αποκλειστικά με γεωτρήσεις, διότι δεν υπάρχει σχετική πρόσβαση σε επιφανειακά ύδατα ή κάποια σύνδεση με τις τοπικές τεχνητές λίμνες του Πλαστήρα ή του Σμοκόβου. Μία σημαντική αδικία που υφίστανται οι αρδευτές της περιοχής συγκριτικά με αρδευτές της ανατολικής Θεσσαλίας ή ακόμα και από άλλες περιοχές της ΠΕ Καρδίτσας, είναι ότι καθώς στην περιοχή υπάρχουν και αρκετές ιδιωτικές γεωτρήσεις, η αρδευτική περίοδος περιορίζεται το αργότερο μέχρι μέσα Αυγούστου. Αυτό συμβαίνει διότι έχει παρατηρηθεί ότι το νερό δεν επαρκεί για την επέκταση αυτής της περιόδου αφού, τόσο οι γεωτρήσεις του ΤΟΕΒ όσο και οι ιδιωτικές μοιράζονται τους ίδιους υδατοφόρους ορίζοντες και προκειμένου να δημιουργηθεί κάποια φθορά στις εγκαταστάσεις, οι ίδιοι οι παραγωγοί επιλέγουν να ολοκληρώσουν την άρδευσή τους.
Αποσπασμα 1
“-το γεγονός ότι υπάρχουν πολλές ιδιωτικές πομώνες, αυτό σας δημιουργεί πρόβλημα ως προς τη διαχείριση του νερού η ακόμα και τη διάθεσή του; Αν τραβάνε όλοι από τον ίδιο υδατοφόρο ορίζοντα
– ναι ναι, γιατί είμαστε πιο βαθιά εμείς. Τον Αύγουστο επειδή πέφτει το νερό, σε ορισμένες γεωτρήσεις υπάρχει θέμα
– του ΤΟΕΒ γεωτρήσεις;
– όχι και του ΤΟΕΒ και ιδιωτών, αλλά πέφτει η στάθμη από όλους στα 15-20 μέτρα αυτές σταματάνε τον Αύγουστο. Εμείς ποτίζουμε μέχρι αρχές Σεπτεμβρίου εδώ.
– αυτό ισχύει και εκτός ΤΟΕΒ ή υπάρχει διαφοροποίηση;
– αυτοί που ποτίζουν με ιδιωτικά, μέχρι τέλος Αυγούστου βαριά ποτίζουν μέχρι 15-16.
– είναι σε συνεννόηση με τον ΤΟΕΒ αυτό;
– όχι δεν τους φτάνει το νερό για παραπέρα. Και τότε καταπονείται και η γεώτρηση και κάνει καθίζηση, διότι άμα βγάλει άμμο πάει καταστράφηκε, επομένως την ταπώνεις, από το να χάσω την γεώτρηση. “
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με εκπρόσωπο ΤΟΕΒ της ΠΕ Καρδίτσας)
H έλλειψη νερού ή η ανεπάρκεια διαθεσιμότητας νερού που συναντάται ιδιαίτερα στους καλοκαιρινούς μήνες λόγω τοπικών ιδιαιτεροτήτων [εξαντλημένοι υδροφόροι ορίζοντες, λειψανδρία], είναι μία διανεμητική αδικία με την έννοια ότι σχετίζεται με τον ισότιμο διαμοιρασμό των πόρων και της πρόσβασης σε αυτούς. Στην περίπτωση της Περιφερειακής Ενότητας Καρδίτσας, το ΤΟΕΒ Σελλάνων, εξυπηρετεί αρδευτές από τέσσερεις δήμους (Μουζακίου-Φαλκαδόνας-Καρδίτσας-Παλαμά), μέσω γεωτρήσεων. Το σύνολο της έκτασης που δραστηριοποιείτε είναι 112.000-120.000 στρέμματα, με 138 γεωτρήσεις σε 10 αγροκτήματα. Από το 2016 και μετά, όπως επισήμαναν οι εκπρόσωποι του ΤΟΕΒ, άρχισε να πέφτει δραματικά η στάθμη των υπόγειων νερών, από τα 30-75 μέτρα που είχαν συνηθίσει, φτάσανε στα 300 μέτρα που πρέπει να κατέβει το στέλεχος της γεώτρησης, με παράλληλη μείωση της πίεσης της άρδευσης. Η δραματική αυτή μείωση του υδροφόρου ορίζοντα, οδήγησε αρκετούς παραγωγούς να εγκαταλείψουν τις αρδευόμενες καλλιέργειές τους, επιλέγοντας είτε ξερικές είτε εγκαταλείποντας εντελώς την παραγωγή. Βάση των εκτιμήσεων των εκπροσώπων της περιοχής, από τα 120.000 στρέμματα που ήταν στην αρμοδιότητα διαχείρισης του ΤΟΕΒ, εν έτη 2024 μόνο τα 11.000 πλέον αρδεύονται, λόγω του δυσβάσταχτου κόστους της παραγωγής. Στις περισσότερες περιπτώσεις μειώθηκε ο κύκλος των αρδεύσιμων καλλιεργειών στους τρείς μήνες, όπου το διαθέσιμο νερό μπορούσε να υποστηρίξει μια παραγωγή ανάλογα με την χρονιά και τις συγκυριακές βροχοπτώσεις.
Αποσπασμα 1
“- στο ξεκίνημα, τώρα αρδεύουν περίπου 10.000 στρέμματα 11.000 από τα 120,000 στρέμματα που έχουμε στη δικαιοδοσία μας
– πολύ λίγα είναι τα αρδευόμενα
– ναι το πολύ 10-15%
– γιατί έτσι;
– γιατί φύγαν, βρήκαν άλλους τρόπους όταν ανέβηκε το κόστος, με μικρά αρτεσιανά κανάλια… υπόγεια όλα, τίποτα άλλο, δεν έχουμε άλλη σύνδεση και φτάνουμε τα 300 μέτρα βάθος
– είναι πολύ βαθιά ήταν πάντα έτσι; Ή από ένα σημείο και μετά άρχισαν να πέφτουν
-δηλαδή ο υδροφόρος έπεσε από ένα σημείο και μετά, από το 2016 και μετά
Φ: πιο πριν πόσα περίπου πήγαινε η πομώνα;
-στα 30-75 παίρναμε εμείς το νερό, η τρύπα έφτανε πιο κάτω αλλά επειδή υπήρχαν στρώματα και με τα χρόνια πέφτει αναγκαζόμαστε και κατεβάζουμε πιο χαμηλά το σκέλος “
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με εκπρόσωπο ΤΟΕΒ της ΠΕ Καρδίτσας)
Η αδυναμία ρύθμισης της τιμής του ηλεκτρικού ρεύματος για αγροτική χρήση από την Πολιτεία παράλληλα την αδυναμία προτεραιοποίησης των ΤΟΕΒ για την χρηματοδότηση ενεργειακών έργων που θα συμβάλουν στην ενεργειακή τους αυτονόμηση (ενεργειακός συμψηφισμός ή άλλη μορφή διασυνδεδεμένων δικτύων ή αυτόνομων με μπαταρία) αναγνωρίζεται ως μια κομβική αδικία αναγνώρισης που οδηγεί στην αύξηση των λειτουργικών πάγιων εξόδων μιας καλλιέργειας που στηρίζεται στην άρδευση με γεώτρηση. Σημειώθηκε επίσης ότι οι αυξανόμενες τιμές του ηλεκτρισμού λειτούργησαν αποτρεπτικά στην άρδευση με γεώτρηση, όπου σχεδόν διπλασιάστηκε το κόστος. Η επέκταση του κλειστού δικτύου, δηλαδή πέρα του 30% που είναι προγραμματισμένο και έχει χρηματοδότηση από τα προγράμματα ΣΔΙΤ, είναι κομβικής σημασίας για την μείωση της αδικίας που υφίστανται οι αρδευτές της περιοχής διαχείρισης του ΤΟΕΒ, καθώς θα μειώσει σημαντικό κόστος, αφού θα υπάρχει η δυνατότητα εξοικονόμησης τόσο του διαθέσιμου νερού, αλλά και κυρίως τις απαιτήσεις για ηλεκτρισμό.
Απόσπασμα 1
“-το δίκτυο να γίνει κλειστό δίκτυο, για να μειώσουμε το κόστος, γιατί έχουμε μεγάλο κόστος το ρεύμα
– πόσα σας βγαίνει εσάς στην άρδευση το κόστος; Το στρέμμα και πως ως ΤΟΕΒ κάνετε την τιμολόγηση;
– φέτος το 2023 βγήκε στα 43 ευρώ το κόστος, Βγήκε στα 26 ευρώ το ρεύμα και 17 τα λειτουργικά του ΤΟΕΒ
– χαμηλά είναι σχετικά με τα άλλα ΤΟΕΒ, ούτε εσείς έχετε δίκτυο ηλεκτρικό σωστά;
– εξαρτάται πέρυσι με τη ρήτρα είχε έρθει 36 ευρώ, από 200.000 στο σύνολο της χρονιάς πήγε στα 370.000 δύο χρονιές. Το 2022 και βγαίνει και πάνω από 30 ευρώ. Γενικά εκεί κυμαίνεται και τώρα με την υπογειοποίηση θα μειωθεί περισσότερο.
– πόσο περίπου
– Από 7-8 μέχρι 10 ευρώ το στρέμμα.”
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με εκπρόσωπο ΤΟΕΒ της ΠΕ Καρδίτσας)
Ένα σημαντικό ζήτημα που τέθηκε από τους εκπροσώπους, είναι ως προς την ισότιμη μεταχείριση των ΤΟΕΒ από την Πολιτεία, δηλαδή η συμπερίληψη. Η συμπερίληψη και η αναγνώριση των τοπικών αναγκών και μικρότερων σε έκταση και δυναμικότητας ΤΟΕΒ σε κρίσιμες αποφάσεις που αφορούν το μέλλον των αρδευτών μιας κοινότητας. Υπάρχει η αίσθηση ότι τα μεγαλύτερα σε γεωγραφική έκταση ΤΟΕΒ και εκείνα που βρίσκονται γεωγραφικά εγγύτερα στα κέντρα διοίκησης της πολιτικής εξουσίας, λαμβάνουν μια προνομιακή μεταχείριση, τόσο στην επίλυση των προβλημάτων τους, καθώς και προτεραιοποιούνται ως προς τις διάφορες αποφάσεις. Οι εκπρόσωποι των ΤΟΕΒ αυτών θεωρούν ότι και λόγω της χιλιομετρικής τους απόστασης από το πολιτικό κέντρο της Θεσσαλίας [Λάρισας], τους δίνεται η αίσθηση ότι αποκλείονται και δεν λαμβάνουν μέρος σε σημαντικές αποφάσεις, στις οποίες πολύ σημαντικό ρόλο παίζουν η εγγύτητα και οι διαπροσωπικές σχέσεις. Τα μεγαλύτερα σε έκταση ΤΟΕΒ αναγνώριζαν την προσπάθεια της Πολιτείας να βοηθήσει στην αποκατάσταση από τις πληγές, αλλά παρατηρούν κάποιοι εκπρόσωποί τους ότι ένα σημαντικό ζήτημα που είχε προκύψει από τις πλημμύρες είναι η καταστροφή των ορίων των χωραφιών, πράγμα που δημιουργεί αβεβαιότητα στην παραγωγή, μέχρι να επιλυθεί.
Αποσπασμα 1
“-ε ναι κοίταξε να δείς, τώρα αν πάμε στο ΤΟΕΒ της Λάρισας που είναι το κέντρο αποφάσεων εκεί πέρα, ήταν ο Αγοραστός εκεί, αφού τον ψηφίζουν κι όλας προσωπικά. Και εμείς εδώ να να ψηφίζαμε δεν έφτανε. Πήγαινα μιλούσαμε στο καφενείο, αλλά, δεν. Αυτοί πήγαιναν για φαγητό μαζί έπιναν ποτό μαζί. (Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με εκπρόσωπο ΤΟΕΒ της ΠΕ Καρδίτσας)
-Βλέπετε να υπάρχουν δηλαδή διαφοροποιήσεις;
-Κοίταξε να δείς, τώρα αν πάμε στο ΤΟΕΒ της Λάρισας που είναι το κέντρο αποφάσεων εκεί πέρα, ήταν ο **** εκεί, αφού τον ψηφίζουν κι όλας προσωπικά. Και εμείς εδώ να να ψηφίζαμε δεν έφτανε. Πήγαινα μιλούσαμε στο καφενείο, αλλά, δεν. Αυτοί πήγαιναν για φαγητό μαζί έπιναν ποτό μαζί
-Άρα ήτανε οι διαπροσωπικές σχέσεις λέτε ισχυρότερες και για αυτό;
– Όταν έχεις έναν προσωπικό φίλο κάπου θα σε βοηθήσει περισσότερο, μέχρι εκεί που θέλει και μπορεί, άντε και εσένα το ΤΟΕΒ Θεσσαλιότιδος θα τον πω, θα σου δώσω και σένα κάτι και θα κλείσει το θέμα… Δεν μπορεί τώρα το μεγαλύτερο ΤΟΕΒ στην Θεσσαλία, μην σου πω και πανελλαδικά, και να μην με προσέχει, τουλάχιστον όπως τον Πηνειό.”
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με εκπρόσωπο ΤΟΕΒ της ΠΕ Καρδίτσας)
Η αδυναμία ρύθμισης της τιμής του ηλεκτρικού ρεύματος για αγροτική χρήση από την Πολιτεία παράλληλα την αδυναμία προτεραιοποίησης των ΤΟΕΒ για την χρηματοδότηση ενεργειακών έργων που θα συμβάλουν στην ενεργειακή τους αυτονόμηση (ενεργειακός συμψηφισμός ή άλλη μορφή διασυνδεδεμένων δικτύων ή αυτόνομων με μπαταρία) αναγνωρίζεται ως μια κομβική αδικία αναγνώρισης που οδηγεί στην αύξηση των λειτουργικών πάγιων εξόδων μιας καλλιέργειας που στηρίζεται στην άρδευση με γεώτρηση. Σημειώθηκε επίσης ότι η αυξανόμενες τιμές του ηλεκτρισμού λειτούργησε αποτρεπτικά στην άρδευση με γεώτρηση, όπου σχεδόν διπλασιάστηκε το κόστος. Επίσης σημειώθηκε η αδυναμία των εκπροσώπων των ΤΟΕΒ να παρακολουθήσουνε τη χρηματιστήριο ενέργειας για τις τιμές του ηλεκτρισμού. Σχεδόν το 80% του κόστους της παραγωγής αποτελεί το κόστος του ηλεκτρισμού. Επίσης αναφέρθηκε από εκπροσώπους ότι η ισχύς ενός μοτερ (γεώτρησης), είναι και σε άμεση εξάρτηση με την καλλιέργεια που επιτρέπει να ποτιστεί ή μάλλον είναι πιο παραγωγικό να ποτίσει. Η διαφοροποίηση στην ισχύς του μοτέρ μιας πομώνας, αφενός είναι καθοριστικός παράγοντας καθορισμού του κόστους της άρδευσης, μιας και είναι σε άμεση συσχέτιση με την κατανάλωση του ρεύματος, αλλά η ισχύς δύναται να καθορίσει και την επιλογή της καλλιέργειας. Για παράδειγμα η υψηλότερη ισχύ 120-150 βατ, μπορεί να αποβεί καταστρεπτική και είναι αποτρεπτική για καλλιέργεια βαμβακιού λόγω ευαλωτότητας του ανθού.
Αποσπασμα 1
“Δεν καταστράφηκαν. Δεν λειτουργούν διότι το αρδευτικό τέλος είναι πολύ μεγάλο. Εμείς εδώ έχουμε κάθε γεώτρηση, παραγωγός εσύ παραγωγός και εγώ. Εσύ μπορεί να πληρώσεις 60 ευρώ εγώ 80-90 ευρώ… [η τιμή/κόστος] είναι η διαχείριση της κάθε πομόνας. Είμαστε 2-3, κάθε ένας που θα ρθεί, σε αυτήν την πομόνα είμαστε 2-3 και ποτίζουμε όλοι μαζί γιατί υπάρχει νερό. Αλλά πάμε σε ένα θέμα στο άλλο. Μία γεώτρηση στο χωριό μου βγάζει 10 γαλόνια νερό... Άλλη πομόνα μπορεί να βγάζει άλλο. Δεν υπάρχει κάτω από 2 καρούλια νερό. Οι περισσότερες είναι από 2 και πάνω. Και αυτές έχουν μεγάλα μοτέρια. Πάνω από 80, 100, 150 αυτή έχει 200ρι μοτέρ. Και έχει κάψημο πολλά, έχει μεγάλη κατανάλωση ρεύματος. Όταν είναι ένα μοτέρ 50ρι και το προσέχεις λίγο θα πληρώσουν παρακάτω 40-50 ευρώ. Αλλά οι περισσότερες τώρα είναι από 60 μέχρι 120. Το οποίο είναι απαγορευτικό για την καλλιέργεια του βαμβακιού.”
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με εκπρόσωπο ΤΟΕΒ της ΠΕ Καρδίτσας)
Αποσπασμα 2
“Τώρα αυτό που συμβαίνει με τα ηλεκτρονικά [χρηματιστήριο ενέργειας], δεν μπορούμε να βρούμε άκρη... γίνονταν καλή διαχείριση μπορώ να πω και είπα αυτή ήταν [το κόστος της άντλησης ήταν] μέχρι 45-50 ευρώ.. [τώρα είναι] 81,5! Από που να βρεθούνε; Πως να ανταγωνιστεί ο παραγωγός ένας αγρότης σε οποιαδήποτε περιοχή και να είναι άμα ποτίζει από γεώτρηση;”
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με εκπρόσωπο ΤΟΕΒ της ΠΕ Καρδίτσας)
Η ανάγκη αμεσότητας με τους παραγωγούς νοηματοδοτήθηκε από την πλειονότητα των ενδιαφερόμενων μερών ως μια ενδεχομενική αδικία, στην περίπτωση απομάκρυνσης της διοίκησης από τα ΤΟΕΒ, σε μία πιθανή κεντρικοποιημένη οργάνωση του νέου φορέα διαχείρισης για τις αρδεύσεις (Ο.Δ.Υ.Θ.). Η διαμεσολάβηση και η αμεσότητα των ΤΟΕΒ είναι κρίσιμος παράγοντας στην εξομάλυνση των σχέσεων των αρδευτών σε περίπτωση συγκρούσεων για την προτεραιότητα στην άρδευση, για την διαθεσιμότητα και διαμοιρασμό των διαθέσιμων υδατικών αποθεμάτων, αλλά και για την οργάνωση του κύκλου της άρδευσης. Υποστηρίχθηκε σε αυτό το πλαίσιο ότι ένα μεγάλο έλλειμα που θα μπορούσε να καλύψει ο νέος οργανισμός είναι αυτό της σχεδίασης και υλοποίησης νέων υποδομών που είναι κρίσιμες για την άρδευση, όπως κρίνεται κατά τόπους με βάση τις τοπικές ανάγκες της κάθε περιοχής. Αλλά όπως επισημάνθηκε από τους εκπροσώπους του ΤΟΕΒ, δεν θα πρέπει να χαθεί η αμεσότητα με την οποία λειτουργεί σήμερα η άρδευση, καθώς είναι κρίσιμος παράγοντας για την ομαλή λειτουργία της παραγωγής. Σε μία πιθανή ενοποίηση των ΤΟΕΒ κάτω από μία ενιαία διοίκηση, θα υπάρξει το ζήτημα της ανισότητας, καθώς ένα χαρακτηριστικό κοινό που εκφράστηκε από τους εκπροσώπους ήταν ότι οι αρδευτικές ανάγκες έπρεπε να εξυπηρετούνται άμεσα ειδικά όταν δημιουργείται το πρόβλημα, καθώς το χρονικό διάστημα που παραμένει είναι κρίσιμο για να μην χαθεί η παραγωγή και κατά επέκταση πληγεί το εισόδημα των αρδευτών που έχουν το πρόβλημα.
Αποσπασμα 1
“Τώρα εδώ αυτός ο εξωτερικός συνεργάτης που έχουμε έχει 3 γερανούς και άμα τον πάρω τηλέφωνο 12.00 το βράδυ και τον πω κάηκε η πομόνα, εκείνο θα πάει άμα περάσει η ώρα όχι. Ή χάλασε η πομόνα, μηχάνημα είναι βγάζει αέρα, είναι πολλές φορές που χαλάει, βγάζει φθορές, αποκατάσταση σε χρόνο ρεκόρ. Εγώ όταν ήμουνα τότε που καλλιεργούσα και πολλά χωράφια πριν το ΤΟΕΒ έκανε μια βδομάδα για να έρθει…Τι να σου πώ τώρα, τότε ήταν να μην πάθεις ζημιά, αν πάθαινες θα έτρωγες το λιγότερο μία εβδομάδα. Το λιγότερο για να αποκατασταθεί. Ότι έχει σχέση στα ηλεκτρολογικά [από δολιοφθορά] τέλος πάντων τα φτιάχνουμε σε ώρες, όχι μέρες, σε ώρες. Όταν έχεις πει στο ΤΟΕΒ η βλάβη φεύγει ηλεκτρονικά κατευθείαν, με αριθμό πρωτοκόλλου για να μην ρθείς εσύ αύριο εδώ, και πείς για έλα εδώ, πέρασαν 5 μέρες, δώσατε τη βλάβη; Τι δώσαμε. Όχι δεν σας πιστεύω, ορίστε το πρωτόκολλο. Για να είμαστε εντάξει απέναντι στον κόσμο. Οτιδήποτε γίνεται ανά πάσα στιγμή. Τώρα, ποιος θα ειδοποιηθεί; Και θα έχουνε αυτοί; Ή θα έχουν ένα συνεργείο για όλη τη Θεσσαλία; Που να έρθει εδώ.”
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με εκπρόσωπο ΤΟΕΒ της ΠΕ Καρδίτσας)
Αποσπασμα 2
“Να τον στήσουν τον φορέα εγώ το είπα και στον Υπουργό, αφού λες ότι θα είναι για το καλό μας, να κάνεις , το θέλω τον έλεγχο, ελάτε εδώ, ελένξετε μας. Υπάρχει διαφάνεια, εδώ τα χαρτιά μας τι θέλετε. Αλλά θέλουμε να υπάρχουν τοπικά συμβούλια, τοπικοί υδραυλικοί, όπως έχουμε εδώ, αυτός ήταν και στο έργο ξέρει τα πάντα. Τοπικά ξέρουμε και τις δουλειές, ποιοι είναι τζαναμπέτηδες ποιοι δουλεύουν, ποιοι από τους αρδευτές κάνουν ματσακονιές και θέλουν να βγαίνουν και από πάνω, τους ξέρω, αυτοί που τους ξέρουν; Τους ξέρω φατσικά, γνωριζόμαστε τόσα χρόνια, κάποια δεκάρα ο ένας με τον άλλο, τους γνώρισα όλους. Μιλάμε πάω στα χωριά, είμαι κοινωνικός, πάω στα χωριά κάθομαι εκεί πέρα, κάνουμε κουβέντα, να πιούμε ένα τσιπουράκι.”
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με εκπρόσωπο ΤΟΕΒ της ΠΕ Καρδίτσας)
Η πρόσβαση σε χρηματοδοτήσεις και ευκαιρίες για επένδυση στο δίκτυο αποτελεί μια διανεμητική αδικία που χαρακτηρίζει τόσο τα μικρότερα σε έκταση ΤΟΕΒ, όσο και εκείνα που τα πάγια έξοδά τους, όπως το κόστος του ηλεκτρισμού, αφήνει λίγα περιθώρια για περεταίρω επενδύσεις στο δίκτυο από τα διαθέσιμα αποθεματικά του Οργανισμού. Οι επενδύσεις για την συντήρηση και τον εκσυγχρονισμό του δικτύου είναι κομβικές ενέργειες για την διασφάλιση της σταθερότητας του δικτύου αλλά και για την εξοικονόμηση της κατανάλωσης του νερού. Η πρόσβαση σε χρηματοδοτικά πλαίσια, απαιτεί την κατάρτιση τεχνικών μελετών και ένα πλήθος άλλων γραφειοκρατικών αναγκών που ξεπερνούν τις δυνατότητες αυτών των ΤΟΕΒ. Μία σημαντική αδικία για τους αρδευτές των Σοφάδων και της ευρύτερης περιοχής διαχείρισης του ΤΟΕΒ, είναι η καθυστέρηση της υλοποίησης της επέκτασης του κλειστού δικτύου. Το κλειστό δίκτυο δεν θα εξοικονομήσει μόνο σημαντικές ποσότητες νερού, αφού δεν θα υπάρχει απώλεια ύδατος, όπως συμβαίνει μέχρι σήμερα κατά τον διαμοιρασμό της άρδευσης σε περιοχές που δεν έχει επεκταθεί το κλειστό δίκτυο, με τη βοήθεια ανοιχτών καναλιών. Επιπλέον η έλλειψη νερού οδήγησε πολλούς παραγωγούς εκτός του κλειστού δικτύου να παρατήσουν τις γεωργικές τους τους και να τις αφήσουν ακαλλιέργητες ή να γυρίσουν σε καλλιέργειες σιταριού. Ένα ζήτημα που τέθηκε επίσης είναι η περιορισμένη έκταση των τεχνικών τμημάτων των ΤΟΕΒ. Για παράδειγμα στο ΤΟΕΒ Σοφάδων που έχουν στην διαχείρισή τους το φράγμα του Σμοκόβου, δεν έχουν εξειδικευμένο προσωπικό για τη διαχείρισή τους, ούτε κατά επέκταση αντίστοιχη θέση εντός του ΤΟΕΒ. Για τη διαχείριση του φράγματος στηρίζονται σε ιδιώτες – επαγγελματίες, οι οποίοι είχαν αναλάβει και την περάτωση του έργου. Αυτό δημιουργεί σοβαρές ανησυχίες για την συνέχιση της λειτουργίας του έργου αλλά και την διάχυση της γνώσης γύρω από το έργο αυτό ως προς την χρησιμότητά του για την περιοχή. Επίσης δεν υπάρχει εξειδικευμένο προσωπικό για την οργάνωση και εκπόνηση μελετών για αντίστοιχα έργα. Ακόμα και στην περίπτωση του Σμοκόβου, το ΤΟΕΒ ήταν πλήρως εξαρτώμενο από τις υπηρεσίες του Κράτους και τους ρυθμούς διεκπεραίωσης των δημόσιων υπηρεσιών.
Αποσπασμα 1
“Το φράγμα του Σμοκόβου, την έχουμε την διαχείριση εμείς, για τα νερά, αλλά για αν βγούν τα νερά έξω πρέπει να υπάρχει κάποιος άνθρωπος να πατήσει κάποια κουμπιά τέλος πάντων. Έχουμε ένα κύριο που διαχειρίζεται και κάνει αυτή τη δουλειά. Αυτός ήταν στην κατασκευή του έργου, ήταν κρατικός λειτουργός, τέλος πάντων ήταν εδώ και γνωρίζει το έργο από την αρχή την κατασκευή του μέχρι το τέλος. Αυτός μας κάνει την κατανομή του νερού, στην αρχή της σεζόν μιλάω μαζί του για το πότε θα ανοίξουμε, πόσο νερό θέλουμε, του λέω, πήγαινε άλλαξε την οικολογική από το ποτάμι. Ανοίγουμε και από εδώ και ποτίζουμε χωριά εκτός ΤΟΕΒ”
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με εκπρόσωπο ΤΟΕΒ της ΠΕ Καρδίτσας)
Αποσπασμα 2
“Εμείς εδώ σαν ΤΟΕΒ δεν κατασκευάζουμε δεν έχουμε την οικονομική δυνατότητα πρώτα από όλα. Εμείς παραλαμβάνουμε έργα τα οποία είτε τα έχει κάνει η Πολιτεία είτε η Περιφέρεια, ή ακόμα και ο Δήμος ακόμα εδώ, μας κάνουν χορηγίες και τα διαχειριζόμαστε και από τη στιγμή που θα αναλάβουμε τη διαχείριση να αντικαταστήσουμε και βλάβες, εντός δικτύου πάντα.”
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με εκπρόσωπο ΤΟΕΒ της ΠΕ Καρδίτσας)
Οι ελλιπείς συνθήκες εξισορρόπησης του ανταγωνισμού στο κόστος παραγωγής προκύπτει μέσα από διαφορετικές πρακτικές άρδευσης σε κάθε περιοχή, αποτελεί μια διανεμητική αδικία καθώς συνδέεται άμεσα με τις διαθέσιμες υποδομές, την γεωγραφική θέση των αρδευτών. Ο τρόπος άρδευσης είναι σε άμεση εξάρτηση με την αύξηση ή μείωση του κόστους παραγωγής. Αν και στην ευρύτερη περιοχή των Σοφάδων η άρδευση στηρίζεται από το κλειστό σύστημα άρδευσης από τη λίμνη Σμοκόβου (χωρητικότητας περίπου 237 εκατομμύρια κυβικά μέτρα νερού), ένα έργο το οποίο δεν έχει ολοκληρωθεί στον βαθμό που σχεδιάστηκε, ως προς το κλειστό δίκτυο, δηλαδή την εξυπηρέτησή 250.000 στρέμματα καλλιεργήσιμης γης, καθώς επίσης και για την ύδρευση μεγάλου τμήματος του ανατολικού κάμπου της Καρδίτσας. Αρκετοί αρδευτές στους οποίους δεν έχει επεκταθεί το δίκτυο άρδευσης από το Σμόκοβο, εξυπηρετούνται αποκλειστικά με τη χρήση 200 (197 ενεργές) γεωτρήσεων. Επομένως ακόμα και εντός των μελών του ΤΟΕΒ, υπάρχουν αδικίες που συγκροτούνται στην διαφοροποίηση της τεχνικής στην άρδευση, όπου αρδευτές της περιοχής αναγνωρίζουν ότι η συγκεκριμένη πρακτική (χρήση πομόνας) αυξάνει κατακόρυφα το κόστος παραγωγής, άρα μειώνει και το καθαρό εισόδημα των παραγωγών, έναντι εκείνων που μπορούν να εκμεταλλευτούν προνομιακά το κλειστό δίκτυο. Το κλειστό δίκτυο χαρακτηρίστηκε από αρκετούς εκπροσώπους, ως το ‘μέλλον’ της άρδευσης και ως η μοναδική λύση για την αποτροπή των φαινομένων της λειψυδρίας και της κατασπατάλησης του νερού. Τα κλειστά δίκτυα παρουσιάστηκαν ως ‘πολιτισμένα δίκτυα’ για την πρακτικότητα και την εξοικονόμηση που προσφέρουν, ως ανταγωνιστικό πλεονέκτημα των αρδευτών. Η δυνατότητα επέκτασης της υποδομής του κλειστού δικτύου θα αποτελέσει σημαντικό παράγοντα εντατικοποίησης της καλλιέργειας, αλλά και την μείωση των ανισοτήτων ως προς το κόστος της άρδευσης με την περεταίρω επέκτασή του βάση του προγραμματισμένου έργου. Επίσης αναφέρθηκε από εκπροσώπους ότι η ισχύς ενός μοτερ (της γεώτρησης), είναι και σε άμεση εξάρτηση με την καλλιέργεια που επιτρέπει να ποτιστεί ή μάλλον είναι πιο παραγωγικό να ποτίσει. Η διαφοροποίηση στην ισχύς του μοτέρ μιας πομώνας, αφενός είναι καθοριστικός παράγοντας καθορισμού του κόστους της άρδευσης, μιας και είναι σε άμεση συσχέτιση με την κατανάλωση του ρεύματος, αλλά η ισχύς δύναται να καθορίσει και την επιλογή της καλλιέργειας. Για παράδειγμα η υψηλότερη ισχύ 120-150 βατ, μπορεί να αποβεί καταστρεπτική και είναι αποτρεπτική για καλλιέργεια βαμβακιού λόγω ευαλωτότητας του ανθού. Οι χρήστες των κλειστών δικτύων είναι ευνοημένοι από τους χρήστες των κλειστών δικτιών ή με γεωτρήσεις διότι έχουν νερό σε αφθονία και χωρίς περιορισμούς και φραγμούς. Οι ενδιαφερόμενοι αναφέρθηκαν στην σύγκριση αυτή παρουσιάζοντας και περίπτωσης ’κλοπής’ νερού από το κλειστό δίκτυο, με τη χρήση λαστίχων πολλών χιλιομέτρων. Η μεγάλη διαφοροποίηση στο κόστος αλλά και στη διαθεσιμότητα της άρδευσης οδήγησε κάποιους αρδευτές της περιοχής, στους οποίους αν και ήταν κοντά στο κλειστό δίκτυο, δεν είχε όμως επεκταθεί σε αυτούς, να απολαμβάνουν τα προνόμια του δικτύου με την χρήση λάστιχων, τα οποία συνδέαν στο κλειστό από απόσταση.
Αποσπασμα 1
“-μέσα στο κλειστό μπαίνει και αυτοί που είναι εντός δικτύου ας πούμε, άλλοι βάζαν λάστιχο εδώ και το βγάζαν 1000 μέτρα πιο πέρα
-Επειδή υπήρχε η έλλειψη παρακολούθησης εκμεταλλεύονταν το κλειστό για να μεταφέρουν το νερό σε περιοχές που δεν θα είχαν τρόπο να ποτιστούν;
– περνάει το δίκτυο σε αυτούς αλλά δεν περνάει κοντά. Απλώνει το λάστιχο και παίρνει νερό. Μπορώ να σου πω σε ορισμένες φορές είναι και αρκετά μακριά.”
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με εκπρόσωπο ΤΟΕΒ της ΠΕ Καρδίτσας)
Αποσπασμα 2
“άμα γίνει το κλειστό, είναι Πολιτισμός! Είναι πολιτισμός και εξοικονόμηση κατά 70-80% και στο οικονομικό κομμάτι θα πάρει αέρα όλος ο κόσμος. Ένας που ποτίζει τώρα στο κλειστό έχει 300 στρέμματα θα πληρώσει 3*7 =21, άρα 2.100 ευρώ με τα αντίστοιχα στρέμματα ένας στις γεωτρήσεις και ένας στο χωριό που είναι ακόμα χειρότερα γιατί, έχει όλο μεγάλα μοτέρ τα περισσότερα, λίαν επιεικώς θα σου πω 90 ευρώ το στρέμμα. ΛΙΑΝ ΕΠΙΕΙΚΩΣ, θα θέλει 21.000, μέσα σε δύο χρόνια ο αντίστοιχος παραγωγός θα τον έχει καπελώσει 40.000 ευρώ, μπορείς να κάνεις μια αγορά, έναν εξοπλισμό, παίρνω ένα μεταχειρισμένο ελαφρός.”
(Απόσπασμα συνέντευξης με εκπρόσωπο ΤΟΕΒ της ΠΕ Καρδίτσας)
